The Riots and the Radicals . . . . **Tom Kahn**

DISSENT

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COMMENTS AND OPINIONS

Tom Kahn

The Riots and the Radicals

Within this issue we print some comments on the riots by Bayard Rustin, comments with which I agree. We shall also have before long the inevitable, and hopefully useful, studies by the sociologists. While awaiting their reports, however, we need not delay moving toward certain political conclusions, some of which bear heavily on the prospects of the democratic Left in America. These are what I want to consider in the following observations:

1) During the next period the political atmosphere in the country will be largely determined by the intensity and duration of three "backlashes." First is the "white backlash" as conventionally defined—i.e., a shift to the Right among people at the Center and Right. Second is the "black backlash," by which I mean a revolt within the Negro community against destructive rioting. Third is the "liberal backlash." The first two I will discuss later.

The "liberal backlash" is a so-far barely noticeable shift to the Right among some white liberals and radicals who, more out of habit than intent to deceive, continue nevertheless to express their frustration in radical terms. They have been induced by the riots to question the most basic premises of race relations: can we really have integration or should we settle instead for a kind of coexistence? Is equality necessarily tied to integration? Are not Negroes in some sense a separate nation after all? Aren't the Negroes' *real* problems—family instability, demoralization, alienation, pathology—beyond the reach of "mere" social and economic programs?

Answers are not firmly given; they are speculated upon, toyed with, discarded and taken up again. What they disclose is a flirtation with separatism that until recently would have been unthinkable among liberals and radicals.

In an earlier DISSENT Paul Feldman suggested that "Black Power" (as distinct from black power) had a way of letting white liberals off the hook. It won the endorsements of Barry Goldwater and William F. Buckley, who recognized that its emphasis on self-help, local initiative, and race pride was a rehash of Booker T. Washington's prescriptions; seemingly an echo from the American frontier; and a "lesson" handed down by Irish, Italian, and Jewish immigrants. It did not challenge the federal government to tear down the slum ghettos and end *de facto* school segregation; it accepted both as *given* and demanded only that they be controlled by black people.

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The liberal attraction to "Black Power" is somewhat different. While the conservatives do not *want* the huge federal programs required to abolish the slums, the liberals despair of *getting* them. The conservatives are at least defending a principled position, the status quo. The liberals who flirt with "Black Power" are willy-nilly accommodating to that status quo; they may think they are embracing a new Negro militancy, but *in reality they are accepting, however reluctantly, the givenness of the segregated society.* Their sentiments are akin to Abraham Lincoln's following the Civil War: believing that Negroes should be free but despairing of their ever finding a place in American institutions, he saw no alternative but their emigration to Africa.

No liberals or radicals have so far publicly proposed this solution to the "race problem." But the Left fascination with the cry for black control of the ghettos is a rough modern equivalent. The self-governing colonies would be not in Africa but imbedded in the center cities. (One wonders who would govern Negroes who have wandered into the suburbs.) Black people would then acquire possession of their own slum tenements, control their own crowded and segregated schools, do battle with their very own rats. They would still receive the crumbs—no, the garbage—from the table of this affluent society, but they would take title to that garbage.

In fairness, not all liberals leaning toward "Black Power" fail to see beyond the struggle for independence to the problems of economic development. But even the more sophisticated create confusion by counterposing false alternatives. In a recent column (August 2) Joseph Alsop identifies himself with "those who want to put the practical horse—the horse of radical improvement of Negro housing, education and job opportunities *inside the ghettos*—ahead of the moral cart, which is desegregation and integration." He goes on to quote Columbia sociologists Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward as saying: "The Achilles' heel of housing programs has been precisely our insistence that better housing for the [Negro] poor [should] be achieved by residential desegregation. . . . Reformers must [instead] apply what political pressure they have to secure relief in the ghetto itself."

I submit that this is nonsense, and dangerous nonsense at that. The failure of our housing programs is that we are not building enough housing for low-income groups, not that we are hell-bent on integrating. If such housing were being built, the logical place to start putting it would be where the need is greatest—in the ghettos. What could be more futile and misleading than to engage now in a debate over the location of housing that doesn't exist? What could be more absurd, in a society where segregation is increasing, than to argue that the bar to Negro progress is an excessive zeal for integration? Before we get trapped in this Alice-in-Wonderland discussion, let's get out. It makes more sense to recognize that we have achieved neither uplift nor integration than to blame the absence of one on preoccupation with the other. When we stop inventing new grand-scale theories to explain simple political failure we may come closer to understanding the causes of defeat.

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Meanwhile, since we are back to first principles, let me state my own conviction that social equality and integration are inseparable—not simply as ideals but as sociological realities. If the socio-economic status of the Negro were to become equal to that of the white, the class basis for his separation would disappear. If the slums are rebuilt, the ghettos cannot last long. (That fairly affluent Negro ghettos exist in some suburbs is not to the point; segregation and discrimination will victimize *all* Negroes, including the well-to-do, until the vast majority of Negroes have achieved at least an approach to socio-economic equality as a fact of life.) But let us suppose that I am wrong in my "old-fashioned" and here necessarily over-simplified belief that integration will follow on the heels of equality more or less automatically and rapidly (over, say, one or two generations). Then, the feeling on the part of Negroes that despite their equality in every measurable degree they are still separated, now on grounds of color alone, will intensify racial frustration. This possibility need not greatly concern Rap Brown; but it must be squarely faced by those whose proposals for upgrading the ghettos while abandoning integration are advanced as . . . antidotes to rioting.

In truth, the integration issue in this context is a straw man. If the goal is to rebuild the ghetto, population density must be reduced. New housing must be built outside the ghettos as well as within. Would Messrs. Alsop, Piven, and Cloward propose that new housing sites be chosen and standards for admission be drawn so as to avoid integration? Are they suggesting—one assumes they are not—that the moment white middle-class suburbanites protest the building of low-income housing in their neighborhood the plan be immediately withdrawn so as not to make integration an issue? Are they saying that rent subsidy programs to support low-income Negro families in middle-income housing should be opposed or ignored because these raise the issue of integration? But then at what point does this voguish pooh-poohing of integration mean anything?

At practically no point in the making of concrete policies; but it does reflect a mood among some people on the Left, a mood intensified by the riots. White liberals feel hurt by the riots, almost personally; they are stunned and pained by the depth of anti-white hostility expressed by "extremist" speakers, by the epithet "honkey." Unlike most whites, however, the liberal cannot justify his alienation, his separateness from the Negro community with anger. But sharing in various notions of "Black Power" enables him to invest these feelings with virtues they do not possess. "I am not wanted by the Negro, and do not deserve to be. Let *them* do what *they* want, unburdened by my advice—so irrelevant in the past." Guilt is assuaged and, simultaneously, withdrawal justified. And meanwhile—unwittingly, with the best of intentions—this kind of liberal or radical verges on the cop-out now sweeping American society: the cop-out of saying, "give the Negroes lots of help, social economic and psychiatric, but let them stay in their own limits."

2) Who are *they*? What do *they* want?

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In the August 13 *New York Times Magazine* Bayard Rustin referred to a trend toward "mystification" among some white liberals and radicals, and I should like to offer some elaborations of my own.

For some years now Rustin and other Negro leaders have warned that the problems in the ghettos were getting worse, that unless substantial progress was made in employment, housing, and education, violence might well erupt. Substantial progress was not made; violence erupted.

Now one would suppose that fulfillment of a prophecy draws attention to its premises, that in this case attention would be drawn to the ur-

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Bayard Rustin

American Negroes— On the Verge of Revolution?

Is it correct to speak of "race rebellion," or "Negro rebellion"? Are America's Negroes on the verge of revolution? More than one newspaper and television commentator has already begun to draw comparisons between the ghetto uprisings and the French, Russian, Algerian, Irish, and Black African independence revolutions. Some Black Power advocates have proclaimed the beginnings of guerrilla warfare and see the urban Negro as a counterpart to the Vietcong. . . .

The reality is that the revolutionary rhetoric now employed by some young Negro militants cannot create the preconditions for successful, or even authentic, revolution. The independence movements in colonial territories provide no model for the simple reason that American Negroes can have no geographical focus for nationalist sentiment.

Moreover, American Negroes do not constitute a popular majority struggling against a relatively small white colonial ruling group —the ideal condition for guerrilla warfare. Whatever separatist impulses exist among American Negroes cannot find appropriate models in the colonial world.

If independence revolutions are no model, what of social revolutions? This is a more interesting subject because the phrase "social revolution" has been widely used by the civil-rights and liberal movements generally. But in this sense—and the sense in which I have been using it for 30 years—the term designates fundamental changes in social and economic class relations resulting from mass political action. Such action would be democratic. That is, it would aim to create a new majority coalition capable of exercising political power in the interest of new social policies. By definition the coalition has to be interracial.

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gency of providing full employment at decent wages, of constructing millions of new housing units, of increasing investment in quality integrated education. And in fact, among significant political groupings in the country (the mayors, for example) these needs are being voiced increasingly. Yet, again to some liberals and radicals, this list of social priorities has become tedious, commonplace, *unoriginal*—as if the constant recitation of a need were synonymous with implementation. The reaction of this political type to the massive programs of, say, the Freedom Budget is that they must already have been enacted by the New Deal. Thus proposals that have never

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As a minority, Negroes by themselves cannot bring about such a social revolution. They can participate in it as a powerful and stimulating force; or they can provoke a counterrevolution. In either case the decisive factor will be the political direction in which the majority will move.

Numbers is not the only issue. Also important is the class content of revolt. At least in the French and Russian revolutions revolutionary leaders and parties sought to mobilize fairly definable and cohesive socio-economic classes—workers, peasants, the middle classes—classes which, though oppressed or aggrieved, were part of the society they sought to transform. Upon what classes do the advocates of rioting, the voices of apocalypse, base their revolutionary perspective? This is another way of posing the question I left hanging earlier: Who is rioting?

Daniel Patrick Moynihan is correct in locating the riots in the "lower class" or, in the words of another controversial man, Karl Marx, in the *"lumpenproletariat"* or "slum proletariat." Lower class does not mean working class; the distinction is often overlooked in a middle-class culture that tends to lump the two together.

The distinction is important. The working class is employed. It has a relation to the production of goods and services, much of it is organized in unions. It enjoys a measure of cohesion, discipline and stability lacking in the lower class. The latter is unemployed or marginally employed. It is relatively unorganized, incohesive, unstable. It contains the petty criminal and antisocial elements. Above all, unlike the working class, it lacks the sense of a stake in society. When the slum proletariat is black, its alienation is even greater.

From the revolutionist point of view, the question is not whether steps could be taken to strengthen organization among the *lumpenproletariat* but whether that group could be a central agent of social transformation. Generally, the answer has been no.

From "A Way Out of the Exploding Ghetto,"
The New York Times Magazine, August 13, 1967

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been effected are assumed to have failed, or at least to be badly dated. And so we turn to notions that are "novel," even if they are also more misty and vague.

Among these is the view that the Negro suffers most from "powerlessness," from lack of identity and community, and that the answers to these afflictions lie in social experiments in decentralization and, yes, participatory democracy. We must develop new political arrangements wherein Negroes can have *a sense* of controlling their own destiny.

I do not mean to ridicule or simply to denounce this line of thought. Negroes *are* victimized by bureaucracies, brutalized by the police, evicted by urban renewal boards; they *are* pushed around. But let us return the word "powerlessness" to whatever underdeveloped science gave it to us. It is now about as useful as the overworked "Establishment." It does not advance analysis; it mystifies. Intellectuals, because they see themselves as separated from power, are too eager to apply that perception, unmodified, to the socially oppressed. Power to the

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Bayard Rustin

The Tragedy of Negro Youth

The black slum proletariat has been growing in numbers and density. As agricultural mechanization and other factors continue pushing Negroes out of the South, the urban ghettos expand each year by half a million; only 40,000 Negroes annually find their way into the suburbs. This trend has not been affected at all by any anti-poverty or Great Society programs.

When the migration of Negroes to Northern and Western cities was at its height during World War II, factory jobs were available at decent wages. With the advent of advanced technology eliminating many semiskilled and unskilled jobs, and with the movement of plants from the central cities to the suburbs (New York lost 200,000 factory jobs in a decade), urban Negroes suffered rising joblessness or employment in low paying service jobs. . . .

Within the slum proletariat, youth constitutes a subdivision of increasing economic and political importance. While according to the official unemployment rates the joblessness gap between Negro and white men over 20 has been narrowing since 1961, even this official rate records a widening of the gap between Negro and white teen-agers since 1957. Right now [the national Negro teen-age unemployment rate] is 25 per cent, but for 16–19-year-olds in the 10 slum areas surveyed, it is over 38 per cent! Moreover, this rate was unaffected by the downward trends of the nation's overall unemployment rate late last year. For white teen-agers, on the other hand, unemployment since 1957 never went beyond 15 per cent and is now at 10 per cent.

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intellectual may mean having his views heeded; power to the socially oppressed means primarily having the conditions of their lives changed. The various brands of "Localism" now in vogue, "Black Power" being one, may well give people a heightened sense of participation, of being heard—and that's fine, up to a point. But if our goal is to go beyond class therapy to institutional change, local efforts at autonomy can take on substance only if infused with national resources.

The Negroes of Harlem are more interested in having decent jobs than in serving on poverty boards. Who wouldn't be? They are more interested in decent homes than in "controlling the ghetto." A poll by John F. Kraft, Inc., reprinted in *The New York Times* of January 15, found *84 per cent of Harlem's residents would prefer to see the slums torn down rather than rehabilitated;* only 17 per cent said they would like to stay in Harlem if they had to move. (Incidentally, 48 per cent said they would like to move into a public housing project.) They are more interested in quality schools for their kids than they are in the col-

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Nor is there any evidence that Negro teen-agers do not want to work. Whenever job programs have been announced, they have turned out in large numbers, only to find that the jobs weren't there. In Oakland, a "Job Fair" attracted 15,000 people; only 250 were placed. In Philadelphia, 6,000 were on a waiting list for a training program.

What Negro teen-agers are not inclined to accept are dead end jobs that pay little and promise no advancement or training. Many would prefer to live by their wits as hustlers or petty racketeers, their version of the self-employed businessman or salesman. That their pursuit of this distorted entrepreneurial ideal only mires them deeper in the slum proletariat is not the point.

Nor can they really be blamed by a society which has itself produced these yearnings, reveled in its affluence, encouraged the consumption of trivia, and proclaimed the coming of computerized utopias. The middle classes may nostalgically extol their immigrant parents' fortitude and perseverance in manual labor, but they do not steer their own children toward the garment district. They show them the push buttons, not the push cart. Might they not then show some compassionate understanding of black youngsters who dream of better things even when crippled by poor education, broken families and the disabilities bred by slum life. If it is true that a Negro boy is nobody unless he owns alligator shoes and an alpaca sweater, who created things even when crippled by poor education, broken families, and the sale of these commodities, and who advertised them? And who is victimized?

From "A Way Out of the Exploding Ghetto,"
The New York Times Magazine, August 13, 1967

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or of the principle or of the student body. The means for satisfying these needs are at hand; compelling their use is the immediate and crucial task facing the democratic Left.

3) The riots have brought "the Movement" to the end of innocence. It is no longer the monolithic moral crusade it once seemed, a marching phalanx holding aloft Christian nonviolence and the Constitution, defending violated American ideals, saving the national soul. This image was always superficial and naive; now it has vanished.

And with its disappearance, the movement has come to maturity. Increasingly we think of it, not as the civil rights movement, but as the Negro movement. If that seems a narrower label, it is in fact much broader. The NAACP was not named the National Association for the Advancement of Certain Principles; it sought the advancement of a certain class of people—as the labor movement seeks the advancement of workers, not of certain wages and hours. We now see the Negro movement as a full-fledged social force, pursuing race class interests, and involved in decisive political and economic issues.

A movement for certain principles can disagree only over tactics and strategy. A movement for the advancement of a class of people will contain disagreements over principles as well. A labor movement may contain Communists, Socialists, anarchists, liberals, even Fascists—all advancing their own programs for the movement, their own interpretations of what its principles and goals should be. Some of these interpretations are incompatible with the necessities of trade union development. They are either defeated in internal struggle or, if they prevail, they reveal their character by wrecking the union.

The Negro movement has come to a comparable stage. It contains a wing —associated with Stokely Carmichael and Rap Brown—which, by identifying the movement with the riots and advocating a Castroite insurrectionary violence, seeks to change the fundamental character of the movement. Small groups have emerged in the Negro community with conspiratorial fantasies. In addition, anyone who has seen some of the armed, uniformed young Negro men who hurl anti-Semitic epithets and who are imbued with authoritarian discipline cannot but feel himself in the presence of a fascistic element.

The mainstream tendencies in the movement, among whom there are also differences, are well known. The point is that a a redefining of goals is inevitable and absolutely imperative. The facade of unity broken, internal debate should no longer be muted behind closed doors; it should be broadcast through the streets, where disastrous history is now being made. The lines must be drawn.

They must be drawn in the radical movement, too. Those who, out of sentiment for the old SNCC or nostalgia for their own youth, pinned some part of their hopes for social reconstruction on the Stokely Carmichaels and the Rap Browns must now surely know that their road leads to a dead-end. It is not the reactionaries who burn up in their apocalypse. It is Negroes—their bodies, their homes, their hopes for change.

(When Stokely, Rap, and I were at

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Howard, we arranged a debate between Bayard Rustin and Malcolm X. Rustin repeated to Malcolm what he had said to Robert Williams some years before: that the Negro leader who advocates violence will end up in one of three ways—assassinated, imprisoned, or in exile. The prediction seemed melodramatic to me at the time.)

Meanwhile, a reaction against the rioting and those advocating it is building up within the Negro community. In Detroit the Negro press and prominent leaders criticized the police for not acting swiftly enough. Negro mothers and housewives will become more outspoken. Increasingly people who in 1965 or '66 might have felt the riots were giving the country a needed shaking-up are beginning to feel that the damage far outweighs the alleged benefits. I believe this feeling will grow as the political repercussions of the rioting become clearer with the approach of the 1968 elections. Rap Brown and Stokely Carmichael may continue to be heroes to some uprooted militant youth, and their capacity to inflame already smoldering situations may be undiminished. But they will not be able to organize the constituency they seek to lead, and within the larger Negro community they will become more isolated.

My two remaining observations concern the posture of the radical movement in these times.

4) Let us, for God's sake, stop using the Negro as a political football—more accurately as a footnote to theses on Vietnam. How many more cities must explode before certain friends in the peace movement will abandon their deprecation of every economic proposal that does not simultaneously call for an end to the war in Vietnam? When will they end their haughty insistence that nothing can be done on the domestic front unless everybody pulls out of the domestic reform movements to join the peace movement? At a time when cities are in flames and the Negro people cry out for relief, what is particularly moral about Dr. Spock's assertion that the riots are "inevitable" so long as the war continues? And what is so high-minded about Senator Fulbright—who has consistently voted *against* civil rights, minimum wages, medical care, etc.—when he now declares that we must divert Vietnam war-spending to help Negroes and our cities?

5) There is no way to discuss the riots without a word about the 1968 elections. They are of enormous importance; they may see a right-wing victory of considerable proportions.

In the 1966 Congressional elections, which marked the beginning of the right-wing political resurgence, the danger was minimized by some radicals who saw Republican victories as a positive sign of dissatisfactions with Johnson's Vietnam policies. But despite the vaunted "liberalism" of some Republican victors, the result of the election was to re-establish the Dixiecrat-Republican coalition, which proceded to wreck rent subsidies, slash "Model Cities," cut back the war on poverty and aid to education, and even defeat the Administration's anti-rat bill. The latter action symbolizes what the right wing really feels and wants. Its victory in 1968 would bring neither peace in Vietnam nor reconstruction of our cities.

On the other hand, there are still

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potent forces for social progress. There are millions of Negroes, not in the least represented by Stokeley Carmichael, who want substantial change, not token protest however shrill. They want victories, as their voting patterns in the South have shown. There is the labor movement, determined to cash in on management's mushrooming profits; this year will see a record number of strikes. There are the progressive religious forces, more deeply involved in social and political problems today, including opposition to the Vietnam War, than at any time in memory. And of course there are various independent liberal forces in the academic and professional worlds.

What does the radical movement have to say to these people in 1968? Are we thinking about this or waiting until it is too late to have an effect on anybody? Admittedly, the problems we face are enormously difficult, and I do not propose to lay down a "line" here, if only because some of the necessary information is not yet at hand. My own tentative bias is to urge liberal-left emphasis on Congressional elections.

But one thing seems clear: the events of this summer have destroyed the idea of a one-issue politics. It is no more possible to take an electoral stand based solely on the Vietnam issue than to take such a stand based solely on the issue of riots in the cities. Both involve a kind of parochialism, and the problem we will face is to find ways of linking constructive proposals in regard to the two or, in some extreme cases, weighing one against the other. This lesson applies, even if in different ways, to elements in both the peace and the trade union movements.

The proposal for a "peace candidacy," even apart from the nature and limitations of the forces now inclined to support this proposal, must be examined with the greatest sobriety in terms of its likely consequences in American politics: would it signify giving tacit aid to Republicans whose major campaign stress is likely to be "order in the cities" (and all the reactionary implications behind that stress)? To me it appear clear that it would.

What seems terribly ominous about the forthcoming election is the prospect of a "polarization" which would satisfy William Buckley, on the one hand, and Stokely Carmichael, on the other. Such a polarization would occur around two issues: heat up the Vietnam War, shoot down the Negroes in the streets. Such a confrontation could only encourage, on both sides, the hell-bent forces who wish to plunge this country into repression and "insurrection." And as between repression and "insurrection," it takes no great wisdom to realize that repression would triumph overwhelmingly.

It is time to be militant and time to be sober. Any proposal in respect to the urban ghettos which does not center upon insisting that the United States government fulfill its economic and social responsibilities to the Negro masses is a cop-out—no matter how militantly phrased. Those forces which only a few years ago did lead to victory by and for the Negroes, even if victory insufficient in quantity and kind, must be reassembled for a struggle to fulfill the promise made in the name of the Great Society. Otherwise we shall *all* suffer consequences too terrible to contemplate.

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WAR, RIOT, AND PRIORITIES

A Statement by Ten Congressmen

Our nation is in crisis. We fight a stalemated war 10,000 miles from our shores; there is no immediate prospect for peace. We face despair and disruption in our cities; there is no immediate prospect for solution. . . .

The deprived, whether in Vietnam or the ghetto, cry out for redress and independence; but their call is not understood. And so their violent rebellion is attributed to external conspiracy, to scapegoats. Thus, even in desperate violence, the oppressed are ignored. America, then, is threatened not only by overwhelming problems, but by the dangerous consequences of our response, a cycle of vigilantism and repression, in domestic and foreign policy alike, which may ultimately tear apart the soul of this nation. . . .

We seek, therefore, a national movement for social reconstruction to help reverse the dangerous drift to reaction currently threatening our public life.

Such a project must acknowledge the great lesson of summer 1967; *the crisis of our ghettos is more urgent than the war in Vietnam.* To bring real and lasting peace to our cities, we must end the war in Asia.

First, then, the war must end . . . now. America must reject the present course of escalation and instead offer our adversaries a compromise peace, which accepts a coalition government for South Vietnam, and the eventual withdrawal of American troops.

Second, we must begin, in effect, a Marshall Plan for the cities, a redistribution of American affluence and a new plan for the full participation of this nation's deprived in reconstructing every ghetto in every city of this country. Our public resources must be stretched to their limits, and supplemented by funds currently spent for War. And from the affluent and the comfortable of this nation—an enormous and unprecedented majority—we must require personal commitment and material sacrifice.

This country, then, must turn about. It must limit its unwarranted preoccupation with other continents—and face itself. This historic task is no longer a matter of simple choice. At stake is our self-preservation. . . .

PHILLIP BURTON (Calif.)
JOHN CONYERS, JR. (Mich.)
JOHN G. DOW (N.Y.)
DON EDWARDS (Calif.)
AUGUSTUS F. HAWKINS (Calif.)
HENRY HELSTOSKI (N.J.)
ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER (Wis.)
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL (N.Y.)
EDWARD R. ROYBAL (Calif.)
WILLIAM F. RYAN (N.Y.)

August 1, 1967

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Walter Laqueur

REFLECTIONS ON THE THIRD WORLD

Cassandra, daughter of King Priam of Troy, (we are told) had her ears licked by a serpent while asleep and so got her prophetic gift: forever after she was fated to foretell the evil results of successive events. All civilizations have had their Cassandras, but probably none more than twentieth-century Europe. A symposium in *Le Figaro* in 1898 ("What's wrong with France?") reads uncannily like a *Partisan Review* symposium 70 years later. Visions of doom have been fashionable for a long time, and their prophets sometimes address large audiences. Brahmaism taught that the world was in decline, Horace and Livius are full of dire predictions following the general relaxation of Roman discipline, and every self-respecting writer in the tenth century began his chronology: "While the world is approaching its end. . . ." Henry and Brooks Adams wrote long ago about the decline of Western man and Baudelaire hated Paris (*"centre et rayonnement de bêtise universelle"*) as much as do Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir. Between the two world wars fascism proclaimed the impending demise of the senescent West—and the rise of the young nations.

Since World War II prophecies of doom have come from many quarters and on the basis of different political convictions. Usually, these are frightening visions. Arnold Toynbee regards Western civilization as an apostasy of Christian civilization, the fatal plunge from faith into the barren grounds of secularism. Western civilization, he says, exhibits authentic symptoms of breakdown and disintegration, and the only thing that can save it is a fresh religious revolution.

Such reasoning is not shared by many. Toynbee has been chided by (among others) Geoffrey Barraclough, a British historian now a resident of California; Barraclough criticized the "breath-taking oblivion to the enormous genocide involved," as well as the lack of accuracy and consistency in Toynbee's historical judgment, the wishful thinking and dubious speculations in his reflections on the prospects of Western civilization.

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Yet Barraclough himself is the author of a recent introduction to contemporary history which could, with equal justice, be entitled "New Light on the Decline of the West." In one of his essays he wrote that in 1943, when Stalingrad was relieved by the Russians, he suddenly awoke to the fact that he had mis-spent his life dealing with such recondite subjects as the machinery of papal chancelleries in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Such an awakening to the winds of change by people educated in an Eurocentric tradition should only be welcomed.

That Europe is no longer the center of the world is hardly in dispute any more. The realization of this fact, however, came too abruptly for some who were led to believe that Europe was finished altogether. What did Hitler and even Stalin matter in a world whose history was only to begin? For how could one be blind to the wave of the future personified by Mao and Sukarno, by Nasser, Nkrumah and Ben Bella? Politically and economically the European age was over, and with it the predominance of European values. Culturally too Europe had had its day; new peoples were arising, new energies seeking expression, a definite view of life set in conscious counterpoint to the weary disillusion of Europe. These, at any rate, were Professor Barraclough's conclusions, and he was not alone in holding them.

Toynbee rejects Western civilization on the basis of religious-mystic convictions. Barraclough, on the other hand, is a radical, a left-wing liberal. The politics of Frantz Fanon are different again; his rejection of Europe is total.[1] *The Wretched of the Earth* ends with a passionate appeal to all the downtrodden in the ex-colonial world to leave this Europe where they are never done talking of man yet murder men everywhere they find them:

> The European game has finally ended. . . . We, today, can do everything so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. . . . Europe now lives at such a mad, reckless pace that she has shaken off all guidance and all reason and she is running headlong into the abyss. . . . When I search for Man in the technique and the style of Europe, I see only a succession of

[1] "Europe" for Fanon includes the United States: "Two centuries ago a former European colony decided to catch up with Europe. It succeeded so well that the United States of America became a monster, in which the taints, the sickness, the inhumanity of Europe have grown to appalling dimensions." Professor Toynbee would disapprove of the language but likewise regards the United States as an extension of Europe. Barraclough, on the other hand, seems to consider America a case of *sui generis*: the positive European heritage (he wrote) has become embedded in both the Russian and American civilizations.

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> negations of man and an avalanche of murders. . . . What we want to do is to go forward all the time, night and day in the company of all men.

The Third World is here assigned the task of starting a new History of Man. The number of these prophets of doom is legion, and they have all seen the writing on the wall: Europe is a spent force, America incurably ill. But despondency is a mood, not a way of life. If the old idols have been shattered, men need new ideals and new gods. For two previous generations Soviet Communism was the great beacon illuminating the darkness, showing the road to a better future. But Russia's attraction in the West as the standard-bearer of progress has diminished in the same measure as its economy has advanced. Some former admirers now believe that the price that has been paid for this progress was too high; others find the Soviet preoccupation with production and things material uncongenial, the emergence of a new autocracy and all-powerful bureaucracy distasteful. Others yet, while not denying the "progressive" character of the Soviet regime if seen against the background of Russian history, doubt the validity of the Russian lesson for the rest of mankind.

During the last decade more and more of the sympathetic attention formerly devoted to Russia has been transferred to China and Indonesia, to Ghana and Guinea, to Algeria and Egypt, and to some other countries attempting against heavy odds to carry out national revolutions on the basis of Marxist-Leninist concepts differently interpreted and applied. It is now believed that only in these countries (to quote Frantz Fanon) is there the opportunity "to do everything," to advance a step further beyond Europe, to learn from the mistakes committed elsewhere, "to bring the problem of mankind to an infinitely higher plane." These regimes have been in existence only for a comparatively brief period, but long enough to draw an interim and tentative balance. It is not too early to ask whether their progress has been encouraging, and to what extent others could benefit from the example set by them.

A Balance Sheet on Maoist China

What lesson can the outside world draw from recent events in China? China has become strongly isolationist, almost entirely preoccupied with internal affairs; it has virtually cut itself off from the outside world. As these lines are written the cultural revolution is still in progress. There is little doubt that some of the antics of this extraordinary movement will be revoked in coming months and years: this is the dialectic of history. But it has happened, it cannot be explained

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away. It took place, not at the beginning of the Communist era, not during a civil war, but 18 years after the establishment of Communist China. It came as a surprise not only to the friends of Communist China, it surpassed the expectations of its worst enemies. No Sinologist expected such outbursts; area experts, however critical of their subject of study, are motivated by a certain ambivalence. In this case they clearly exaggerated not merely the depth of Mao Tse-tung's thought but the general intellectual level of Communist China. They overrated (it now appears) the element of rationality in Communist China—and they underrated the impact of such elements as obscurantism, nationalist passions, the struggle for power between various factions; they were aware that China was economically backward, but they underrated the extent of *cultural* backwardness in twentieth-century China. They read into official pronouncements and speeches hidden meanings and a sophistication that never existed.

Inasmuch as this second Maoist revolution has a rational purpose (and it may be wise not to overrate this aspect), it aims at the perpetuation of the revolutionary fervor of both the Chinese elite and the masses. This aim can only be achieved by frequent changes in the leadership on all levels, by combating specialization and "bureaucratization," and by preventing the emergence of a "new class," the technical intelligentsia. There is a certain logic in these aspirations. Equality, after all, is one of the basic socialist aims even though historically the most neglected. But the inner contradictions of Maoism are glaring, and, in all probability, self-defeating. From a Marxist point of view it is a major heresy; there are, of course, Marxist elements in Maoism, but the "utopian" element, not to mention the nationalist motivation, seems to be stronger. The idea that Chinese man (equipped with Mao's thought) can overcome all obstacles, achieve all aims is an attractive one, but what has it in common with a political system concerned with the study of the laws governing historical and social change?

Mao's second revolution is a romantic-idealist movement, a primitive reaction against the trends inherent in a modern industrial society that make it more and more difficult to stick to the way of life established in the caves of Yenan during the 1930's. It is interesting that such a movement finds support, temporarily at any rate, among the very young in China. But it conflicts with another basic aim of the Chinese revolution—to modernize the country, to increase industrial and agricultural production, to raise the standard of living. Constant change is the one way to defeat the danger of revisionism in China, whereas the opposite—stability—is the prerequisite for the economic development of the coun-

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try. Such a movement is unlikely to be more successful than the Luddites; it either adjusts itself to historical forces stronger than itself or it is swept away. There are no precedents for Mao's second revolution, but it can be said on the basis of much historical experience in other parts of the world that movements with a fervent belief in the omnipotence of a great leader and that "everything is possible" often end by pursuing policies very different from, sometimes diametrically opposed to, those they originally set out to accomplish.

The cultural revolution may be a temporary aberration, a setback, from which the country will eventually recover. What has been the balance sheet if we ignore the upheaval and the confusion of 1966–67? On the credit side there is the fact that China is united, that the country received a great national uplift after 1949, that there are few unemployed, that China has produced the bomb. In foreign affairs China has been less successful—perhaps it does not bother; why should a country of 700 million be unduly worried about the opinions and susceptibilities of others? Its foreign policy has been clumsy and arrogant. It has lost ground in the battle for influence in the Communist camp. It has antagonized most of its well-wishers in Asia and Africa, despite the great sympathy for China that originally existed and the "objectively revolutionary situations" in many sections of the Third World. China's promises to give aid and its subsequent default have antagonized even such a well-disposed regime as Castro's. The antics of the "cultural revolutionaries" have made China the butt of ridicule almost everywhere outside Tirana.

What is the internal balance sheet? During the 50's there was very considerable progress. The great leap forward ended in a fiasco; about seven years were needed to recover. Broadly speaking, Chinese industry and agriculture are only slightly ahead of where they were eight or nine years ago. These estimates do not take into account the effects of the "cultural revolution," the extent of which cannot be assessed for some time to come. Since the population continues to grow at a rapid rate, the standard of living is now no higher than it was 10 years ago. Real earnings in industry and agriculture may have slightly declined since 1958. Chinese industry can only expand on the basis of "primitive accumulation." But agriculture during the next five years will hardly increase at a faster rate than the population. Where will the industrial investment come from? Mao's little red book may be a source of spiritual comfort to many Chinese, but it does not offer an answer to the very basic questions facing the regime. Achievements in nuclear weaponry

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and the building of missiles are impressive but not matched by similar development in the national economy.

A country of the magnitude of China will always remain a very important factor in world politics, which no one will be able to ignore. The Chinese are patriotic and exceedingly hard working; perhaps they will be able to overcome the present convulsions in a comparatively short period. Given moderately favorable conditions, the Chinese will continue to make headway. But there is no indication at present that it will serve in the forseeable future as a model to anyone outside China, except perhaps by the industry and the dedication of its inhabitants and other such features of national character that antedate 1949.

The Bizarre Policies of Sukarno's Indonesia

If we ignore for a moment the "cultural revolution," China has held its own during the last decade. Not so Indonesia. "Is there anything real in Sukarno's Indonesia?" one observer asked shortly before the coup—and the counter coup of 1966. And he provided this answer: "This huge and heavily armed country full of sound and fury and decay ceased years ago to belong to the world of today." The combination of verbal extremism in foreign affairs, political mysticism, and utter incompetence in domestic affairs which was so typical of Sukarno's rule, created a state of permanent chaos.

Indonesia received considerable aid from both Russia and the West —the foreign debt is now $2.7 billion. But foreign aid made no difference in respect to the economic situation; funds were spent on military equipment and prestige buildings the country could ill afford. There was no serious attempt to tackle industrial development or the country's very basic problem: agricultural resettlement. So far, 80 per cent of all Indonesians make their living from agriculture, but 60 per cent of the population is mainly concentrated on the land area of Java. A land redistribution scheme in Java and Madura was passed in 1960, but it provided land for less than 10 per cent of the landless and moreover was inefficiently applied. A real resettlement program would involve the removal of substantial sections from Java to Sumatra and Borneo. But the present resettlement rate is considerably lower than the normal population increase in Java. Inflation under Sukarno assumed fantastic proportions, the price of rice, for instance, going up six-fold within a few months in 1965.

Meanwhile "Indonesian socialism" was propagated. But beneath its veneer of revolutionary activism (to quote a close observer of the Indonesian scene) there was a deeply conservative policy idealizing a

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regression toward a natural economy and the social structure of the Javanese village. Basically, Sukarno was far more interested in foreign affairs, where successes (New Guinea!) were after all possible—very much in contrast to the domestic front. From Mussolini he adopted the principle of living dangerously (*tahun vivere pericoloso*). But in Italy the fascist bombast was spread by a regime that, however abominable, somehow functioned. In Indonesia these were just words that had no relation to reality.

Sukarno's personal responsibility was grave; but the failure was also that of a whole elite. The problems inherited from Dutch colonialism were grave; objective conditions such as the demographic structure of the country were, to say the least, not propitious. But was the country bound to fail? There was no inevitable logic in the retreat from rationally coping with the situation to magical incantation. Demagogic politics, human frailty and incompetence caused the breakdown in 1965–66; not predestination. Indonesia, after all, is potentially a rich country. Around the turn of the century it had been the world's main exporter of raw materials. The preconditions for an economic take-off—for primitive accumulation—existed. Indonesia had once been known as the country of Bandung and *pancha sila*, its prestige in the early 50's had been high; within a decade it had become a textbook illustration of how to ruin a country.

The Bravado of Algeria's Ben Bella

In the 1950's and early 60's, a new political force emerged—the bloc of the national-revolutionary countries of Asia and Africa. In addition to Sukarno's Indonesia there was Nasser's Egypt, Nkrumah's Ghana, Sekou Touré's Guinea, Ben Bella's Algeria, united in the struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism. By 1967 this bloc had disintegrated, not merely as the result of outside pressure, but mostly as a consequence of inner weakness. There have been some instances of solidarity such as Sekou Touré's assistance to Nkrumah. Egypt, in a similar way, showed concern for Ben Bella after his overthrow. Attempts are still being made to reassemble the national revolutionary regimes; but since a chain cannot be stronger than its component links, these efforts are at present not very promising.

Among the leaders of the national revolutionary camp no one enjoyed greater prestige than Ben Bella. His country had won independence after a bitter and heroic seven-year struggle against France. The leaders of the FLN were a group of devoted revolutionaries, a "band of brothers." They had been trained in the French left-wing political school

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and had a clear anti-capitalist program. Surely, Algeria faced great structural economic and social difficulties which the protracted civil war had aggravated. But on the whole, the state of affairs was not without promise when Ben Bella took over; there existed, owing to French initiative, the basis of a modern industrial infrastructure. The return of almost a million French settlers to France and the seizure of their property enabled the Algerian government to engage almost immediately in a socialistic transformation of agriculture—not on a basis of poverty but on a relatively highly developed level. This was a chance which no other Asian or African country had. Not only were industries nationalized, but also the trade, small hotels, and cinemas. Self-management was introduced in both agriculture and industry.

A year sufficed to show that "socialism" could not be introduced by decree, that the revolutionary phraseology bore no relation to reality. Within a short time Ben Bella had deposed, exiled or imprisoned his erstwhile comrades and established one-man rule. Within an even shorter time an enormously inflated, grossly overpaid, and parasitic bureaucratic machine developed which for all practical purposes ran internal affairs. Production in most industries fell to about one-third or one-fourth of what it had been before independence. (Oil production was the one exception but this was entirely in French hands.) Output in agriculture fell, especially of wine which is so vital a product for export. (Ben Bella nevertheless declared that Algeria was an advanced country, that self-government in Algerian agriculture was more progressive than in Yugoslavia!) The net agricultural revenue which had been over 100 billion fr. in 1961 fell to 10 billion fr. in 1964.

At the same time Ben Bella decided (to quote his successor) simply for reasons of personal prestige to spend 15 billion fr. on the Afro-Asian conference that was to be held in Algiers in 1965. While pursuing political schemes far beyond the power of his country, both in the Maghreb and all over tropical Africa, his government neglected elementary social reforms at home; unemployment in Algeria was estimated between 60 per cent (Soviet sources) and 80 per cent (Western observers) of the total labor force. Again, it cannot be too strongly stressed that disaster was not inevitable. It was the result of theoretical confusion, of demagoguery and verbal radicalism, of a regime in which there was far more corruption than sincere will to build a new society. About Ben Bella's political orientation his successor has said: "For him socialism was only a means to avenge himself on those who opposed his personal power. One day he would proclaim Castro's type of socialism; the next day he

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would call himself an Algerian socialist; on other occasions a Muslim socialist. . . ."

Ben Bella set out to realize his aims in a particularly inept way. But the schemes themselves were unrealistic. A meaningful socialist transformation is impossible with an intelligentsia lacking the technical know-how as well as patriotic spirit and selfless devotion to serve the country. There were individuals, some of them known, others nameless and faceless, who were inspired by genuine idealism, even if their ideas all too often turned out to be mere chimeras whenever they collided with the harsh realities. But by and large it was an unedifying rush by a new elite to escape austerity, to establish itself as a privileged class, materially as well as politically.

What Hath Nkrumah Wrought?

The story of Nkrumah is not dissimilar to that of Ben Bella or Sukarno: a national leader of strong if confused left-wing convictions who acquired genuine respect and admiration in the struggle for the independence of his country, but whose subsequent rule had disastrous consequences. There is in some ways more ideological consistency in Nkrumah than in Sukarno or Ben Bella. He began as a Christian Socialist but moved steadily toward fairly orthodox Leninism (Marxism-Nkrumahism) adapted by him for African conditions.

Nkrumah's ideas have been developed in his two most recent books *Conscientism* (including an attempt to describe "positive action" in mathematical formulas) and *Neo Colonialism.* In these books Dr. Nkrumah comments at length on philosophical questions, on world affairs and world economics in general, and on the need for African unity. He hardly ever deals with his own country's problems; the Ghanaian stage clearly was not big enough for him.

Nkrumah was handed over by the British colonial administrators a country that, with all the ill effects of colonial rule, was the most developed in tropical Africa. It had the highest literacy rate by far. It received very substantial sterling holdings. But it also inherited an agriculture geared largely to monoculture and thus subject to the vagaries of world prices. (210.000 tons of cocoa in 1954–55 yielded Ghana about $240 million; 590,000 tons ten years later actually yielded Ghana less—about $210 million.)

Instead of lessening this dangerous dependence on cocoa crop exports by diversifying agricultural production, Nkrumah's government encouraged new planting which eventually led to flooding the world market. The state farms turned out badly. While 32 big state corpora-

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tions were established in industry, trade, and communications, all but one steadily lost substantial money; mining and the timber industry contracted. At the same time tremendous sums were spent on prestige projects such as Nkrumah statues, sports grounds, and conference halls for meetings with African heads of state.

Many millions were allocated to promoting Nkrumah's prestige abroad and the training of political agents to be used in other parts of Africa, in pursuance of ambitious schemes for a pan-African government. The cost of living rose by 30 per cent in one year, financial resources were dissipated: holdings of about $600 when the country attained independence in 1957 had turned into a debt of fantastic size when Nkrumah fell in February 1966.[2]

Not all this money had been squandered by mismanagement and corruption, though the famous golden bed of Mrs. Edusei was certainly not an exceptional case. Ghana had been the pace setter for tropical Africa before 1957, and it tried to live up to its reputation after independence. Nkrumah's government built many new roads and did much to develop education in Ghana. There was a real attempt to industrialize the country, and achievements such as the Volta dam scheme ought to be mentioned. The little fishing village Tema was transformed into a big modern harbor. But most of the development schemes were undertaken in the mistaken assumption that the outside world would pay for them in the end.

What is, or was, Nkrumahism?

In his saner moments Nkrumah realized that without the transformation of Ghana into a strong industrialized economy and society, "socialism" would remain a slogan and all talk of socialist progress empty chatter. And he also understood that one could not build socialism without socialists. But instead of concentrating on the basic tasks, he engaged in overambitious schemes in many directions at one and the same time. Not a very brave man at the best of times, he isolated himself in his castle, became the "Redeemer" depicted together with Jesus Christ—the man who would live forever. He surrounded himself

[2] The extent of the debt (and the general plight of the country) became known only after Nkrumah's fall. The misinformation about the real state of affairs in Ghana was to a considerable extent the fault of certain European and American residents—journalists, scholars, and others—unfortunately a recurrent phenomenon in many African and Asian countries. Journalists and scholars are admittedly under indirect pressure not to publish unfavorable reports about their area of study. Any violation of this unwritten rule may cause their expulsion, and thus cut them off from the subject of their specialization. As a result, the coverage of the African and Asian scene both on the scholarly and the journalistic level is often unreliable.

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with self-seeking courtiers and established a dictatorial regime that antagonized the country's technical intelligentsia.

Conor Cruise O'Brien wrote that proportionately no African country had more of such people than Ghana and none lost more. Those who left or gave up did so not because they were anti-socialist or pro-colonialist—"on the contrary, they had contributed more than their share to the real progress which Ghana has made—but they experienced conditions in which it proved increasingly difficult to work effectively." The official model was a strong, disciplined party, with "democratic centralism" as its guiding principle of organization and leadership. In fact, the one-party system was simply a means to communicate commands from the top leadership to the masses—and not a very efficient and reliable means at that, as the crumbling of the party after Nkrumah's fall has shown. Only then did it emerge how little idealism and genuine conviction there had been behind the staged mass adulation of the great leader and his invincible party, how narrow his "mass basis." Nkrumah was motivated by a strange mixture of "scientific socialism" and black magic (his trust in Kankan fetishes and, to a certain extent, in witchcraft).

There was nothing specifically left-wing about this regime; one political observer has said that Nkrumah possessed more of the hysteria of Hitler and the vanity of Mussolini than of the cold genius of Lenin. Nkrumahist Ghana was "an ideological state without an ideology, a one-party dictatorship without a party." The rise of the regime meant in sociological terms the "eclipse of a bourgeoisie *manquée* by a new petty bourgeoisie of the new municipalities and local market centres" (Dennis Austin). Nkrumahism was an "indiscriminate hotch-potch of sadly familiar concepts, usually ludicrously exaggerated and invariably unsuited to Ghanaian realities. The parentage of most items is easily recognizable; manic industrialization for its own sake; the glorification of autarchy and self-help; the official slogan of 'One leader, one Party, one Nation'; the egregious cult of personality; the abuse of Western plutocracy, the doctrine of proletarian nations" (T. Szamueli).

Social Failures in Africa

Almost every African country has made socialism its declared policy and everyone agrees that boundless confusion has been created as the result of the indiscriminate and, on the whole, misplaced application of a Western term to African realities. "All kinds of strange notions are peddled in many parts of Africa as to the nature of a socialist society," a British Communist has written. There is Muslim socialism, Arab social-

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ism, Neo-Destour socialism, pragmatic socialism (in Nigeria), African socialism, and so forth. But if modern history has had any lessons at all, it is that socialism presupposes a fairly high level of development—social, economic, and political. In its absence all talk about a socialist society is either meaningless or a perversion of the term.

African countries, especially those which have inscribed revolutionary socialism on their banners, have learned this to their detriment. Congo-Brazzaville, for instance, is extremely radical; it follows a pro-Chinese foreign policy, but there is nothing revolutionary about the domestic policy of a government whose power is based exclusively on a palace guard of several hundred men, many of them foreigners.

Guinea engaged in an ambitious socialist experiment in 1959–60, promising a rate of growth superior to the Soviet Union and China. Illusory plans were drawn up which failed within a very short time. Most of the national Guinean companies that had been established went bankrupt or were dissolved. Those who prepared the plans were not all aware what kind of effort was needed to carry them out. French observers of the Left (René Dumont and Charles Bettelheim) have noted the extreme disparity between the institutional superstructures and the degree of political morality: "Guineans have not been willing to bend themselves to the efforts and discipline necessary to carry out the measures they adopted even when they were advised by Communist countries (whose nationals have left Guinea quite discouraged) . . . ." These are strong warnings, all the more telling, because they came from close friends and sympathizers. "To some extent, a lack of knowledge can be compensated for by complete honesty and vice versa; but a country cannot do without both."

The preconditions for development in Mali were somewhat better than in Guinea because its leaders had a better grasp of economic problems and because the peasants of Mali are among the most industrious and progressive in West Africa. However, to quote Dumont again, "when political leaders and particularly civil servants, address the Mali peasants, they give them orders in much the same way as the colonial administrators do. They do not understand rural problems and therefore cannot help the peasants efficiently." The result has been stagnation in agriculture (with the exception of cotton production which has been boosted at very high cost) and very small advance in industry.

Tanzania is one of the more hopeful countries of Eastern Africa. Like Guinea and Mali it has a one-party system and the economic sector has been gradually nationalized; about 75 per cent of the exports are

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government controlled. Yet the country is beset by the same difficulties as the other "socialist" African countries: considerable—and growing—unemployment, shortage of materials, allocation of resources to unproductive purposes, lack of trained personnel. True, the population is treated to radical socialist speeches and ambitious plans as if these had any bearing on reality. As in most other African countries, enormous sums are squandered on prestige projects, expensive embassies abroad, the latest models of aircraft, etc. Far more money is spent on administration than on productive development. President Nyerere has called for hard work and austerity on the Chinese pattern, but the local elite has shown a marked lack of enthusiasm in following this appeal.

Nasser: Domestic Problems and Foreign Disaster

Compared with Algeria, Ghana, and Guinea, Nasser's Egypt (the United Arab Republic) is, with all its weaknesses, a model of purposeful achievement. From a position of a somewhat vague "Arab socialism" President Nasser has moved toward a platform of "scientific socialism." All the main industries and the banks were nationalized in the early 60's; agricultural reform, which began hesitatingly in the middle 50's, has been speeded up. Cooperatives have been developed in the Egyptian village, work on the Assuan dam has made satisfactory progress. The rate of growth in key industries, in mining and oil production has been substantial over the last few years. Yet despite this progress Egypt found itself in a state of permanent crisis even before Nasser tried his luck in brinkmanship. Most of the progress was achieved owing to massive economic help (both aid and free gifts) from West and East. The country has vastly overspent, its foreign currency reserves are exhausted, and this in turn has caused stoppage of work in certain industries. Since Egypt is unlikely to receive such huge gifts in the future, and since the war with Israel was also an economic catastrophe, its crisis has immeasurably deepened. The cost of living has risen rapidly, much faster than productivity. The population explosion continues, the cotten crop is mortgaged on arms sales for years to come.

Some of the reasons are, for the time being, beyond human control; Egypt is one of the poorest countries in the world. The odds facing Egypt in this respect are much heavier than those which the other, more primitive African countries have to overcome. Yet, Egypt has been, of course, all along far more developed: it never really was a colony. It has technical experts in almost all fields needed, so much so that it exports teachers to many Arab and African countries.

Some of the setbacks can be explained by miscalculation and

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overambitious schemes on the part of the government, lack of enthusiasm and willingness to work on the part of the masses. Like other Asian and African leaders, Nasser has tried to play a role in world politics out of proportion to the real strength of his country. The unsuccessful attack by Britain and France in 1956 gave him enormous political credit, which in some ways has lasted to this day. On the other hand, there have been severe setbacks in the Sudan, in tropical Africa, and Yemen; it is too early to say whether anything may come of his schemes to unite the Arab world under his leadership. He has shown realism and has learned from defeats, but there is little doubt that his ultimate ambitions have not changed over the years—to engage in a policy of expansion. Whether Egypt will ever be capable of achieving this is not certain; the outcome of the war with Israel, deliberately provoked by him, has shown all the weaknesses of a regime, the inner strength of which had been grossly overrated by many outside observers.

Basically, Egypt is as poor as it was, though poverty has been spread more evenly. Economics apart, to what extent has Egypt under Nasser advanced toward a socialist and democratic society? The attempts to establish a state party, never very energetically tackled, have not been successful: the country has been ruled by a new class, army officers (including those who were subsequently given civilian assignments), and the secret police. Among the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia there are conflicting trends: Islamic, orthodox Communist—and those favoring Marxism-Nasserism, i.e., "military socialism" which has absorbed economic and social techniques from Leninism and which in foreign affairs steers close to the Soviet camp but socially is no nearer to Soviet Communism than to France under Napoleon III or to Fascist Italy. Following the defeat in the war and the ouster of so many officers who had to serve as scapegoats, the mass basis of the regime has further narrowed. Since Nasser can now no longer be certain of the loyalty of the new class, he has to rule through his party—which hardly exists as an effective body—and, to an increasing degree, through the police. Egypt under Nasser is a more modern state than it was under Farouk and the Pashas 20 years ago. If there is a harsher dictatorship and less political freedom now than two decades ago, it is difficult to see how any semblance of parliamentary democracy could have prevailed under any effective regime. The bulk of the population, vegetating on subsistence level, totally incapable of influencing politics in Cairo, has not basically changed since Farouk—the people have no more at stake in this country than their ancestors 50 or 200 years ago. Under Nasser, Egypt has survived; but

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it is grotesque to think that this police-socialism, now wholly dependent on outside help, could or should serve as a model for any other country.

Dilemmas of the Third World

An interim balance sheet in 1967 of the national revolutionary regimes of the Third World shows, to put it cautiously, that the expectations of some of their prophets mentioned here have not or not yet been realized. It is one thing for the *literati* of St. Germain des Prés (and their colleagues in other parts of the world) to declare that the Third World is starting a new history of man. But facts (as Lenin among others used to observe) are a stubborn thing. Facts and figures show that the industrialized countries of the West (including, of course, Eastern Europe) have forged ahead, while the distance between them and the national revolutionary regimes of Asia and Africa has widened, not lessened.

Seen from this angle there are no major differences between the national-revolutionary regimes of Asia and Africa and those that do not proclaim a radical-nationalist policy; the problems of backwardness are common to all of them. Comparisons are always risky and often unfair; if other North African countries have done better than Algeria, it is only fair to add that Algeria, regardless of its political system, faces greater problems than its neighbors. If, on the other hand, the performance of China (or of Pakistan) and the relative stability of these countries is compared with the mounting crisis in India, the reason is not merely, and probably not mainly, the greater inefficiency of a democratic government. Geographical, climatic, and historical factors are at least of equal importance. Can one reasonably expect labor productivity in a tropical country like India to be equal to that in a moderate climate? Indonesia and Algeria have failed, but not simply as a result of their national-revolutionary and quasi-Marxist orientation; generalizations along these lines are almost impossible because conditions vary so much from country to country. But it can no more be doubted that what was hailed as a panacea—namely radical slogans—has, by and large, not worked better than other forms of government.

The general trend in Asia and Africa is toward military dictatorship. Some observers have regarded this as a retrograde step, others welcomed what they consider the "progressive character of military socialism." The truth is simpler: when civilian rule breaks down, the military remains as the only force capable of preventing chaos. Military rule which seems likely to prevail in Asia and Africa for a very long time

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is thus an *ultima ratio*. It is hardly the dawn of a new civilization that Fanon or Sartre imagined.[3]

Since these developments come as a disappointment to everyone, their causes ought to be discussed frankly and dispassionately. Some have already been mentioned; they are "objective" in character—geographical and climatic. So far, industrial societies have developed only in the moderate regions of the northern hemisphere and they were not plagued by a population explosion at the time of their take-off. With further technological progress this handicap may eventually be overcome, but this may take many decades if not centuries. Nature has made Egypt much poorer than Kuwait (as long as petroleum is needed), or than Syria and Iraq. Given the nation-state, inequality will persist. Nor is there much point in blaming neo-colonialism for the falling prices of raw materials on the world markets; world demand for most commodities is limited and cannot be artificially boosted. Something ought to be done to remedy the situation—but it is a problem likely to recur regardless of the world order.

There has been a strong inclination in Asia and Africa to blame colonialism and neo-colonialism for most, if not all, the present misfortunes. Much emotion is involved and it is difficult to separate myth from reality. That the colonial situation was an unnatural and an immoral one goes without saying. Nor does one have to repeat the whole register of colonialist crimes of commission and omission. Perhaps the most fatal omission was the failure of the colonialist powers in education —with the result that in the Belgian Congo or Indonesia, for instance, there was hardly a native intelligentsia at all to take over when these countries became independent. And in most other countries the elite was deficient both in number and quality. The political failure of Asia and Africa is therefore to a large extent the responsibility of the West.

But the proponents of the new Afro-Asian ideology go much further. They claim that the Western powers have exploited Asia and Africa all along, that modern societies in the West could only be established

[3] There is little sense in discussing in this context other predictions that are manifestly absurd—such as the assumption that Asian and African society would be regenerated by a series of peasant wars, more or less on the Chinese model. That such Jacqueries may occur is extremely likely and they may be wholly justified; they may possibly be successful in one country or another owing to local conditions. But the idea that they will be able to achieve anything other than a redistribution of agricultural property is fanciful. Even in China, where the peasants provided the mass basis of a revolutionary movement, it has ended, it would seem, in a military dictatorship. Populist ideas have their attractions but they are even less relevant now than 100 years ago.

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on the basis of this stolen wealth of the colonies. The riches of London and Paris belong therefore to the damned of the earth as well as to Englishmen and Frenchmen. Western economic aid is therefore simply a partial restitution of stolen property. These are sweeping claims, but do the facts bear them out? That the colonial powers did not acquire colonies for humanitarian reasons need hardly be elaborated, and that individuals and companies have greatly enriched themselves from them goes without saying. But in the overall balance and from a Western point of view, colonies were a prestige operation, and an expensive one at that—most of them cost the metropolitan country more than they contributed to its wealth, especially during the last 50 years

The economics of the former European colonial powers were not ruined as a result of the loss of colonies; they prospered more than ever before. According to the classical theory of imperialism, colonies were needed by the metropolitan countries for the export of capital and the import of raw materials. The first part of the formula is not true—Western capital has never been really attracted by the colonies. And to obtain raw materials in the modern world there are cheaper ways than the establishment of colonies. The most telling charge against the Western imperialist countries is not that they robbed Asia and Africa, but that they prevented indigenous economic development.

But would these countries be more highly developed today if there had not been Western domination? The answer is by no means clear. The idea that a substantial part of the wealth of the West belongs by justice to the countries of Asia and Africa may have its attractions, seen from the capitals of these countries. The danger of passivity and self-comforting illusions is obvious.

It is in the self-interest of the West to help the countries of Asia and Africa transform themselves economically and politically into viable countries. Much of the economic aid given during the last two decades has for a variety of reasons not had the intended effect; but this is no reason at all to discontinue it. The new Afro-Asian ideology, however, is dangerous because it tries to provide the ideological justification for what is, not to mince words, a parasitical relationship, as harmful in the long run for the self-respect of the Asian and African peoples as was the colonial relationship. It has, above all, the effect of blinding the countries, and especially their elites, to their own responsibility for the present shortcomings and failures.

The Asian and African elites are overwhelmingly "socialist" in political aspiration. Yet even the most sympathetic outside observers have had to admit that more often than not this is based on the assump-

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tion that a radical socialist phraseology is sufficient to build a socialist society. That there is a relationship between socialism and work is not at all clear to those who believe that a revolution is like a magic table in the fairy tale. In the private life of these people, revolutionary phraseology is often coupled with a horror of work and an exaggerated urge for the good things in life. In this respect the African and Asian revolutionaries could no doubt learn from the Chinese example but for the fact that Peking's motivations seem not to have been altogether altruistic. (Potentially dangerous intellectuals have been sent to work in the communes; one has not heard of the party *apparatchiks* taking part in similar exercise.) This is not to say that the national revolutionary regimes ought to copy Sparta or the Puritans in every detail. But unless there is some work ethos, unless these elites begin to understand that socialism is not only high-flown oratory but that it has some direct bearing on their own lives, that selfless devotion, sacrifice, and hard work are needed, they will not make any real progress. Unless they give up their aspirations of a life of luxury, all the talk and all the literature about socialism and socialist society will remain meaningless phrase-mongering.

The editors of Dissent express to their friend

PAUL GOODMAN

their deepest sympathy at the death of his son

MATTHEW

20 years old, in an accident this August.

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William Pfaff

A CASE AGAINST INTERVENTIONISM

We print below another in a series of essays, from various points of view, concerning American foreign policy. They will be brought together next year in a book.—EDITORS

The intervention of nations into the affairs of others is one of history's inevitabilities. Interests collide and interlock; states want to change the conduct of others. What is interesting—and perilously relevant—is why they do it, what means they use, and how far they are prepared to go.

In American policy today, the great controversy arises not so much from the fact that we are intervening abroad as from the scale and character of our interventions. In Vietnam, in Latin America, in Western Europe, an American political intervention was well established, supported by an American public consensus, and tolerated (or even welcomed) by the greater part of the international community, long before the present policy crisis. What seems to have gone wrong is that the United States has crossed a threshold of acceptable means. The objection is to the use of war as an instrument of intervention in Vietnam, large-scale military intervention in a Caribbean political crisis, the *kind* of pressures we have employed to attempt to isolate France and to affect West German policy. The judgment in these cases is that our methods are disproportionate to what reasonably can be expected to be achieved.

The objection is to excess—to a failure of political judgment and discrimination. It makes a sound argument, one of practicality rather than principle, and it probably is more persuasive for the omission. But there are two issues of principle involved in the present situation which are worth some attention for the light they throw on what may be expected from the future of this American world involvement.

The first concerns the morality of our means. Without attempting a scholastic determination of when it may be licit to kill in a political cause and when not, it ought to be a counsel of mere prudence—given the record of violence in recent history—to err on the side of restraint.

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Totalitarianism, political purges, and genocide, to say nothing of the mass slaughter of civilians by Allied airpower duringWorld War II, ought to have given us a lively sense of the fragility of those standards which sustain civilization. Behind much of the outcry against the American course in Vietnam is an instinctive (or historically conditioned) reaction against a casualness about violence, against an advertised "tough mindedness" about the established conventions of war and international law, which are literally demoralizing to international society.

The second issue of principle has to do with the rationale for American interventionism. The evolution of our foreign policy since the 1940's has not been wholly deliberate, and the commitment this country made to international "leadership" after 1945 was accompanied by much domestic controversy. The policies we adopted in Europe and the Near East, and subsequently extended in Asia (and even later, in Africa) were a series of improvisations in the face of what were understood as major crises. (The revisionist arguments that find the source of cold war in Truman Administration aggressiveness seem to be unconvincing —as well as reflecting, often enough, a willful sentimentalization of the Roosevelt era.) None of that series of major commitments made in the early years after 1945—the Truman Doctrine, the rearmament of Germany and establishment of NATO, the commitment to a permanent program of foreign aid, the intervention in Korea—was accepted with enthusiasm by the American public. Each was undertaken in a public mood of soberness and even of apprehension. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations had to fight for these programs in Congress; and together the individual programs amounted to a reversal of a one-hundred-fifty-year-old American policy of isolationism.

The roots of isolationist policy lay very deep in the American consciousness—in the experience of physical isolation, of ocean barriers, but much more important, in the peculiar American historical experience of repudiation of Europe. The founding of this country was an act of self-separation from the tradition of Europe, making a new "compact" among men which superseded the old forms of political society. The great immigrations of the 19th and early 20th centuries were almost entirely made up of people who rejected Europe and wanted to cut themselves off from the past. In these conditions a foreign policy of isolation gratified deep and complex impulses within American society. More could be said about this, but for the purpose of illuminating the interventionism of American policy today it is enough to say that the American historical experience conduced us to a view of the United States as a society morally different from and superior to the rest of the

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world, and to a view of other nations as politically unredeemed, waiting —as Woodrow Wilson put it—to "turn to America for those moral inspirations which lie at the basis of all freedom . . . [For America's] flag is the flag not only of America, but of humanity."

This strain of messianism in American political attitudes found gratification, but also a practical check in a foreign policy of isolationism. But when the events of the last two decades forced an American policy reversal, that messianism inevitably sought expression in the new policy. And indeed the appeal to messianism was one instrument by which the change was effected: the public was constantly told that ours was a "unique" challenge, a responsibility to create, in Secretary of State Dean Rusk's formulation, "A world free of aggression; a world which moves toward the rule of law . . . a world of better life for all mankind."

If such is the meaning and goal of American foreign policy, what compromises are plausible? And the practical obstacle to gaining this imposing objective is no mere nation or nations, but an ideology—a force which itself purports to be universal in relevance and morally inspired. The messianism of Lenin, looking beyond the borders of Russia to a world-wide class struggle, and of Mao Tse-tung, preaching the revolutionary unity of the "rural" peoples, today confronts the liberal messianism of America.

II

The Vietnamese intervention is hardly intelligible outside this intellectual framework which makes the political fate of a weak and remote society crucial to our own affairs. A justification may be argued in domino theories or indefensible analogies with Europe in the 1930's, or warnings that if we don't fight here we soon will have to fight (the miraculously amphibious Chinese? native revolutionaries?) in Hawaii or California. Or it may be given a *Realpolitik* but question-begging statement which limits itself to arguments of past commitment or national prestige—we are there because we are there. Yet underlying all of this is a kind of universalism: we are threatened by world Communism, able to challenge "freedom" anywhere if it is not "taught a lesson"; or by Asian Communism, potentially the vehicle of all "rural" Afro-Asian discontent; or (as Mr. Rostow now puts it) by "romantic revolutionism" derived from 1789 and about to be given a final blow in Vietnam; or by multiple factors of poverty, racism, and human discontent which manifest themselves in Vietnamese Communism at this moment but will break out in some other violence elsewhere unless they are contained here and

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ultimately disarmed by energetic world-wide programs of social reform and political development.

The Left, often enough, is contemptuous of the former arguments but inclined to accept the last one. Much of the controversy in the United States over Vietnam is really an argument over method, not over assumptions or objectives. Liberals, after all, supported our early intervention on behalf of Ngo Dinh Diem. They backed his programs of national unification and social reform in the 1950's. The disillusionment with Diem led the Kennedy Administration, intellectually representative, surely, of contemporary liberalism, to signal his overthrow but simultaneously to enlarge our intervention and restate its objectives in exceedingly ambitious terms. That many of these same people now object to Mr. Johnson's militarization of the intervention does not change the fact that they wanted, got, and presumably still support, a vast American intervention, as such, into the affairs of Southeast Asia. They simply want it to be carried out through aid missions, political counsel, and the Peace Corps, rather than with combat troops. They want the same objectives Mr. Johnson wants, and share the same essential assumptions about America's responsibilities and role in Southeast Asia, but they want to do it all with clean hands. The government officials, the American diplomats and agents in Vietnam, the troops, who have felt themselves compelled to bloody their hands in the service of this American enterprise, may be forgiven for rewarding this kind of criticism with anger or indifference.

Contemporary interventionism—"globalism"—then is a democratic society's rejoinder to the transnational ideological challenge of communism. It flourishes on both left and right of the political spectrum because the old American sense of moral separateness and superiority disposes virtually all in this country to an interpretation of international politics as essentially a struggle of values—and to the historicism implicit in such a notion of universal struggle (a struggle which both we and the enemy assume to be to determine the character of "the next and higher stage of history"). The principal controversy is simply over the particular form which intervention should take—economic, social, educational, military?—and in fact American foreign policy in the last two decades has used all of these instrumentalities. For the CIA simultaneously to support leftist trade unionism abroad and sponsor rightist military cliques should not be surprising, for these merely are aspects of a general American effort, supported by nearly all the elements in our society, to bring about a world-wide "conversion" to the values we embrace.

I began with the remark that some measure of intervention is in-

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evitable in the relations of nations. The problem of interventionism as we today practice it is that we have made our objective in foreign policy a fundamental moral change in the condition of men in history. We have adopted a sentimentalized reversal of our opponents' ideology, a kind of counterfeit Marxism equally committed to universal struggle for historicist goals. And in practice we have proven less aware of the practical limits of intervention than the Soviets, whose original challenge in 1945–1952 drove us into this game. Their interventions in Eastern and Western Europe during the early Cold War were unsentimental, backed by plausible military threats and, in Eastern Europe, by rigid police controls. Moreover, the Soviet leadership was prepared to be entirely ruthless in cutting losses, exploiting its allies and sympathizers, and dealing expediently with the enemy; the overriding Russian national interest was never lost sight of. This much of the lesson the United States did not learn—perhaps to our credit, though not to our advantage.

The Vietnamese war should then be understood as the end-point of a policy of sentimentality and intellectual complacency, rather than as an example of neocolonialism. Vietnam is the fulfillment of a kind of vulgar liberalism which assumes that the political experience and aspirations of all men everywhere are essentially identical with our own, and that the desire for peace, democratic government, and material welfare are the dominant ambitions of men everywhere. Corollary to this belief has been the conviction that when the conduct of peoples abroad contradicts these ambitions—which are our own, and should thus produce alignment with us—it must be the result of intimidation or evil, which must be fought, or deprivation, ignorance, or misunderstanding, which can and should be removed.

In Vietnam an American preoccupation with the freedom and well-being of other men, morally inspired but sentimental in its analysis of real possibilities, has converged with an American fear of Communism which naively exaggerates the unity, power and threat of the Communist movement. A serious foreign policy of containing Soviet power, and a decent national concern for the condition of our fellow men, have over two decades been allowed to degenerate into a program that is messianic, intolerant, and intellectually unserious. The worst of America has proved stronger than the best, and the result is a war whose solution is not easily foreseen, conducted by a distracted and divided nation whose serious internal problems are ominously exacerbated by this war. The outcome of it all seems to me to include more disturbing possibilities than are ordinarily understood. And the prospect for a reform of policy, for a constructive or progressive remedy, seems to me rather bleak.

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III

Let me deal first with what the outcome of present trends might be. The concern commonly expressed is that the war in Vietnam will grow bigger, that China or the Soviet Union might be provoked into counter-intervention, and that major war or even nuclear war could result. That the war will get bigger before it can be ended seems a virtual certainty. That it will produce a nuclear confrontation with Russia seems much less likely—because of the spirit of withdrawal, of isolationism, evident among the present Soviet leadership, and because the intellectual weight of the Pentagon today is almost wholly on the side of nuclear prudence. However extravagant the American faith in military power to achieve political solutions, a vast system of intellectual and institutional inhibitions have been built up in Washington against risking direct challenge to the Soviet Union.

More plausible is an enlargement of the war which simply deepens our commitment and increases American frustration and domestic controversy, producing a further hardening of government policy at the same time that it produces a further erosion of the government's confidence and assurance. Bad policy will be reinvested in and reinforced out of the unadmitted need to vindicate the human and moral investments already made.

The outcome, then, would undoubtedly be an eventual compromise —possibly under a Republican administration—which amounted to a disguised capitulation, not to the NLF so much as to the intractable realities of Vietnamese society. But while officially there would be neither victory nor defeat, it would be a self-defeat for the United States, and the domestic reaction could, I think, be very bitter, self-laceration accompanied by vengeful public controversy and a repudiation of the individuals, the party, the foreign policy advisers responsible for creating the conditions for this debacle.

I hardly think that in these circumstances public opinion would turn Left. I do not think it necessarily would turn Right, either, or at least toward the Right now politically recognizable as such, although a hardening of American attitudes, a deepening intolerance towards the world abroad, is plausible enough. There might, as one French critic has suggested, have to be an American "Algeria" in some such place as Brazil, before interventionism can die.

But the more likely turn in American attitudes is inward. Isolationism remains very close below the surface of both Left and Right in this country today. The interventionism of the Republican Right is simply a caricature of liberal interventionism, addicted to the language

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of military solutions and near-Manichean in its political simplifications; but the instinct of the Right remains conservative—resistant to ground wars on foreign soil, hoarding the peculiar treasure of Americanism. And the more benign interventionism of the rest, committed to a belief in the power of social and economic reform to dissolve conflict, expresses an American moral isolation—our innocence of that experience of civil devastation, betrayal, popular aggression, and mass political hysteria which has dominated the history of much of the world these last fifty years. That prosperity and popular government are inconsistent with war is, of course, sheer myth. And one source of the crisis within Vietnam is the very impact of the alien political and social forces which mass government and industrialization represent. The "development" of the new nations is a matter which proceeds through the destruction and discrediting of established systems and cultural assumptions, the dislocation of human lives and beliefs on a scale obviously comparable only to the early industrial and nationalist revolutions in the 18th and 19th century West.

What I suggest, then, can happen as a result of the Vietnamese war is a profound American disillusionment; and not with interventionism so much as with the possibilities of national action itself. Vietnam represents the fullest expression of the interventionist spirit; but our policies toward Europe and Latin America are also obsolete today, resisted by the most dynamic elements on both continents, and we show little interest in any policy changes except those which would reinforce the old ambitions and defend the old assumptions. A general collapse of American policy is not out of the question. The ensuing retreat could be an American popular retreat from internationalism, from liberalism as well, and a renewal of an intolerant American messianism that becomes wholly exclusivist, directed inwardly to national self-reassurance. There is precedent for this in other societies which have had an external mission repudiated by those whom they intended to save. For 16th century Spain, frustration abroad resulted in an internal hypocrisy and decline which was undramatic in its progress but decisive in effect, a failure of confidence that eventually rendered Spain irrelevant to modern Europe. Nothing so dark need be predicted for the United States for the weight of the precedent to be felt.

There is another possible outcome. Interventionism could be persisted in and reasserted in collaboration with a Soviet Union whose own political messianism is today badly shaken. Russia clearly is in a period of political disorientation—or reorientation—today, an aftermath both of the excesses of Stalin and the failures of Stalin's successors. For a

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nation which defined itself as marking a new stage in man's social organization, the present condition of the Soviet Union and of its international bloc must prove deeply demoralizing—however well disguised the political truth may be by goulash and ballet. Proposals for Soviet-American collaboration to settle the war in Vietnam over the heads of the Vietnamese, to contain China, to contain nuclear proliferation and check the arms race, imply the possibility of collaboration to "contain" a good many other forces in the contemporary world whose collective effect is to reduce both Russia and the United States to the place of mere nations among nations. This, it seems to me, is a more plausible course for "convergence" between Soviet and American societies than any convergence in social democracy. But collaboration to protect one another's super-power status, however well rationalized it might be as preserving the peace or controlling arms, would amount to a neo-imperialism which genuinely deserves that epithet.

IV

These are two outcomes which are plausible within the present course of American foreign policy. There are less bleak possibilities, the best probably being a series of half-failures of American policy—including a Vietnamese settlement on bad terms—which we refuse to acknowledge as failures. In this case the trend would be an enforced retreat from commitment but without the harsh decisions and sharp reactions of the first of the possibilities I have discussed. Yet even here the result is likely to by a creeping sense of American failure which obstructs domestic reform, a growing social stagnation.

But is this deep a pessimism warranted? In the immediate perspective I think that it is. The fact that our present foreign policy is under attack from as many different positions as it is today is a good sign. Yet beyond agreeing that we should get out of Vietnam, the New Left, the civil rights movement, the disestablished liberals, the literary Left, the neo-isolationists, the academic "realists," and the Robert Kennedy government-in-exile have little enough in common, and in some of these cases it is not at all clear that they understand what they should expect, or want, of a foreign policy. Yet clearly the more creative elements in American society reject what existing policy has come in practice to mean. Elements in American life which are indispensible to serious government, to a serious national political consensus, have gone into opposition, even if it is a largely incoherent opposition.

Their opposition is not, alone, enough to bring down the Johnson Administration. The public—which today clearly is highly volatile in

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opinion—can be expected to support the President so long as no convincing alternative to present policy is stated at the level of national politics and national candidates. A dramatic failure of interventionism could bring down the Johnson Administration, but this is politics by provisional catastrophe and, moreover, the successor administration could be worse—intellectually. The way would still be open to national stagnation, self-laceration, and retreat. What is important, then, is whether the alternative put forward in 1968—or even in 1972—will be serious, an intellectually responsible alternative. There is as yet little evidence that it will be.

For too many elements in the opposition are against Mr. Johnson's Vietnamese policy yet are committed to the same assumptions of universal crisis and universal goals which underlie that policy. They are no less ambitious in what they believe can and should be accomplished by an American foreign policy. Against them are the "neo-isolationists," presumably including all of those who believe that an increasingly intense and intolerant mission to the world has come to serve for America as an evasion of domestic realities and domestic accomplishment. But by definition this is an ill assorted group, drawn from the Left, Center, and Right of national politics, and an effective alliance is not easy to imagine. Yet if there is to be a turn away from interventionism the national political leadership will have to come from here.

Intellectual leadership remains the immediate problem because a new policy which does not deal with the established reality of American power and our inevitable involvement in the affairs of others would be fantasy; isolation is no longer an American policy option, even for neo-isolationists. Yet the existing community of foreign policy specialists and professionals is precisely that group most responsible for our present situation. The public has faithfully supported the foreign policies of the last three administrations as it accepts Mr. Johnson's leadership today, and the foreign policies of all these administrations have fairly faithfully reflected the counsel of the foreign policy establishment—in the universities, the foreign affairs institutes and policy centers, the government departments concerned with international relations. If sentimentality, messianism, an egregious lack of realism, have increasingly marked American conduct and resulted in the present crisis, this must ultimately be accounted the failure of an intellectual class. And this failure is a sobering one—for our world power and world involvement cannot be repealed.

It may be that the American historical experience all but precludes a sustained foreign policy of limited objectives and assumptions. That

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such a policy, once established in the early Cold War years, should have been undermined and then transformed by the enduring forces of American optimism and isolation, is a cautionary sign. Yet the effort must be renewed. Such a policy is intrinsically defensive. Foreign policy is fundamentally a means by which the American nation is protected, and it is not an appropriate vehicle for the reform or revolution of foreign societies. The objection to the latter definition is, first of all, prudential—such is the course of ideological politics. unlimited in ambition and expedient in method. But it is also a practical argument. The fact is that nations and societies work out their own fates, and while outside powers can help them or crush them, true national successes (like national failures) result from the character of the society itself. Our power to help others in the matters that really count, in establishing decent and representative government, practicing humane social policies, achieving "development," is not very great: it necessarily is auxiliary to their own efforts and decisions, is warped by our own preoccupations, and is distorted by the very great problems of comprehending the character and rhythms of other cultures. (And the last is a matter in which the United States is notoriously weak.)

The values of American society are relevant to the world beyond America: to call for a limited foreign policy is not to discount the importance of the constitutional and social achievements of this country. It is, rather, to argue that these will not be promulgated by means of propaganda, military action, or—except minimally—by foreign aid and diplomacy. It is conventional today to warn about the limits of power, yet the warning seems hardly comprehended even by the government officials who issue it.

A new American policy cannot abandon a commitment to values and to moral influence in world affairs, but would be skeptical in its expectations and would understand that its primary obligation is to defend the international conditions which secure a civilized domestic society—for the United States, and by indirection for others. This means limiting conflicts, not enlarging them in the name of an ultimate banishment of conflict from the world. It means containing and isolating the disorders of international affairs, not inflating them and intervening in them on ideological—and ultimately historicist—arguments It means strengthening the established institutions and conventions of international arbitration and legality, not breaking them. It means dealing with the ideological attacks of others in terms of what those states actually do and can do to harm us, rather than adding our own voice to the clamor of rhetoric and hysteria which embitters international relations.

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Described as a policy of limit, this is perhaps better understood as an existential policy, dealing with international realities as they exist and with nations as they act—not as they conform to purported historical imperatives. Thus we must take seriously those who can hurt us or our friends—as we have been hard and prudent towards Russia since 1945. We would take seriously the unstable situations today which involve the commitments of powerful states; as in Europe where a settlement which can get Soviet troops out of Eastern Europe, will open up further the European Communist states to the creative political forces of contemporary Western Europe, and redefine Germany's status on terms the Germans and their neighbors can live with. This is a problem whose growing urgency threatens to burst the obsolescent political structure established twenty years ago.

In Asia (and Africa and Latin America) a new policy would isolate and neutralize conflicts and the inevitable disorders of a part of the world which is going through a profound upheaval which nonetheless—so long as the great powers keep, or are kept, out—is of intrinsically limited consequence. A mobilization of any major part of the bitterly nationalist and reactive Third World under a single aggressive leadership is as much of a chimera as the Third World's unification under liberals. Real threats from this area can come when such states as China (or Brazil, or India) achieve the national power Japan already possesses—if they succeed in doing so. But unless we are prepared to try to "solve" this problem by repression or destruction there is no alternative to restraint, and to prudent containment or deterrence of such threats as actually emerge—when they emerge. Tolerance and patience are banal counsels—yet time steadily recasts the situations and ambitions of nations, and while this may be a matter for pessimism, it is also the ultimate argument for existential judgments. No doubt this makes up an unsatisfying prescription for America in its hour of world preeminence; and that is precisely our problem.

Yet history simply is not susceptible to solutions, any more than the essential anxieties and frustrations of individual life can be "solved." The personal analogy can be pursued. The nations that count in history are those which civilized themselves, establishing a standard of justice, and of social, intellectual, and artistic accomplishment. Here is permanent achievement, where the United States thus far has done not badly, but not so well as to earn that world leadership which our foreign policy so insistently asserts. And the discrepancy between claim and achievement has grown disquietingly large, with a danger in this to others, but primarily to ourselves.

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The following articles extend our series of poverty reports which began last fall. Reports on various problems and areas of the Poverty Program and on poverty in the U.S. will appear regularly in subsequent issues.— ED.

Robert Lekachman

CAN "MORE MONEY" END POVERTY?

One of the more tantalizing statistics of the decade is this: for a mere $11 billion we could raise every poor American above the poverty line as poverty is currently and officially defined—an income below $3,130 for a family of four. Now, as the world knows, poverty may be a great deal more than a shortage of money, and giving money to the poor may indeed amount to no more than treating the symptoms of deeper personal and social disorders with financial palliatives. All the same, even within the most sophisticated and sociological definitions of poverty, lack of money is at least part of the condition of the poor. Moreover, as every consumer of aspirin should be able to testify, symptomatic relief is much to be preferred to no relief at all.

Now $11 billion is not much, a mere one and a small fraction per cent of Gross National Product, considerably less than half of Vietnam's annual cost, just about the size of the Pentagon's *underestimate* in 1966 of Vietnam expenditure. It must also be said that of all the ways to assist the unfortunate, simple transfer of funds is the simplest, the least niggling, and the most respectful of human dignity. Either of two magnificently efficient agencies, the Internal Revenue Service or the Social Security Administration, can handle the affair with infinitely less sweat than the assembled social workers and Welfare Departments of the land who spend substantially smaller sums. No wonder than that economists of very different ideological preferences and diverging motives have come to perceive merit in some version or other of income maintenance as a part or (on occasion) the whole of the assault upon poverty.

This of course raises the question, if the New Conservatives at Chicago join New Frontiersmen at Yale, Harvard, and MIT in favor of income maintenance, why doesn't some alert, major-party politician adopt this mechanism for his very own? Why doesn't Lyndon Johnson

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incorporate income guarantees into his domestic program instead of merely promising to appoint a commission directed to make its report safely after the 1968 Presidential election? Some of the answer may lie in the politician's timidity before any new idea. The remainder just might be found in the sheer meanness which seems to compel so many pious Americans to deplore the prospect of giving their fellow citizens money they haven't worked for.

But even if sudden altruism swept over the national psyche, a number of issues of principle would be important, indeed rather more important than they are now in the 1967 political mood. One way to identify the issues is to list the criteria of a good income maintenance scheme. At the least these number four:

1. Money should be given to those who need it but not to those who do not (of this more later).
2. The grants should not be tokens. They must be substantial enough to achieve their stated purpose, the elimination of financial poverty.
3. Grants should be extended in ways that strengthen rather than damage the incentive to get paid jobs in the labor market.
4. Finally, the grants should be substitutes only for that portion of welfare assistance which covers goods freely available in the market place to those with the money to buy them—food, clothing, recreation, and the like. Where welfare counsels, trains, or treats, the argument is for extension of present programs not contraction.

Broadly, these criteria describe the position of economists who are also liberal Democrats. Those to the Left will not accept the first criterion as now stated. Those to the Right will quarrel with the last one.

Without further preamble, let us glance at some of the actual proposals that have been made. Take a very simple one first. If a family's earned income is too low, why not just give its members whatever is needed to bridge the gap between its present situation and the poverty minimum? Thus, if a family of four earns only $2,000, the prescription is a cash grant of $1,130. As the family's earned income rises to $2,500, diminish the grant to $630, and when earned income touches $3,130, discontinue the subsidy entirely.

This procedure severely tests the incentives of the poor and the generosity of the just barely not poor. As far as the effect upon the poor is concerned, increasing earned income from one point below the poverty line to another, higher point means a tax of 100 per cent upon earnings, a poor impetus indeed to initiative and extra effort. Those whose incomes just barely exceed $3,130 and who are therefore ineligible for assistance will, to put it mildly, be inclined to dislike a program that

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differentiates little between the fully employed at low wages and the "poor." A man earning $3,200 a year is unlikely to be thrilled at the sight of his neighbor, unemployed and granted a cash subsidy of $3,130.

Examine next a very different scheme. Chicago's Milton Friedman supports income maintenance because, as a believer in the free market, he desires a maximum freedom of choice. Cash benefits are superior to present welfare measures for reasons that Mr. Friedman summarizes in this way:

> The advantages of this arrangement are clear. It is directed specifically at the problem of poverty. It gives help in the form most useful to the individual, namely, cash. It is general and could be substituted for the host of special measures now in effect. It makes explicit the cost borne by society. It operates outside the market. Like any other measures to alleviate poverty, it reduces the incentives of those helped to help themselves, but it does not eliminate that incentive entirely, as a system of supplementing incomes up to some fixed minimum would. An extra dollar earned always means more money available for expenditure.[1]

In this statement Friedman made explicit his intent: rely on free choice, substitute grants for welfare services, and preserve incentives. This last point deserves amplification, for in Friedman's view the preservation of incentives requires termination of assistance at incomes far below the poverty line.

Without necessarily endorsing this limited assistance, the Wisconsin economist Robert Lampman has described the way Friedman's plan would work. Speaking of our present structure of taxes, Lampman notes that the "present rates fall from 70 per cent at the top to 14 per cent at incomes just above $3,700 for a family of five, to zero per cent for income below $3,700." It would be easy to extend the progressive tax structure downward:

> The average negative tax rates could move . . . from zero per cent to minus 14 per cent for, say, the unused exemptions that total $500, to 20 per cent for those that total $1,000 and 40 per cent for those that total $3,700. This would amount to a minimum income of $1,480 for a family of five; it would retain positive incentives through a set of grants that would gradually diminish as earned income rose.[2]

But the gain in incentives would entail a high cost: many families would be left far below the poverty line and some would be placed in a worse situation than welfare now puts them in. And the emphasis upon incentives appears decidedly misplaced so far as the elderly, hand-

1 Milton Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom*, University of Chicago Press, p. 192.
2 *American Economic Review*, May 1965, p. 527.

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icapped, or disabled are concerned in groups which form a very large percentage of the poor.

The most seriously worked out (and the most generous) version of income maintenance is that of James Tobin, a member of the first Kennedy Council of Economic Advisers and now Professor of Economics at Yale. Tobin makes a deliberate effort to compromise among incentives, grant adequacy, and financial burdens upon the community. His proposal makes ingenious use of both cash grants and tax benefits. If a family has no income from earnings at all, Tobin would pay it $400 per person. For Lampman's family of five this would be $2000 as compared to the $1,480 contemplated on Friedman's assumptions by Lampman. But for Tobin this is by no means the maximum. As this family's earned income moves upward from zero, the grant is decreased by 33⅓ per cent of each additional dollar earned. It stops entirely when family earned income approaches $1200 per person. Above that income the family continues to pay taxes at the same 33⅓ per cent rates until it attains earnings of $7963 where it begins to encounter normal tax treatment. A portion of Tobin's illustrative table will make the consequences of the Tobin arrangement plainer:[3]

MARRIED COUPLE WITH THREE CHILDREN

(1) Family Income before Federal Tax Allowance	(2) Present Tax (–)	(3) Tax Schedule Income after Tax	(4) Tax (–) Allowance	(5) Proposed Schedule or Income after Tax or Allowance
$ 0	$0	$0	$2000	$2000
1000	0	1000	1667	2667
2000	0	2000	1333	3333
2500	0	2500	1167	3667
3000	0	3000	1000	4000
3700	0	3700	767	4467
4000	– 42	3958	667	4667
5000	–185	4815	333	5333
6000	–338	5662	0	6000
7000	–501	6499	–333	6667
*7963	–654	7309	–654	7309
8000	–658	7342	–658	7342

* Income level at which the present and the proposed methods of calculating taxes and benefits coincide; above this income (as at the $8,000 level included in the last line) the present tax schedule applies.

[3] James Tobin, "The Case for an Income Guarantee," *The Public Interest*, Number 4, Summer 1966, p. 38.

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How successfully does this schedule of benefits and taxes compromise among Tobin's three objectives? On the incentive side, the plan scores well. Beneficiaries of the scheme are allowed to retain two-thirds of additional earnings. They receive special tax treatment all the way up to an earned income of $7963. On any reasonable computation the budgetary cost is also manageable. In the summer of 1966, Tobin estimated gross cost to be $12.5 billion annually. However, since welfare payments would be reduced (not eliminated as under Friedman's scheme) net costs would be much lower, possibly of the order of the year to year increase (at full employment) of federal budgetary receipts.

Some important questions remain, even after this much is said. It is apparent that in Tobin's model, families whose earned incomes do not reach $2500 will still be below the poverty line even after they receive their income grants. Whether their lot will be improved by substituting grants for some portion (or all) of welfare payments will depend upon the political constituency in which the poor family resides. In the more ungenerous states where welfare assistance stops at a low percentage of the poverty minimum, Tobin's system would improve the lot of many families even if all welfare payments stopped as a consequence of the grants. But in comparatively liberal constituencies like New York City and Connecticut, many poor persons will actually be worse off. This is likely to be especially true of elderly widows or widowers whose sole present income derives from Social Security. A $400 grant added to a small Social Security pension leaves their beneficiary well below the poverty line. Conceivably Tobin's position may be damaged if the income grant serves as a pretext for the elimination of more generous welfare supplements to his Social Security pension.

Such points, however, are far from fatal flaws. If the public will allows, it is perfectly possible to reform welfare practices in such a way as to avoid automatic curtailment of assistance by as much or more than the income grant. But it bears repetition to say that if the objective of public policy is the elimination of poverty, no plausible scheme of income maintenance can serve as a complete substitute for other measures, including welfare, housing subsidies, retraining allowances, and unemployment compensation.

Tobin's plan raises questions at the other end of the income scale as well. As the table makes clear, families will receive actual cash grants even though their income from earnings substantially exceeds poverty minima. Moreover, some families will enjoy special tax treatment all the way up to nearly $8000 of earned income. Should we thus assist families, substantially above the poverty line, and actually above the

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median income level of all American families, a figure not much in excess of $6000? Or, to put the matter sharply, should the extremely prosperous subsidize not alone the poor but also the *less* prosperous?

To say "yes" unequivocally to these questions (as I do) is to make a judgment about the equity of present taxes and the fairness of the present distribution of income between rich and poor. If one believes (as again I do) that present exemptions and rates outrageously favor the affluent, then any proposal which redistributes even a small sum from rich to poor and average citizens is a good thing. It is important to recognize that any proposal which promises really substantial help to the poor (on a scale far larger than Tobin contemplates) will redistribute income and at the same time fracture the fragile alliance which joins liberal and conservative exponents of income maintenance plans.

What finally of the rather different mechanism of income support favored by Daniel Moynihan? In his testimony before the Ribicoff Committee, Moynihan spoke strongly in favor of a family allowance scaled to the number and age of dependent children. As he noted, most industrial nations (including neighboring Canada) operate family allowance plans, so that the idea itself is less novel than negative income taxes or other forms of generalized income grants. For the United States Moynihan estimated the cost of a possible program as about $9 billion each year. Some of the relevant numbers appear in this quotation.

> A family allowance for the United States roughly equivalent to Canadian or Scandinavian levels would suggest payments of perhaps $8 a month for all children under 6 years of age, and $12 a month for children between 6 and 17. At present population levels this would cost $9 billion a year, just over 1 per cent of the gross national product. For a family of four children, this would increase income by, say, $40 a month, or roughly $500 a year.[4]

Of this approach to income support, it must be said at the outset that it raises in the most direct form an issue of social policy implicit in all income maintenance schemes. A public policy which simultaneously sings the virtues of birth control and small families, and actually rewards financially not the childless but rather the parents of large broods, is, to say the least of it, confusing. The mind rather boggles at public subsidy, say, to Senator Kennedy's 10 children. More seriously, family allowances at least on the scale presently advocated by Mr. Moynihan will not of themselves raise a very large proportion of the poor out of their poverty even when families are large. The program will evidently do nothing at all to assist the childless or the elderly.

[4] See *The New York Times Magazine*, February 5, 1967, p. 71.

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Where do we come out at the end of this quick glance at the schemes of the well-intentioned? As now designed, no proposal is a complete remedy for financial poverty. In part this outcome is the consequence of intent (as in the Friedman proposal). In part it is the result of prudent estimates of political reality.

Here is an example of the political reality Tobin and Moynihan may have held in mind. The speaker is Senator Ribicoff, a cautious and presumably representative moderate northern Democrat:

> The idea of giving the poor more money—whether it is a guaranteed income or a negative income tax—is being discussed a great deal these days. As a person with some political experience, you can recognize how hard it is to put the idea across. Instead of talking about a guaranteed income tax, suppose we talk about guaranteeing everybody a job... The person earning $100,000 a year wouldn't be worried very much about someone who would be getting $3,000 a year, even though he was not working. But how about the man who works 40 hours a week for $3,500 a year and sees his neighbor get $3,000 a year for not working? I think the American people will just not be able to swallow this.[5]

Friedman set his final income after assistance at so low a percentage of the poverty minimum because he feared larger benefits would impair incentives and divert benefits to those who really did not need them. The Tobin approach has the effect of relieving a rather larger percentage of poverty but only at the cost or with the added merit (according to viewpoint) of indulging in some redistribution of income in the direction of equality. Though it is not so presented, the Tobin proposal is the most radical in its implications.

All plans seems to demonstrate that it is impossible to design a proposal which simultaneously eliminates financial poverty, stimulates incentives, and avoids "unneeded" rewards to the moderately prosperous, nonpoor. It is fair then to restate a point which has run through this essay.

At least for liberals and still more for radicals, income guarantees, however designed, are an addition to the armory of social care, not a substitute for everything from job retraining to psychiatric counseling. A good income maintenance scheme will substitute for that portion of welfare now most burdensome upon both recipient and social worker, the portion which consists of grants for food, shelter, and clothing. Income maintenance will facilitate the long-overdue reconstitution of welfare as individual case work. Income guarantees, properly viewed, fit properly into a public policy design which includes more liberal

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 68.

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Social Security programs, a full-employment level of aggregate demand, provision in public service employment for those unable to secure jobs even in time of high demand, genuine desegregation of schools, suburbs, and cities, and a serious attempt to turn our cities into livable abodes for free citizens.

William B. Gould

DISCRIMINATION AND THE UNIONS

As the protests of 1963 and '64 with their picketing of "Jim Crow" construction projects begin to fade into history, so does the unequivocal blessing the AFL–CIO gave to the 1964 Civil Rights Act and its fair employment provisions. Certainly, no leadership has been so far in advance of its constituency as that of the labor movement on the civil rights issue. The CIO unions, particularly, pushed hard for civil rights legislation when the issue was far more moral than political —as it was 20 years ago. Large Negro memberships have also made it less difficult for them to speak out, for instance, against formal racial exclusions and the separation of Negro workers in segregated locals.

Yet, although the labor movement continuously reminds us of its support for anti-discriminatory legislation, its somewhat defensive repetition of this point indicates that something has gone wrong. This is not George Meany drawing away from the 1963 "March on Washington" for fear of a tactical error. It is something more fundamental, suggesting that organized labor is out of step with the general drift of job advancement for Negroes when that advancement tampers with established union policies and procedures.

What was said by the Civil Rights Commission in 1961 still holds: "within the labor movement . . . civil rights goals are celebrated at the higher levels but fundamental internal barriers tend to preserve discrimination at the workingman's level." Moreover, as some of Walter Reuther's recently expressed frustrations with the craft unions reveal, the resistance to institutional change has also begun to emerge more clearly at the international level.

This refusal to abide with civil rights legislation penetrates the

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union's own bailiwick and tends to disrupt efforts by those in both the civil rights and labor movements who still seek to fashion a Negro-labor-liberal coalition that will be a vehicle for effective reform. For while liberals like Gus Tyler talk about the need for such an alliance (see his recent book, *The Labor Revolution*), the unions seem unwilling or unable to take the initiatives which could make such a pact beneficial to *both* sides.

A number of recent disputes are representative of what I would describe as an unyielding response on the part of labor to certain fundamental Negro demands. The first arises out of civil rights agreements negotiated in 1964 and 1966 between the Hotel Employers Association of San Francisco and various civil rights organizations. Under federal law a union which is designated by a majority of the employees bargains as exclusive representative for *all employees* within the unit. On the basis of this doctrine and certain hiring hall provisions in their collective bargaining agreement, the Culinary Workers Union challenged the validity of these agreements. The case was decided by arbitration in November 1966—in a hearing held without any of the civil rights groups that had negotiated the agreements in question. Although the courts are divided on whether a minority rival union has the right to engage in limited negotiations where certain employees prefer such representation to their own exclusive bargaining representative, the arbitrator ruled flatly that ". . . the civil rights group had no right to represent or purport to represent employees of the hotel with respect to terms or conditions of employment since the Union was the authorized bargaining representative."

The opinion neglected to mention the above referred-to decisions on rival unions or to note that a civil rights organization should be far less disruptive to the concept of an exclusive representative than a rival union. Moreover, the arbitrator held that the contractual obligation to hire more Negroes was unlawful "preferential" treatment, a theme which is being used against minority employment in many contexts. While portions of the civil rights agreement appeared to contradict the collective agreement negotiated by the Culinary Workers Union and were perhaps therefore void, the arbitrator's decision was so wide-sweeping in its exclusion of Negro representation that it provided the basis for justifiable furor in the San Francisco Negro community.

As might be expected, the right-to-work advocates have attempted to capitalize on the mood of outrage and to convince the Negro community that unionism, as an institution, is hostile to the aspirations of colored workers. The more sensible Negro approaches, however, do not

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express opposition to the union *qua* union but rather seek to limit the arbitrary uses of union power. Where this sort of conduct makes it impossible for Negroes to work within the established structure, some form of independent action may be the only alternative. Thus, Herbert Hill, labor secretary for the NAACP, came to San Francisco in December to call for the decertification of unions "that are engaged in anti-union practices" i.e. racial discrimination; and perhaps more important, Hill asserted that the NAACP would support new "black unions" whenever the "AFL-CIO fail in their legal duty to provide fair and equal representation to minority group members and also where they refuse to organize in Negro ghetto areas. . . ."

Used as a bargaining lever to gain concessions from the labor movement, the "black union" concept may have something to commend it as a temporary measure. But it is doubtful whether such unions can provide Negro workers with resources, financial and otherwise, to improve their work conditions substantially. It is not probable—nor desirable—that black and white unions will engage in competition for the loyalty of Negro workers. Where the AFL–CIO unions are in default, however, "black unions" can be a useful thorn in the labor movement's side.

In February of this year there was another visitor to the West Coast—Bayard Rustin, of the A. Philip Randolph Institute—who pointed out that "right to work" legislation meant "destroying the institution of collective bargaining and thus keeping Negroes and other minority members at the bottom of the economic ladder." Rustin went on to say that

> there is still discrimination in a minority segment of the American labor movement. This is a scandal, however, that is being vigorously fought by every unionist, black or white, who is worthy of the name. I myself am, in my own capacity, committed to end the vestiges of discrimination in the trade union movement, but I absolutely refuse to conduct the battle along lines that will ultimately injure the labor movement. I could not do this and still remain convinced that Negroes have a need and responsibility to make that movement stronger and more effective.

One finds the Rustin line appealing, premised as it is on the coalition theory, until one ponders an essential question which he leaves unanswered: must it always be the labor movement itself which determines what is injurious to its interests? If the answer is yes, then clearly the price of coalition is too high and, at least for the time being, the Hill approach becomes a plausible technique for extracting concessions.

One example of this trend is the Maryland Freedom Labor Union, which is staffed by Negro workers and serves as a bargaining agent for

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employees—practically all of whom happen to be colored—in a small number of retail establishments in East Baltimore. MFLU has recently negotiated a contract with Roth's Supermarket in East Baltimore in which wages were substantially increased. The AFL–CIO has not paid sufficient attention to this segment of the work force and has thereby missed an opportunity.

In Columbus, Ohio—where the Justice Department brought suit on April 13 against Local 683 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers for engaging in a "pattern or practice" of discrimination (the first such suit under the 1964 Civil Rights Act)—some government contractors are being forced to hire Negro craft workers through an organization called the Independent Alliance of Skilled Crafts. Negro workers—who, after all, were forced out of the crafts by white employees after Reconstruction—have formed the Independent Alliance to fill the needs of employers who are fearful of having their government contracts revoked because of the absence of Negro workers and who, at the same time, cannot get Negro labor from the craft unions in Columbus. In Columbus and in many other cities, there is untapped organizing potential in Negro craftsmen who work outside the union structure, sometimes on a part-time basis, on any job they can obtain. The significance of this potential is underscored by the much publicized recent decision of *Ethridge v. Rhodes* were the Ohio District Court has held that the State of Ohio cannot enter into construction contracts with parties that will not "obligate themselves and be legally eligible and prepared actually to secure a labor force only from sources that will reasonably assure equal job opportunities."

Both the MFLU and the Independent Alliance are representative of increased organizational cooperation and racial pride among Negroes —as distinguished from racism or "black power" insofar as that term signifies an anti-white philosophy. While it is foolish to regard phenomena like the Maryland Freedom Union as a serious threat to the established order, such groups may make the AFL–CIO sufficiently uncomfortable to encourage a more responsive attitude toward Negro demands.

This cannot come too quickly. For even the Workers Defense League —which has received cooperation from the craft unions in recruiting minority youngsters in New York and preparing them for apprenticeship entry tests—has begun to run into resistance from the Sheet Metal Workers Local 28. In 1964 there had been litigation before the New York State Human Rights Commission and the New York State courts concerning the union's traditional father-son rule which gives preference

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for apprenticeships to the son of a member; this litigation broke down the barrier of nepotism.

The ranks were then opened up and tests given. In 1965, the WDL was able to place 11 Negroes in an apprenticeship class of 65. But the Union decided that the scores registered by Negro applicants were too high to have been legitimately obtained, and the State Commission was required to go to court before the Union was restrained from voiding the results of the tests. This flimsy pretense grasped at by Local 28 leaves a lasting impression. Even where sophisticated organizations like WDL intervene, there is no predicting the roadblocks that can be erected.

II

The most fundamental and serious controversies, however, involve the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). EEOC was established by Title VII, the fair employment practice provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. A growing discord between Negroes and the unions is graphically reflected in an article which appeared in the *Daily Labor Report* on April 3, reprinted from the monthly magazine of the United Association of Plumbers and Pipefitters and written by Peter T. Schoemann, its president.

Schoemann was responding to the EEOC's stepped-up offensive against the exclusion of Negroes from the skilled trade unions which regulate the apprenticeship programs and hiring halls and therefore control the supply of labor for some of the more lucrative jobs in the economy. EEOC is embarking upon a program of record-keeping and reporting; this will permit appraisal of the number of minority-group people within the membership and the apprenticeship programs. Schoemann's first line of defense against what he considered an unwarranted intrusion into the private economy was that the Commission's experience over its two years of existence indicated that industrial and not craft unions should be singled out for special attention. Reporting requirements for the crafts were unjustified, said Schoemann, because "there are few complaints of actual discrimination relating to building trades apprenticeship and hiring halls." Schoemann made it clear that the *raison d'être* of the Commission's program was even more distasteful:

> And what kind of report would be required? An enumeration of apprentices by racial groupings, naturally. How about that?—a practice odious to our membership and completely foreign to our traditions. If they want to inspect the jobsites for members of racial minorities, why don't they do it themselves? Or get the Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training to do it? Or maybe the Bureau of Labor Statistics or the Census

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> Bureau—both of them experienced at nose counting? It's their hot idea, not ours. . . .
> . . . is there something indecent about giving reasonable preference to sons of union members on apprenticeship entrance? Is there something unclean about a contractor taking his own son into his own job in preference to a Negro boy whom some academic liberal in a Washington office thinks he ought to take instead? This is a big part of our fight. Perhaps rather, since people are going to do what I described anyway, the real issue is their right to do it honestly and aboveboard, without the need for becoming ingenious experts at manipulating gobbledygook.

In another part of the same article, Schoemann, with apparent melancholy, says that:

> We helped get Title VII into the Civil Rights Act and so bring the Commission into being. Rightly used it could be the most powerful instrument in our national life for promoting equal employment opportunity. Our support for strengthening the Commission's powers will not be automatically forthcoming in the future, and it will not be forthcoming at all if the Commission demonstrates a healthy measure of bias on its own part towards building trades and apprenticeship and the hiring halls.

In other words, one might say, "we will support Title VII only so long as it is not enforced against us."

That characterization of Schoemann's remarks, however, is a bit unfair. For the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, by establishing the reporting requirements to which the crafts so vigorously object, is for the first time on a collision course with a dominant philosophy in the labor movement—a philosophy which becomes particularly operative where internal union problems are concerned. Employers, of course, have already submitted to the very same questionnaires which are now required of the craft unions—but if the unions objected to this practice, their protestations were not very audible. Now, unless the White House decides that 1968 is too near and that the crafts are more likely to stray from the Democratic fold than are Negro workers, the Commission—which has been relatively inconspicuous thus far in terms of forcing institutional changes—will undertake a major confrontation.

In retrospect, it is curious to recall labor's unanimous endorsement of Title VII. Schoemann probably envisaged EEOC as an agency to be molded along the lines of state commissions which have waited for complaints to come to them. While it might not be fair to place the entire AFL–CIO in the Plumbers' compartment (but see AFL–CIO Secretary-Treasurer William F. Schnitzler's recent statement that accusations of

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racial discrimination against building trades unions are "unadorned bunk"), it would seem that their view is the one expressed by the first Justice Harlan dissenting in *Plessy v. Ferguson*; i.e. a necessary prerequisite to equal protection under the law is color blindness on the part of governmental agencies.

One must be careful to note that the craft unions were not the first in the labor movement to take this type of position. For years it has been known that qualified Negro trade unionists could not be elected to the UAW Executive Board because Negroes were not in the majority in any single UAW constituency. Until 1962, when a vacancy was created with the understanding that it would go to a Negro, Reuther stated that the selection of a Negro to remedy this situation would be racial discrimination in reverse. In a situation aggravated by the allegation that white leaders were *being chosen* for a majority of black workers, Gus Tyler of the ILGWU characterized the notion that Negroes would want to elect a Negro business manager as establishing a "raci t" rather than a "unionist" basis of voting. While one could hope for the day when racial and ethnic background are completely irrelevant to the selection of union leaders, the plain facts are that in most instances Negroes can only be elected if they apply pressure as an organized group. This is what happened in the UAW, where Reuther's new policy seems largely due to the efforts of the Negro American Labor Council.

The charge of "preferential treatment" is levelled against efforts to get Negroes into skilled jobs "through affirmative action" by the Commission. But color *consciousness* is going to be a necessity if Negro workers are to make meaningful advances. Even Professor Ray Marshall of the University of Texas—whose recent report to the Department of Labor, *Negro Participation in Apprenticeship Programs*, is quite charitable to the building trades—has said:

> Preferential treatment for Negroes is opposed, of course, because it might discriminate against whites. But *special* programs for Negroes need not discriminate against Negroes or whites. For example, apprenticeship sponsors who have not recruited among Negroes in the past and who have no Negro employees, trainees, or members might make special efforts to recruit Negroes or to help them acquire training. This would be special treatment to include Negroes in the pattern, *but it would not be preferential treatment because it would extend to Negroes benefits which whites already enjoy*. [Emphasis added.]

Quite obviously EEOC cannot bring into play sanctions of the Civil Rights Act which may encourage recruitment unless it knows where Negroes do not participate. All too often there is not enough informa-

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tion available about even the apprenticeship program—information which might get to the Negro community and thus trigger a complaint. Schoemann makes it clear in his article that, regardless of what information the Commission obtains, his union will defend the father-son apprenticeship policy which serves as a "grandfather clause" in keeping Negroes out of some of the most lucrative jobs in the country. Curiously enough, this same principle is rationalized by Gus Tyler in *The Labor Revolution* on the ground that the same practices are followed by business people. Tyler overlooks the fact that nepotism is on the sharp decline in management circles (see Heilbroner, *The Limits of American Capitalism*). Moreover, even if one unabashedly engages in preferential hiring, the deliberate selection of Negroes and other minority groups has a more rational basis for public policy than does the selection of a member's son.

The building trades make two points, however, for which a great deal more can be said.

One is that the aggregate unemployment rate in the period 1961–65 in the construction industry actually exceeds the unemployment rate for Negro males during the same period of time. This factor not only limits the number of apprenticeship openings but leads to a little-publicized corollary: entry into apprenticeship programs, though it may provide the Negro community with a small cadre of sophisticated civil rights leaders, is hardly the answer to job inequality, let alone to the frighteningly high rate of Negro unemployment. Unless the Negro community begins to appreciate the very small gains that flow from the tumbling of this barrier, insoluble frustrations will remain. In any event, both the Negro community and the unions should be cooperating in support of legislation which will increase employment opportunities for both black and white workers. A recent proposal by Senator Robert F. Kennedy for the employment of slum residents on construction and renovation projects is a good starting point.

The second point made by the craft unions is that the industrial unions—which do not control hiring but influence such on-the-job rights as promotions—do not have clean hands. If the problem were not so serious, it would be amusing to note that both sides of the AFL–CIO blame each other for failing to treat the Negro worker fairly; and they are both correct. Indeed, the AFL–CIO has been resisting, albeit in a much more quiet and subtle fashion, a less stringent reporting system which EEOC is imposing upon "non-referral" unions. Some of the industrial unions, along with AFL–CIO representatives, have gone straight to the White House in an attempt to head off the establishment of

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"guidelines" by EEOC in an area of vast importance to many Negro workers—the discriminatory impact of seniority contractual provisions. Actually, these extraordinary efforts, viewed from the AFL–CIO vantage point, are quite necessary; for, as Peter Schoemann wrote in the article noted above, there have been a large number of complaints filed with EEOC alleging racial discrimination attributable to seniority provisions. The explanation for this is that the Negro worker, once on the job for a number of years, becomes more sophisticated about how the system operates than is the teen-ager who wants to get into an apprenticeship program.

For the moment, the Commission continues to rely on a "conciliation" process which attempts to persuade parties to sign settlement agreements. Former Chairman Stephen Schulman is quoted in the January 5 *Wall Street Journal* stating that "[we] have no policy on seniority as such . . . [it] doesn't lend itself to a proclamation." While the seniority dispute may not lend itself to a "proclamation," it certainly does warrant a policy.

III

This controversy arises out of segregated job patterns. Historically, in many establishments—especially in the South, where the practice was carried out on a *de jure* basis—Negro workers were consigned to the lower paying, less desirable jobs. Although these practices normally antedated union recognition, unions and employers negotiated collective agreements which established seniority districts around each racial group. There is hardly a person who seriously contends that this practice is lawful. The dispute concerns the remedy to eliminate what is unlawful.

The AFL–CIO Civil Rights Department contends that a remedy that disrupts negotiated seniority procedures would break faith with the interpretation of the Civil Rights Act which they have given to their members. In the AFL–CIO document, *Civil Rights: Facts vs. Fiction*, distributed prior to the passage of Title VII, these assurances are given:

> The law will properly put an end to discrimination in employment—including discrimination in seniority systems. *But it does not in any way interfere with existing job rights.* [Emphasis added.]

This statement—completely unsupported by the legislative history of Title VII—has been used to get the unions off the hook with their white members who have profited from job segregation. The unease with which the labor movement addresses itself to this subject is reflected in the manner in which the question is posed in the November 1966 issue

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of *The American Federationist* (the official monthly publication of the AFL–CIO) by Professor Ray Marshall:

> The seniority problem is complicated by a number of factors. Some unions fear the interests of white union members will be ignored in order to compensate Negroes for past discrimination. Civil Rights leaders argue, on the other hand, that preferential treatment of Negroes is necessary because merely eliminating discrimination will not permit Negroes to advance rapidly enough.

Note how that emotive phrase "preferential treatment" creeps back into any discussion which may lead to sacrifice on the part of white workers to compensate Negro workers for lost opportunities. As one who has attended EEOC discussions with civil rights organizations (and also with the AFL-CIO and some of the larger corporations), I must say I have never heard any civil rights spokesman advance a remedy which could objectively be labelled as "preferential treatment." On the other hand, I have seen "conciliation agreements" between EEOC and Negro workers which accord the latter far less than Title VII requires. And I have heard labor leaders say that EEOC should sit on its hands and wait for the remedy of full employment to wipe out seniority grievances.

In essence, unless a Negro worker is given some seniority credit for the purpose of future promotional opportunities and security layoff based upon time worked in the formerly segregated job, he is just as effectively denied equality through a "grandfather clause" as is the Negro applicant to a father-son apprenticeship program. But collective agreements often establish departmental or job classification seniority which designates the department or classification as the seniority unit. Outside of this unit, an employee loses all seniority and is subject to immediate layoff and loss of promotion rights.

Without racial considerations, there would be nothing inherently meritorious in one seniority system as opposed to another. Younger workers, for instance, might legitimately fence themselves into a narrow seniority unit out of fear of displacement by other workers with more plant-wide or company seniority. But it is obvious that a narrow unit, department, or classification, is detrimental to the Negro worker who has been denied the right to accumulate seniority, in the unit to which he now advances, because of a discriminatory promotion policy. A remedy must take into account the seniority previously accumulated and attempt to compensate for what would have been obtained but for discrimination. Without such an approach, the Negro worker's present employment status continues to embody within it past discrimination.

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At a conference between EEOC and the AFL–CIO in May 1966, no union leader would risk the ire of his white members by proposing some type of compromise on this issue. The one-sided response to what is admittedly a difficult question was that the Commission is not authorized to reform labor contracts involving "vested rights" of white employees.

Now anyone familiar with the process of collective bargaining knows that the unions themselves alter these "vested rights" on many occasions and that the courts have upheld such modifications. I therefore suggested in both a report to the Commission and in an article in the Winter 1967 issue of the *Howard Law Journal*—that an accommodation be arrived at between the competing interests of Negro and white workers. For the latter group has built up reasonable expectations, even if predicated on segregation, as to the future of its employment status.

In brief, I said that under practically no circumstances should Negroes *displace* whites; that where a valid "line of progression" exists—where it is truly necessary to learn one job before proceeding to the next—Negro workers should go to the bottom of the line just as the whites had done, unless it could be shown that a Negro's presently existing skills entitled him to more. I propose that Negro workers, once having entered this formerly all-white line, could exercise seniority accumulated on the "Negro job" *after a "residency" period was completed* during which the skills of the job could be learned. The purpose of the "residency" period would be to avoid promotion of the Negro employee with two weeks' experience on the job but more seniority than the white employee already on the job for two years. I suggested that this residency period be devised through collective bargaining between labor and management, a proposal which my civil rights friends caustically regarded as a loophole for evasion. However, my proposal included review by EEOC and the courts, if necessary, to determine whether evasion of Title VII had taken place.

This plan was too radical for the unions. It impinged upon the cherished concept of free collective bargaining. It was of little use to make the simple point that Congress had passed a statute prohibiting racial discrimination in employment regardless of whether collective bargaining agreements sanctioned the bias in question. And apparently this fact has been lost on EEOC which, as former Chairman Schulman says, has no "policy." It would seem that this agency—which cannot walk much faster than the pace proscribed for it by the White House—does not want to jostle the labor movement, at least the industrial-union side of it, as 1968 approaches.

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IV

Is the Negro to be assigned the subordinate role in the coalition? For the time being this would appear to be the case. More talk will not change the trade-union positions which have been referred to above: only court action could do the job. As John E. Hutchinson writes in *Employment, Race and Poverty*:

> Most union leaders are unexceptional men, and their behavior is in some fashion predictable. They are agencies of protest and protection; but grievances have priorities and racial discrimination is not high on the Caucasian list . . . the interests of their members come first. The majority of their members do not like to be disturbed. Race questions disturb.

That generalization, like all others, does not tell the whole story. Two years ago, New York City's District 65, Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union went out on strike in order to upgrade Negroes and Puerto Ricans. A labor leader like Harry Van Arsdale of the New York City Labor Council has opened up apprenticeship opportunities for minority youth in his own Local 3, IBEW. Moreover, Van Arsdale has been instrumental in the placement of Negro workers with other unions. But the conduct of District 65 and people like Van Arsdale is simply not widespread enough.

The cry of "black power" may be nonsensical rhetoric. (Insofar as it means self-defeating separatism rather than organizational solidarity. I believe that it is.) But for the time being, Negroes may well be justified in organizing more "black unions" in areas where the established labor movement will not tread, and by seeking effective representation for Negro workers where AFL–CIO unions are not providing it. Congress and the courts have established a duty for the unions to treat their members without discrimination. The judges may now have to direct more attention to strike action and walkouts by Negro workers in protest against discriminatory policies where the union supports neither their position nor the stoppage itself. Until Negroes have a say about the basis upon which any coalition is to be formed, it is not likely to thrive. In the meantime, the unions are losing the support of some of their potentially most valuable allies.

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P. K. Raina

POLAND: INTELECTUALS VS. THE PARTY

A Report on the Kolakowski Case*

Dr. P. K. Raina is an Indian historian who worked at the University of Warsaw's Institute for Contemporary History on a fellowship from the Polish Ministry of Higher Education. His book on Polish foreign policy until 1938 has been published by the Paris Institut Littéraire. On December 29, 1966, Dr. Raina was expelled from Poland for "anti-state activities" —for his contact with Leszek Kolakowski. The Polish police confiscated two of his completed manuscripts, a biography of Gomulka and a study of Poland's political parties during the period 1939–1944.

Students and faculty at the University of Warsaw can roughly be divided into two groups: one group of orthodox Marxists, which consists of about 5-10 per cent of the University population—and the majority group of liberal Marxists which can be subdivided into one very active group and another that is passive and seems to be indifferent to politics.

This last sub-group lives in constant terror of the Ministry of the Interior. These intellectuals have a most negative view of Communism in its present form and find it abominable; but they are convinced that none of them can do anything to change it. They know that any attempt to change things leads to trouble with the Party, and especially with Moczar, the Minister of the Interior. An intellectual suspected by Moczar is denied foreign travel, and his very livelihood is at stake. They all hate Moczar; but they want to keep their jobs, and they like to go occasionally abroad. So they remain silent, live in constant fear and insecurity, and suffer.

The liberal Marxists of the active sub-group, however, are brave and fearless. They openly oppose the Party. Their aim is to put liberal-

* This article has been translated, in a slightly condensed version, from the Austrian magazine *Neues Forum*.

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ism into practice. Their methods are not illegal: they talk at seminars, party meetings, and university discussion groups. The students are forbidden to demonstrate and are allowed to have discussions only at gatherings previously authorized by the Rector.

The orthodox Marxist students, professors and assistant professors are all Party people who closely cooperate with the leadership. The most depressing thing about them is their collaboration with the Ministry of the Interior. They write detailed reports on seminars, party meetings, and discussion clubs for the Ministry, which uses them to proceed against the liberals.

Censorship, Expulsions, Demonstrations

The liberal Marxists played a leading role in the Polish October Revolution of 1956. But Polish intellectuals were free to criticize Marxism, Stalinism, and their own political system for only a year. By 1957 the Party leadership began to feel that the situation was getting out of hand and Gomulka began to tell the Poles to think realistically—that is, to stop thinking. The intellectual weekly *Po Prostu* was suppressed, and censorship, which had been abolished in 1956, was resumed.

In 1964, when the Party ignored a protest against censorship signed by 34 well-known Polish intellectuals, there were big demonstrations at the University. The students asked the Rector for an explanation. He promised one, and the students dispersed peacefully; but the Rector did not keep his promise.

At the beginning of the winter semester of 1964 there were violent debates, especially among the liberal students, on the negative effects of Marxism, in which two young assistant professors of the faculty of history, Karol Modzelewski and Jacek Kuron, played a leading role. Consequently, they were expelled from the Party and the University; even their wives, who had also worked in the University, lost their posts.

A Letter to the Party

Through its student collaborators the Ministry of the Interior spread the news that the two assistant professors worked with "Western imperialists" and wanted to destroy the Polish state. The two men were offered no opportunity to defend themselves against these slanders. Therefore, they wrote a long letter to the Party organization at the University in which they criticized the orthodox doctrine of Marxism and made the following criticisms:

(1) The Party is almighty.

(2) The Party elite is the sole bearer of state power. All decisions

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are made by this elite. Neither the workers nor the ordinary Party members have any influence on these decisions. Election to the Parliament and provincial assemblies is a fraud because there is only a single list, proposed by the Party leadership.

(3) There is no genuine difference between the program of the United Polish Workers party (CP) and the programs of the other satellite parties.

(4) The people have no alternative choice of government. The government which was not really elected, becomes too sure of itself. There is no opposition and, hence, no confrontation.

(5) There is no opportunity for public criticism. There is no freedom of assembly. The censorship is terribly severe, and the consequences for the intellectuals are deadly.

(6) The penal legislation, which is still semi-fascist or Stalinist, is applied by the Party and the Ministry of the Interior, with no respect for legality.

(7) The result is that state, Party, and society fall into stagnation.

Soon after this letter was received, the Ministry of the Interior had Kuron and Modzelewski arrested. They were taken to a secret trial, handcuffed like criminals, and accused of having spread "destructive propaganda." Their letter to the Party was the only evidence against them. They were condemned in 1965 to six-and-a-half years' imprisonment. At that time, the Rector, fearing a riot, forbade all demonstrations.

Dissolution of the Faculty of Philosophy

In the beginning of 1966 the Party's Central Committee dealt the University another blow. The Party decided to dissolve the faculty of philosophy, which it feared. It now is no longer possible to take a regular five-year philosophy course. And one first must complete another course of studies in order to take philosophy as a special subject. This course takes three or four years and is limited to 15–20 students. The students are selected by the Minister of the Interior upon recommendation by the Party, which thus tries to control the thought of all future philosophers. The same thing has happened at the Universities of Cracow and Wroclaw.

The Warsaw students, protesting against the closing of the University's department of philosophy, marched before the tribune on May 1 and chanted rhythmically, "Phi-lo-so-phy! Phi-lo-so-phy!"

The Rector forbade all discussion on the subject. The *collegium* of the faculty of philosophy, however, unanimously voted a resolution

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against the decision of the Central Committee; but their protests were ignored.

In June 1966 several young assistant professors—Party members—wrote a letter to *Pravda* protesting the sentencing of Daniel and Sinyavski; they were put on the Party's blacklist.

At about the same time, two assistant professors of the faculty of political science wrote a letter to the Central Committee, saying they were puzzled by the political development of the country and especially by the curtailment of the freedom of speech and the severe penalty exacted for holding divergent political opinions. They were expelled from the Party and the University.

October 21, 1966: Leszek Kolakowski Speaks

The meeting was due to start at 6:00 P.M. By 5:30 it was impossible to enter the hall, which normally holds 100 people; several hundred stood outside the door. Students stood on chairs, desks, windowsills, and on each other, their feet on the shoulders of their fellow students, their backs against the wall. Men who found a place to sit had women on their knees, who, in turn, supported other women on their laps. No one complained. Everyone was excited and expectant. We were all happy—happy to hear a man whose thoughts were bold, sincere, and alive.

At 6:15 there were calls for silence. The chairman of the meeting, a young historian, announced that the evening's speaker had already tried to enter the hall, in vain. He asked the people in the hall to let in the man they had come to hear.

Laughter. Then thundering applause for several minutes. A thin man entered the hall, a man with a long pale face and hair difficult to comb, wearing his habitual trenchcoat; a thin man with a bold heart, an iron will, a powerful intellect; an uncommonly good speaker—Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warsaw, Leszek Kolakowski.

Kolakowski's speech was simple and clear:

> Why are we here? Oh, yes, it is the tenth anniversay of our October Revolution. On October 21, 1956, the Central Committee of the United Polish Workers Party (CP) met to give formal recognition to Gomulka's leadership; Stalinism was condemned. . . . A new Poland was to arise—sovereign, free, liberal. Poland's road to socialism had begun. But that was 10 years ago. What have we got to celebrate today? Nothing, absolutely nothing.

There was extreme tension in the hall, and complete silence.

The October Revolution of 1956 was not the starting point of changes

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in the doctrine of socialist ideology; the wave of criticism first arose after Stalin's death. Stalinism was simply the destruction of culture. Terror is terror; destruction is destruction. Khrushchev's Party Congress was the ruin of Stalinist ideology.

Kolakowski then spoke of the liquidation of Beria, the East Berlin uprising, the Hungarian Revolution and Soviet intervention, and of the abuse of the rights won in 1956:

Under those circumstances, the Polish nation could not become united except through change: the Revolution of 1956 gave Poland back its sovereignty—in economic planning, in the right to have its own administration, in freedom of criticism, etc. To some extent, the Revolution meant the end of dogmatism; and consequently, some improvement in the level of newspapers and textbooks. . . .

We can judge breaches of legal rights only when rights exist. But we cannot judge them when they are nonexistent, as in the Stalinist period, when there existed only pseudo-rights and pseudo-laws. Since 1956 we have had reason to believe that certain rights and laws do exist in Poland. We now have had 10 years in which it was possible to make comparisons and pass judgments; today we can say that such and such rights in this country are limited and such and such laws are arbitrarily abused by the state.

The worst of these laws is the Small Penal Code of 1945, according to which one can be sentenced to five years' imprisonment on the ground of a simple denunciation. The very fact that this code exists is proof that legality is disregarded. Denunciations and "political crimes" go together, and their result is repression.

There is no genuine democracy in this country; there is very little chance for the people to choose their leaders. The leadership which is not really elected becomes arrogant and supercilious. There is no opposition; hence, there is no confrontation between those who have power and those who do not. And so our political system is ridden with incompetence and bureaucracy.

The government does not feel responsible to the people. A system of privilege prevails for a few people who are above and outside the law. The language of the constitution can be interpreted differently and arbitrarily. These methods have not yet been abolished.

There is no public criticism. There is no freedom of assembly. The censorship is extremely severe. The situation, if possible, is worse in literary criticism, modern sociology, and contemporary history; for here the consequences are even more deadly.

All this has weakened our society, there is no prospect, no hope. The state, the Party, and society all have become victims of this stagnation.

There is nothing to celebrate.

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Kolakowski ended with a few words of hope against all hope. Tumultuous applause filled the Institute building. We clapped, stamped our feet, shouted—some of us red with anger, some with tears in their eyes.

Some 50 members of the orthodox group, restless and confused, sat in the midst of this enthusiasm. They were busy writing everything down.

The next man to speak was Pomian, a philosopher. He talked only about the ZMS (Association of Socialist Youth); he said it was ridden with a bureaucratic and hierarchical spirit, had no initiative, and was full of indifference—deadly things for an association of this kind.

The Chairman now threw the meeting open to discussion. I was the first to speak. Kolakowski, I said, was a great thinker and moralist, and I loved him not only for his ideas but as a man. Ear-splitting applause. Then I criticized the absurd censorship and the low level of the books on contemporary history.

The next speaker was Duracz, a mathematics student. His words struck like a bomb. He said he wanted to propose a spontaneous resolution: Since the meeting was organized by the Association of Socialist Youth, Duracz said, it was our duty to pass a resolution demanding the freeing of Kuron and Modzelewski. Stormy applause.

The meeting had reached a critical point; the Chairman became restless. Could he permit a debate on the resolution? His post was at stake. First, he took no definite position and proposed to continue the discussion.

Someone said: "Why doesn't anybody defend the Party?"

"They are cowards," said another.

"Here is one of them," said a third, pointing to an orthodox member of the Youth Association. "Let him come up and explain to us why Kuron and Modzelewski were jailed."

Now the Chairman intervened; the meeting had been called for the purpose of normal discussion, not to start demonstrations. As soon as the atmosphere became somewhat calmer, he added that he could not accept the resolution because it wasn't on the agenda.

"Nonsense," answered the audience. Sawicki, a physics student, stood up and read another resolution. It consisted of quotations from a speech made by Gomulka at the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee, held in October 1956. Gomulka had emphasized that Marxists in the Party could hold different opinions. Sawicki proposed a vote on this speech. Great applause.

The situation became more and more critical. The dean of the

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faculty of history was present, and a few younger professors who had been student leaders in the 1956 Revolution. They shared the students' feelings. The students became more and more angry, the professors more and more impatient; all wanted to vote on the resolutions here and now.

Only one man could still bring the situation under control: the Dean. He was an honest and courageous man; his task was thankless, as he openly admitted. He himself had nothing against the resolutions, he said, but under the circumstances he could not permit further debate. Innocent people would have to suffer unnecessarily, he warned. The students proved reasonable. They knew what the Dean was talking about, and they calmed down.

The Chairman asked Kolakowski to say a last word. He was brief: "Socialists," he said, "must be rationalists. Reason and democracy are inseparable. Socialists despise demagogues." [Wild applause.]

The Chairman declared the meeting officially closed. But the students did not want to leave the hall. They wanted at least to discuss the resolution. Kolakowski, Pomian, and the Dean calmed them down, and reason won again.

We parted peacefully, but in an embittered mood.

November 15, 1966: Professors against the Party

The speeches of the meeting held at the Historical Institute on October 21 were not only taken down by certain students; agents of the Ministry of the Interior had also tape-recorded Kolakowski's speech and the whole discussion.

The immediate consequence was Kolakowski's expulsion from the Party. Moreover, several students who had organized a meeting received a sharp warning. Six others were expelled for "indecent behavior," as Rector Turski explained, meaning that they had spoken in the discussion on the resolution for freeing Kuron and Modzelewski and carried placards.

The expulsion of Kolakowski from the Party was ordered by the Central Committee, and the local Party organization of the University was not consulted. The expulsion of the students was also ordered from above.

The Rector's weakness is notorious; he has never questioned the Party leaders' orders. His reputation among the University intellectuals is correspondingly low.

The expulsion of Kolakowski and the punishment of the students upset almost everyone at the University, students and professors alike. There were a few exceptions: the Rector, and members of the Executive

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Committee of the Union of Polish Students (ZSP) and the Association of Socialist Youth (ZMS). The latter are known throughout the University as careerists and opportunists. They are the officially elected representatives of the students; but the election is a farce. They are generally hated by the students and they, in turn, hate the students, especially those who dare to criticize. Not one functionary of the ZSP or ZMS had a good word for Kolakowski.

The initiative now lay with the professors. They felt that their position and honor were under attack and that their livelihood was threatened. They disapproved of this all too direct intervention by the Party in matters under the jurisdiction of the University. Until then, they had expressed their disapproval in private conversations or in seminars. This time there was an explosion.

This explosion, to be sure, was heard only by those who were there on November 15, 1966. The Polish press has remained silent, and Polish public opinion has thereby remained ignorant.

On November 15, 1966, at 5:00 P.M., the Party organization of the University met. Attendance was compulsory. Kliszko, the secretary of the CC, Gomulka's number two man and chief ideologist, addressed the meeting in the Great Hall. Not all Party members come to such meetings, even though attendance is compulsory. The University's Party organization does not meet regularly, only in a crisis. The last meeting had been called almost two years earlier.

The November 15 session was of historic importance: for the first time the members came not to listen to a Party leader but to tell him what they thought—with new candor and courage. It was the most open discussion in the 22 years since the restoration of Poland. Never before had the Party leadership been so violently challenged by the intellectuals; never before did it have to defend its bureaucratic position with so much rhetoric, demagogy, and cynicism.

The session lasted, with short breaks, from 5:00 P.M. to 1:30 A.M.

Kliszko briefly explained the international situation: Vietnam, attacks on China—the usual clichés of no interest to anyone. The blood began to boil only when he touched on the University's most sensitive nerve: Kolakowski.

Kliszko had begun his speech in sober and measured tones. But when he came to the central point, his voice turned shrill, his face orange-red. He wanted to speak from a position of strength, using the old military trick—attack is the best defense:

> Kolakowski is in open opposition to the Party. He has broken Party

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regulations. He must not benefit from the privileged position he has enjoyed at the University for the last nine years. Kolakowski's views are directed against the Party. He offers, as an alternative, another party: Social Democracy. His speech at the meeting in the Historical Institute was a breach of Party discipline.

Why did we tolerate him so long? Why did we not expel him earlier? The guilt lies with the weak Party organization at the University. The Central Committee, too, hesitated before it decided to sentence him to this severe punishment. But his activities have now transgressed the Party's bounds of toleration.

The difference between the Party's thinking and Kolakowski's lies in the attitude toward socialist and proletarian democracy. This difference produced a crisis when Kolakowski defended Kuron and Modzelewski in court.

Kolakowski collaborated with Kotarbinski,* in drafting a document entitled "An Opinion on the Problem of the Idea of Information." This document was submitted to the tribunal that judged Kuron and Modzelewski. It was an insincere document, full of sophistry. Kolakowski, for example, proposed that Modzelewski's views be tolerated in the interests of free research.

Kolakowski gave us the impression of being in Modzelewski's confidence. Modzelewski's doctrine advocates the overthrow of the existing system; Kolakowski supports this doctrine. He defended Modzelewski and used this country's freedom of speech to spread Modzelewski's ideas.

The Central Committee invited Kolakowski to discuss the matter with him; Kolakowski claimed to be a socialist.

At the meeting in the Historical Institute, Kolakowski emphasized that the one-party system leads to stagnation. This shows that he has engaged in a struggle for the creation of another system and that he is against the dictatorship of the proletariat.

These views demonstrate Kolakowski's anti-socialist viewpoint. Kolakowski wants to introduce the bourgeois-liberal system in Poland.

Twenty years are not enough for a new system to influence a society; after each new revolution, it needs several generations.

The PUWP [Polish CP] is no Social Democratic party. It has no independent factions or groups with separate policies. We will not tolerate such groups: Party discipline is compulsory. The PUWP is a party in which there is no stagnation.

Kliszko's report was now to be discussed. The listeners were torn by emotions of fear and of rage. But they did not miss this opportunity of telling the Party leaders what they thought of them.

* The dean of Polish philosophers, now 80, a specialist in logic, former president of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Professor Kotarbinski is much respected by liberal Marxists and is a close friend of Kolakowski.

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Holzer, a young assistant professor at the Historical Institute who had belonged to the revolutionary elite in 1956, was the first to speak:

> The Party is not so well-informed about the meeting in the Historical Institute; it was the only meeting in the whole city to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution. Youth is always radical and lively; that's hardly a surprise. But it *is* surprising that we are being accused of having bourgeois-liberal ideas. The freeing of Kuron and Modzelewski is not a bad thing; they *must* be freed. The Small Penal Code of 1945 is a bad thing that must be abolished.
>
> Kolakowski is one of our great political intellectuals.
>
> It *is* alarming news that secret organizations exist in certain institutions of higher learning. For freedom of speech is indispensable.

Mme. Zakrzewska, professor of the law faculty:

> This is the first meeting of the University Party organization in two years. There seems to be also a need to introduce seminars for more profound discussion of ideological conflicts on a higher level.
>
> Kolakowski's situation must be analyzed with regard to the international situation; his punishment has only brought damage to the Party.
>
> Kolakowski is a great humanist. [Sustained applause.] He was not given the opportunity to defend himself. [Applause.] Kolakowski is a great representative of socialist thinking. [Stormy applause.] I support him and his ideas. [Violent applause.]
>
> The students want more freedom; they have not lived through the period before 1956 and so have no standard of comparison.
>
> The students' situation is also delicate. They will be taken before the Disciplinary Commission. This is a pity; they will now think that they have to pay for their doubts.
>
> I have heard that there will be some changes in the working methods of the Disciplinary Commission. What are they? Our Party and its activities should be a democratic example for other parties.

Myzner, the dean of the faculty of journalism:

> I was a Social Democrat. I think that is nothing evil.
>
> The meeting in the Historical Institute was a symbol of liberalism. People must be responsible for what they say; we should not make fun of youth or treat it condescendingly. And we must tell the people everything. [Applause.] And we must explain to the students everything that happened 10 years ago. It is nonsense to hold discussions behind closed doors; ideas spread and no one can stop them.
>
> Why has the Polish Press Law of 1938 not yet been changed?* The

* This law, passed by the prewar Sanacja government, provided for a strict control of the press and an arbitrary censorship.

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Party is on the defensive. The meeting in the Historical Institute was a confrontation of opinions. Party members had a chance then to proclaim their opinions; they did not take it. Discussions should be held without fear.

The University has inherited a new feudal bureaucracy. This structure must undergo a fundamental change. The University must become the center of political thinking.

Lesnodorski, dean of the faculty of law:

Kolakowski may have acted against the Party; but he is not an enemy of the Party. And it is most doubtful that he would reintroduce capitalism in this country. I now would like to thank Comrade Kliszko for his assurance that Kolakowski will not lose his post at the University.

There may be a group of students who want to cause trouble. But youth is skeptical; it lacks confidence. It may be undisciplined, but it is not bad. In capitalist countries youth adapts itself to the existing conditions; under socialism it is always active. There is great hope for the future of socialism because of the skepticism of our youth.

Other speakers included Morawski, dean of the faculty of philosophy, very pro-Kolakowski. Morawski used philosophical terminology and so much French that Kliszko could not understand the speech and praised it—amid laughter from the audience.

By now it was very late. Long speeches and empty stomachs had made people tired. They smoked many cigarettes, but that did not calm their nerves. They found an outlet in banging on desks, expressing wild agreement, and indulging in frenetic applause. The Party leadership seemed to be losing the ideological battle with the intellectuals. Kliszko was, indeed, already beaten. He was pale and nervous; so were the other Party celebrities: the Minister of Higher Education and five other members of the Politbureau were present.

This was the moment for an arrogant-looking young man in his early thirties, a typical backdoor careerist of no talent. He was a graduate of the University who cooperated closely with the Ministry of the Interior in their effort to destroy the intellectuals—Stanislaw Kociolek, First Secretary of the Warsaw Party Committee. Kociolek's speech was sharp, brutal, and cold:

I am against discussions, dialogues, seminars. Party unity is the supreme goal, discipline the supreme law in the life of the Party.

Modzelewski's ideas are spreading; his ideology is impure. He has adherents not only among youth. We cannot remain indifferent to this group. Modzelewski's followers are not immature. Their policy is cold

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and calculating. They organize demonstrations and meetings; they print political pamphlets. Their aim is to discredit the Party.

First they attack part of the Party program, then the entire program. They counted on being able to act unpunished, and the authorities had to repress them or make concessions.

Kolakowski's remarks about careerists, opportunists, and ideologists are grave accusations. I feel personally insulted by them.

Kolakowski was in contact with the passionate anti-Communist Zbigniew Brzezinski. The ideology spread by Kuron and Modzelewski is petty-bourgeois.

Intellectuals produce neither bread nor steel; the true socialists are the workers. Intellectuals can become as useless as the plague; it is the Party's duty to discipline them. They must submit to that discipline for the Party will not tolerate sectarianism. Whoever shows these tendencies will be destroyed.

Kociolek's speech put professors and students into a state of cold rage. He spoke to them from a position of strength and left no doubt that anyone who attacked his position would be beaten down ruthlessly.

Kociolek treated his former teachers with a cynical lack of respect, and the whole of his intellectual audience with cutting sarcasm. But behind this facade he hid fear and uncertainty. After all, the university professors were the only people who made the Party feel afraid.

In his final summary Kliszko spoke of intellectual snobbery. Generally here he sounded moderate. He admitted that there were two distinct groups in the audience: for and against the Party; unfortunately, the second group did not have the courage to come out into the open. He again condemned Kolakowski's liberalism and accused him of having had several conversations with Cardinal Wyszynski. Then came the final, vigorous warning. The Party would not tolerate "sectarianism," intellectual or otherwise.

Before the end of November the Party appointed a commission, headed by Sokorski, former Minister of Culture and the Arts. The Commission named several subcommissions. Every Party member at the University, students and faculty members, had to appear before one of these subcommissions.

Each subcommission had five to seven members: high-ranking functionaries to question professors, low-ranking ones to question assistant professors and students. Each session lasted two or three hours, sometimes more.

The university people had to read the text of Kolakowski's speech

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and listen to its tape-recording. Then they had to take a position on it. When their position was not clear, they were shouted down: "Comrade, do you or don't you agree with Kolakowski?" It was a kind of psychological torture; for everything that was said was recorded and tape-recorded so that it could be used against one later on.

Most of those questioned were defeated by this fear. They denied any connection between themselves and Kolakowski, between his views and theirs. Others spoke out directly against Kolakowski and condemned his views, both from fear and conviction. Only two, maybe three, professors remained true to their conscience; they defended Kolakowski and stood up for his ideas.

The Commission met last November and December. Poles soon coined a name for it: the Polish McCarthy Commission.

December 12, 1966: Adam Schaff against the Liberals

On December 12, 1966, the Party members of Warsaw University were called to another meeting, this time to elect a new Executive Committee. The meeting began at 9:00 A.M. and lasted late into the evening. The new Executive Committee was to be free of all "undesirable elements"—of candidates who had recently shown liberal leanings.

The discussion was very agitated. Several professors distinguished themselves in the fight against the Party's unjustified measures. Professors Brus (economics), Baczko (philosophy), and Morawski (philosophy) made passionate speeches defending Kolakowski, Kuron and Modzelewski. Brus's attack of the Party's proceedings was especially severe.

A young assistant professor of the faculty of economics painted a shattering picture of the growing anti-Semitism in the Party hierarchy. Before he could end his speech he fainted from excitement.

Another speaker, the son of a peasant, gave an excellent report on the agricultural situation. The Party was talking about how well-off the peasants were; that was a lie. He gave a detailed account of the miserable life the peasants led. It was a shame that certain comrades took their new cars at election time to visit peasants who lived in houses without running water and sanitary installations. "Comrades!" he shouted, "how long is this to go on?" Then he left the room. Werblan and Kociolek, the agents of the Party, turned pale.

The presence of one particular professor was especially noted at this meeting. On November 15 he had managed to be out of the country. This time he was present and it was he who tipped the scales between the orthodox and the liberals. His vote was awaited with the greatest excitement; it was very important to the liberals. But Adam

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Schaff [a leading Polish Communist intellectual and functionary] disappointed them all; he switched to the other side. He spoke for the orthodox group and attacked Kolakowski sharply. Kolakowski wanted to damage the Party, Schaff said. It would be absurd to maintain that there was no free discussion in the Party; there was such discussion in the Central Committee. He himself discussed matters freely in the Central Committee; he was just writing another book on Marxism and would discuss it—in the Central Committee.

It is doubtful whether Schaff, who had originally represented the liberal wing in the Central Committee, spoke from conviction. It is known that he had been dressed down by Kliszko on a number of previous occasions.

The relative strength of the two wings is now two to one in favor of the orthodox. This can be seen from the Party conference which met in October 1965 to discuss Schaff's book *Marxism and the Human Individual.* Fifteen speakers took part in the discussion. Five approved of the book, ten condemned it, including Kliszko.

Kliszko had said at the time that Schaff's views were "ill-considered, disrespectful, and unfounded," that Schaff's criticism was damaging the Party and was a deviation from the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism. "The point of view of our Party," Kliszko had said, "is surely more important than the things that different anti-Communist Marxologists have to say in the West about Marxism and Socialism." Kliszko almost implied that Schaff was about to become "a Western Marxist."

Before the December 12 meeting Schaff was asked to see Kliszko at Party headquarters. He received a sharp warning: "Either you march with us, or you take the consequences."

But Schaff does not have Kolakowski's political courage. As so often before, he yielded to Kliszko's threat. The result was the orthodox victory of December 12.

After December 12, the students called Schaff "opportunistic" and "insincere." His reputation diminished, and he lost the respect of those who still esteemed him.

Kolakowski and his friends now enjoy the highest respect in the country. Schaff is jealous of them; but it is all his own fault. Abroad, he gave the impression of being a liberal, but here in Poland he is—especially in his seminars—an autocrat.

And meanwhile all the issues raised by the Kolakowski case continue to fester.

Translated by I. A. LANGNAS

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Burton Feldman

THE COUNTERREVOLUTION OF SUSAN SONTAG

In that confusing variety of movements and moods lumped together as "the new radicalism," no one is more visible than Susan Sontag. This is in part a tribute to her own variety, for unlike many others, she is not easily blended into any particular wing or tendency. She is in every symposium on Vietnam or America run by *Partisan Review*, but also in *Mademoiselle* on culture in general, and everywhere else on the film or the latest French aesthetic or anthropology. This very versatility, far from diluting her impact, has made her a kind of high arbiter of the new taste as it spreads boldly in all directions. This would be reason enough for taking a close look at her. But there is a better reason: no one is more involved than she in what is most troubling and irresponsible in that newly developing cultural taste and political attitude. Despite her strongly voiced calls for a very radical politics, her final teaching is indifference or even hostility to both radicalism and politics.

At first sight, Miss Sontag's wide interests make it hard to grasp her political views very clearly. A reader's critical sense must be baffled when she starts out all at once praising Nietzsche and Wittgenstein and McLuhan, or SNCC and the Supremes and Emerson and Thoreau, or socialism and optimism and pessimism, or programming sensations along with Dionysian depths. Any critique of her sort of intellectual promiscuousness must seem at the least intolerant, dense, and square—and Miss Sontag does not hesitate to let you know it. Her writing is a marvel of a position pre-fortified against critical attack by its use of so many cherished "modern" hopes and positions. She comes on strong as a champion of experiment, openness, flexibility, and unrealized possibilities—to say nothing of love, youth, the Left—and it is certainly hard to argue with her without sounding a little cranky. But the more one reads her, the more one sees that she has indeed only a few interests with a single but hot focus that lends an energy to everything she writes about. That focus is a narrow "modernism" aggressively sitting in judgment on culture, aesthetics, morals, and politics. Whatever doesn't suit her pro-

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gram is called "old," or worse, "morality," or worst of all, "content"; what does suit her is called "form," or the "new sensibility," or the "extension of sensation." It is Miss Sontag's strategy to equate her version of "modernism" with all good things in culture and politics, and also with the radicalism of the young.

Many of Miss Sontag's admirers take her at her word that she is open and liberal in her views and sympathies. And looking over the list of subjects she writes about, who would dare doubt that? Those who dislike her grant her the pretensions of her stance; they too usually assume that if Miss Sontag spreads a modish irresponsibility and nihilistic attitude, it is because she gets carried away by enthusiasm for everything new, adventuresome, and liberating. Yet it ought to be said right away that Miss Sontag's irresponsibility springs not from an excess of enthusiasm about new possibilities, but rather from a resistance to so much plurality and untrammeled liberality. This can be seen most easily in her refusal to treat the complicated American political scene as if it were complicated at all. Instead, she gives us a grossly simplistic account, as in her recent contribution to the *Partisan Review* symposium "What's Happening in America?" There Miss Sontag is in full voice, provoked to a nihilistic mood by the sheer complexity of our lives and traditions, our cultural and political difficulties. She tells us, for example, that the threatening "Mongol hordes" frighten her much less than the damage done by the "idealism," the "magnificent art," and the "sense of intellectual adventure" of Western man. America is a "doomed country," founded on a "genocide," and it has the "most brutal system of slavery in modern times." She bubbles into denunciation of our "national psychosis" and paints horror cartoons about spareribs chawing John Wayne in the White House.

This is of course silly, melodramatic, and intellectually disgraceful but it isn't what distinguishes Miss Sontag from many spokesmen for apocalypse around her. That tone has become quite common lately (though it might be suggested that its introduction into American left-wing politics is something new). Nor does this kind of ranting portray very well Miss Sontag's typically pedantic manner—and this deserves some attention because she has become accepted by many as a serious intellectual guide. It is much more usual for her to sound like one of the last world-historical professors standing at the last brink of the world-process. She can admit therefore that it is hard to "assess life on this planet from the world-historical perspective." But she goes on to try it: "from a world-historical perspective, that local history which

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some young people are repudiating (with their fondness for dirty words, their peyote, their macrobiotic rice, their Dadaist art, etc.) looks a good deal less pleasing and self-evidently worthy of perpetuation." What she means by that unworthy "local history" turns out to be "Mozart, Pascal, Boolean algebra, Shakespeare, parliamentary government," and the like.

If one tries to understand Miss Sontag and her general place in the culture of the moment, such passages should be kept in mind, even if not necessarily emphasized. She certainly seems to mean what she says. In part, she is trying to provoke what she calls her timid elders into scolding her for irresponsibility. But again, Miss Sontag's apparent extremism is really a false scent, diverting attention from her principal views. What is interesting in her thought is not what she has to say about the groping experiments among the radical young—many others describe that phenomenon with more detail, care, and insight. It is a mistake to see her as a spokesman for whatever might really be radical among these "new radicals." Her real thrust is not toward the radicalism slowly evolving among the young, but rather against the radicalism already evolved among the "older" generation. However much Miss Sontag cloaks herself in everything new and progressive or evokes the sacrosanct immunity of being young and sincere, when one looks twice one sees the odd case of a lady hiding behind someone else's skirts. Miss Sontag is—to use the language of the older folks—what used to be called a counterrevolutionary.

It is of course clear that with Miss Sontag's views about our present situation, hope for any cooperative political action, moderation, or useful compromise is impossible. She scorns those "tired" radicals over a certain age who still think in terms of strikes and ballots, the UAW or the New Deal or even Lenin. What is intriguing about her violently stated views is that she does not even think in terms of putsches or exile. Given her outbursts about American national psychosis and our cancerous super-power, Miss Sontag might seem faced with at least two grim but logical prospects: either exile or underground guerrilla action. She does not choose the first, and thus far America affords no possibility of the second.

What then does Miss Sontag suggest as a *politically* useful course to follow if one does accept her apocalyptic views of America? Her inflamed statements, as it turns out, lead to no political action at all, since there is no politics available that might be adequate to them; and because they have no political consequences, she can inflate them rhetorically without limit or restraint. It is here that one can see why Miss Sontag should be called a counterrevolutionary. She rejects any *political*

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cure for political troubles—whether those cures come from the Left, Right, or Middle. She brings to our political and cultural difficulties mainly an older and narrowly aesthetic cure. Despite her claim to be on the Left and her urgent calls for a new cultural sensibility, she seeks neither political results nor cultural reinvigoration of any sizable part of society, as did Yeats's literary societies or the modern Hebrew language movement. She perpetrates again a familiar nineteenth-century effort and style. Her model for radicalism of all kinds is taken from only one side of the revolution in art. Around the turn of this century aestheticism was often an effort to find some solution to baffling political and cultural frustration by affirming purity of style and form. Miss Sontag repeats this effort in our time quite as if it had never happened before. But instead of merely retreating into art-for-art's-sake, she expounds a new political and cultural radicalism based on such an aesthetic. In some of the *fin-de-siècle* painters and poets, the effort was to depoliticize aesthetics. With Miss Sontag, it is still this, plus the effort to aestheticize politics.

This distinguishes Miss Sontag's brand of radicalism from the various other kinds around. She first became prominent as a critic and polemicist of a "new" view of art which would be autonomous, "transparent," self-inhered and free from "mucky" content and morality. This can seem like a fresh critical position, as long as one does not know or has forgotten that it is a battle long since fought and won in all-but-utter triumph: Eliot, Pound, Joyce, and Picasso are by now almost household classics. Nevertheless, Miss Sontag goes on tirelessly reinventing the same "revolutionary crisis" in art, excitedly informing her readers of the dangers which follow from interpreting art dogmatically or according to irrelevant and external "moral" standards. Aesthetic matters are one thing, content and morality are another, she cries out; and the latter are warned to keep hands off.

None of this would be of any importance here if Miss Sontag were indeed mainly an aesthetician; for then she would seem merely a curiosity. But she is not only an aesthetic "radical"; she is also a self-proclaimed socialist, and she is popularly seen as such. In her view, these two radical approaches naturally go hand in hand. And the difficulties begin precisely here. For socialism, if it is not to lose meaning entirely, seems rooted in a fairly specific historic "content" and "morality," and these don't easily square with Miss Sontag's "pure" aestheticism. The essence of a number of Miss Sontag's essays re-enact her struggle to bring these two incompatibles together, but when the dust raises, "form" always wins and morality bows its head, submitting to being "redefined"

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in terms of such aesthetic form. Quoting McLuhan approvingly, she affirms that for most of the "creative artists of our time"—but not for novelists, those clods who cling outrageously to outmoded content—the "old ethical order" is not a genuine order. Characteristically, Miss Sontag nowhere makes clear what she means by the "old" ethical order. What she means perhaps is simply any of the older insistences on a fairly clear morality of *any* kind. But though the "propounding of moral, social and political ideas" is not a legitimate part of art, she denies that she is therefore rejecting moral evaluation. "Only the scale has changed; it has become less gross, and what it sacrifices in discursive explicitness it gains in accuracy and subliminal power."

Such redefining of morality is typical of Miss Sontag's methods: mere discursive explicitness is turned into subliminal power . . . and then even gains in accuracy! The political usefulness of such a view is not an issue, for there is none. What does matter is the political danger of such an idea. Two sentences from her "America" statement illustrate the procedure beautifully. There is, she says "a profound concordance between the sexual revolution, redefined, and the political revolution, redefined." What that means is filled in by her next sentence: "That being a socialist and taking certain drugs (in a fully serious spirit: as a technique for exploring one's consciousness, not as an anodyne or crutch) are not incompatible, that there is no incompatibility between the exploration of inner space and the rectification of social space." Maybe not; but Paradise is described here, not the hard political work socialism should undertake on this earth.

Whatever she says to the contrary, Miss Sontag's quarrel with morality and content is not simply an aesthetic matter, but the highroad to her kind of political and cultural radicalism. For her, content is "today mainly a hindrance, a nuisance, a subtle or not so subtle philistinism." In one way, "Philistinism" here means what any lover of artistic freedom would say about it—the wish to reduce art to some narrow view. This is Miss Sontag on solid if entirely conventional ground, fighting off reductionists and dogmatists, urging the view that enriched sensibility can nourish our capacity for moral choice and action by nourishing our disinterestedness, attentiveness, and feelings. So far, even Plato wouldn't disagree. But Miss Sontag doesn't have only this in mind. She wants to stay at this level of contemplativeness, attentiveness, and disinterest, uncommitted to specific moral or political choices. It is an aesthetic view of politics, concerned with "consciousness" but avoiding politics itself. There is the peculiar sight of a "socialist" explaining

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morality as only a "*form* of acting and not a particular repertoire of choices." One would have thought that the difference between socialism and fascism, or liberalism and conservatism, went beyond sensibility into the particular "repertoire of choices" one made or chose not to make. But Miss Sontag again wants politics and morality to adjust themselves to her aesthetics. In one sense, it is an inversion of the Marxist view in the 30's that art should mount the barricades. For the socialist of that era, it was often the case that art was approved if it fit the right political line; for Miss Sontag, politics is approved if it fits the right aesthetic approach.

For Miss Sontag, "Philistinism" means finally that morality—or culture and politics in its broad scope—has little inherent dignity. It is crude, gross, vulgar—intransigently plural. It intrudes itself sloppily and demandingly everywhere, insisting on recognition and upsetting many artistic and theoretic applecarts. Miss Sontag disdains this many-headed monster of politics and culture. She cures its nuisance and presence by turning to the higher reaches of "form." Those who think of Miss Sontag as the champion of a new rampant individualism, of inchoate personal style and excess should ponder her constant enthusiastic praise for the aesthetic-engineer reformers of the culture. The "new sensibility" must reject any notion of being a criticism of life, says she, and instead be thought of as a ". . . creative community of artists and scientists engaged in programming sensations, uninterested in art as a species of moral journalism." Or, "art today is a new kind of instrument, an instrument for modifying consciousness and organizing new modes of sensibility." Or, it is "increasingly the terrain of specialists" and is "*not* open to the generally educated."

(One wonders, to use Miss Sontag's words cited earlier, what the "profound concordance" could then be between politics and the triumph of aesthetic form? Is it utterly malicious and dense to wonder if precisely the least liberal governments in modern times have not indeed been most impatient with that nuisance "content," and most in favor of a transcending "form"? But along these lines, a whole series of uncomfortable questions suggest themselves: isn't it legitimate to ask about the possibly horrifying political use of "programming sensations," or of that morally immune elite of "specialists" from which the generally educated man is excluded? Hasn't Miss Sontag herself protested prophetically against the destructive rationality of Western man? How sure can Miss Sontag feel—with our century in mind—that her aesthetic purposes can be guarded against political application?)

One might have thought that someone as committed to the Left

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and so solicitous of the young (whom she praises, for example, for wanting to be "beautiful to look at and touch as well as to be good"), would have more charity toward the sluggish mortal flesh of this world as it possibly moves toward something better--though as reluctantly as possible, to be sure. Politics must be an art of the possible or it isn't anything, said the Greek. But, as Miss Sontag rebuts, "Let the professors be the caretakers of this indeed precious legacy, and discharge the obligations of piety."

Politics with Miss Sontag isn't anything at all, and the same must be said about culture outside the high, pure confines of her aesthetic "transparency" and programmed sensations. Politics is nonsense, and culture too, when Miss Sontag argues that "the white race *is* the cancer of human history; it is the white race and it alone--its ideologies and inventions" that have poisoned life. The "white race" here turns out to mean the West *in toto*, and Miss Sontag caps her cries by proclaiming America (as the culmination of the West!) a doomed country. Needless to say, all varieties of politics are futile now: ". . . some socialist remodeling of institutions and the ascendence, through electoral means or otherwise, of better leaders won't really change anything." (That "otherwise" is fascinating.) It is unprofitable to accuse Miss Sontag of having it both ways again, of finding civilization disgusting while embracing its high artistic visions. These two views are not contradictory as Miss Sontag presents them: they support each other since both are in flight from the banality of our everyday problems. For the same reason, the radicalism of the young is a safe bet for Miss Sontag. Just as her aestheticism is elevated and uncontaminated, so the new radicalism is similarly untroublesome. Anything can be deposited there. But if the new radicalism is indeed emphasizing more and more variety and possibilities, even to the point of anarchic excess, Miss Sontag can hardly be said to advocate that. It is more accurate to say she preaches the opposite of self-indulgent individualism. She has the single-minded stridency of a new puritan whose head is filled with severe, high, clean order; and neither pity nor fear can halt her, nor frivolous backsliding amuse her:

> If hedonism means sustaining the old ways in which we have found pleasure in art (the old sensory and psychic modalities) then the new art is anti-hedonistic. Having one's sensorium stretched and challenged hurts.

Miss Sontag accepts no excuses, compromise or moderation, either

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culturally or politically. Novels which still disgracefully stress character and content in an old-fashioned way, or politics, with its ward-heelers, dumb congressmen, sly Presidents, and infuriating backing and filling—all this violates and resists *what should be*. The unconditioned sprawls fleshily and messily all over, prosaic, dull, unattentive, passionately avid —it offends Miss Sontag. But it happens to be the raw material both of culture and politics.

It is ironic that Miss Sontag should present herself as the champion of the modern in art. For she ignores the unmistakable intention and achievement of that revolutionary artistic movement to go beyond "form," to include anything and everything, the crudest content, as if it were worthy of the highest art. It is plain that most of the famous modern intellects have sought to bring to intellectual dignity the whole range of whatever is everyday, or low, or banal, or buried, or inarticulate —Hegel, or Marx, or Nietzsche, or Freud. Both aesthetically and politically, Miss Sontag is counterrevolutionary: she speaks only for form. Marx admired that royalist and Catholic novelist Balzac, because of Balzac's devotion to his lumpy, bumpy world. But it is consistent of Miss Sontag to applaud the young who see "beyond Freud and Marx," not because Freud and Marx might be wrong but because these two "finks" remained "old-fashioned" about how fast mankind could change. (Miss Sontag never wearies of reminding us how infuriatingly slow people are to embrace the radical changes that would make them better.) Freud and Marx, says Miss Sontag, are "Puritans." True enough, but it doesn't help Miss Sontag's case. For her own desire is to bring to us a different kind of Puritanism—one empty of content, pure, severely beautiful, enriched with refined sensibility, but invulnerable and finally indifferent or even hostile to morality with its discomfiting need to choose particularly and tentatively in this sleepy, meaty world.

IN OUR NEXT ISSUE:

NOTES ON POVERTY AND RIOT
—by Jeremy Larner

IS THERE REALLY A NEW POOR?
—by Stephan Thernstrom

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY
—by Dennis H. Wrong

THE COLD WAR IN RETROSPPECT
—by Arnold S. Kaufman

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NOTEBOOK

Michael Harrington

On the Committee for Cultural Freedom

The recent revelations about secret CIA subsidies has brought to public attention the Congress for Cultural Freedom, an international grouping of intellectuals, and its affiliate in this country, the American Committee for Cultural Freedom. Notably missing in the discussions these last few months has been an effort to analyze politically *the role of these groups during the years when the Cold War was at its height. Such an analysis did appear in the pages of* DISSENT *some twelve years ago; it was written by Michael Harrington; and it seems just as cogent now as it was then. We wish we had the space to reprint the entire article as it appeared in our Spring 1955 issue, but here, completely unchanged, is a significant portion of it.*—ED.

In practice the ACCF has fallen behind Sidney Hook's views on civil liberties. Without implying any "conspiracy" theory of history (or even of intellectual intrigue), one may safely say that it is Hook who has molded the decisive ACCF policies. His *Heresy Yes, Conspiracy No* articles were widely circulated by the Committee, which meant that in effect it endorsed his systematic, explicit efforts to minimize the threat to civil liberties and to attack those European intellectuals who, whatever their own political or intellectual deficiencies, took a dim view of American developments. Under the guidance of Hook and the leadership of Irving Kristol, who supported Hook's general outlook, the American Committee cast its weight not so much in defense of those civil liberties which were steadily being nibbled away, but rather against those few remaining fellow-travelers who tried to exploit the civil liberties issue.

At times this had an almost comic aspect. When Irving Kristol was executive secretary of the ACCF, one learned to expect from him silence on those issues that were agitating the whole intellectual and academic world, and enraged communiqués on the outrages performed by people like Arthur Miller or Bertrand Russell in exaggerating the danger to civil liberties in the U.S.

Inevitably, this led to more serious problems. In an article by Kristol, which first appeared in *Commentary* and was later circulated under the ACCF imprimatur, one could read such astonishing and appalling statements as "there is one thing the American people know about Senator McCarthy: he, like them, is unequivocally anti-Communist. About the spokesmen for American liberalism, they

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feel they know no such thing. And with some justification." This, in the name of defending cultural freedom! As someone remarked, the Committee might better have renamed itself the American Committee for Cultural Accommodation.

We are not, to be sure, dealing with a black-and-white matter. In a number of cases the Committee has acted within the United States in defense of freedom. It protested to Attorney General Brownell on the treatment of Chaplin and Arthur Miller; it was active in the Muhlenberg College case where some Chaplin films were banned; it criticized the procedure of the McCarthy investigation of the Voice of America. The Committee also claims to have done good work in ways precluding publicity, and there is no reason to doubt this claim. Currently, it is intervening in the case of Barry Miller, a former member of the Politics Club of the University of Chicago to whom the army refuses an honorable discharge because of his past (anti-Stalinist) associations.

But these activities do not absorb the main attention or interest of the Committee: its leadership is too jaded, too imbued with the sourness of indiscriminate anti-Stalinism to give itself to an active struggle against the dominant trend of contemporary intellectual life in America. What it *really* cares about most is a struggle against fellow-travelers and "neutralists"—that is, against many European intellectuals; but it fails to see that even in terms of such an objective, it could be effective only if it fought with vigor and passion against the violations of freedom that have mounted up in the U.S., instead of querulously minimizing their extent and gravity.

One of the crippling assumptions of the Committee has been that it would not intervene in cases where Stalinists or accused Stalinists were involved. It has rested this position on the academic argument, advanced most systematically by Sidney Hook, that Stalinists, being enemies of democracy, have no "right" to democratic privileges and that, consequently, no threat to civil liberties or cultural freedom is involved when they are deprived of these privileges. But the actual problem is not the metaphysical one of whether enemies of democracy (as the Stalinists clearly are) have a "right" to democratic privileges. What matters is that the drive against cultural freedom and civil liberties takes on the guise of anti-Stalinism. Thus, for example, such an outrage as depriving the veteran anti-Stalinist radical Max Shachtman of a passport with which to travel in Europe—a State Department act one may assume the ACCF would not approve of—is made possible or at least much easier by the precedents created in prosecutions and persecutions of the Stalinists. Given such facts, it becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible, to defend civil liberties without clearly defending the civil rights of Stalinists (which has nothing whatever to do with [defending] spies or sabotage). And this the Committee has failed to do.

But it has gone even further. In December 1952 it published a "Memorandum on the Visa Problem." This document was concerned with the entry of foreign intellectuals, trade unionists, etc., into the United States. The cases which gave rise to the Memorandum were, of course, those of

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anti-Stalinists. In the course of the analysis, Section 212 (a) (28) of the McCarran Act, which bars visas strictly on the basis of political criteria, is discussed.

In this discussion the Committee assumes as a matter of course that it is perfectly legitimate to bar Stalinists (or members of the Communist party) from visas. There are recommendations for exceptions, for a sophisticated use of criteria, in the case of Stalinist front members, but the assumption is always that the mere holding of Stalinist *opinions* is automatically a sufficient ground for refusing a visa. The Committee objects, on the ground of vagueness, to a definition based on adherence to "economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world Communism or . . . of any other form of totalitarianism." It finds "adequate" criteria for exclusion of those who "advocate or teach or who are members or affiliated with any organization" that advocates or teaches the "violent overthrow" of the government. Thereby, in effect, the Committee proposes its own version of the Smith Act, and abandons the long-standing and honorable position of American liberalism that such phrases as "violent overthrow," besides being vague and misleading, are insufficient grounds for political discrimination.

This curious defense of cultural freedom is capped with an even more curious statement:

> We know that the visa problem was not created by arbitrary malice on the part of Congressmen or State Department officials. It is but one reflection, and not by far the largest, of the stresses and strains which this free country is suffering as a result of its determination to resist Communist totalitarianism.

As a piece of apologetics this statement is fantastic. As a description of reality it is far more accurate with regard to the stresses and strains within the Committee itself than within the United States.

Jack Rader

Midsummer Madness in Quebec

A visitor to Montreal this summer could be pardoned for being distracted from the wonders of Expo by the political antics of Charles de Gaulle.

That de Gaulle did not create the schism between French and British Canada, but came merely to exploit it, was apparent to everyone. While the central government in Ottawa at first acted as if de Gaulle hardly existed and later seemed to wish only that he would go away, the Quebecers responded with emotional fervor. British Canada kept recalling that the Expo, and indeed even de Gaulle's visit itself, were part of the celebration of Canada's 100th anniversary,

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while French Canadians relished every phrase that drove a wedge between the communities.

De Gaulle's automobile trip between Quebec City and Montreal became a triumphal procession. "We are linked by a common past and France will never forget it. All of France watches you, hears you, and loves you." That was one side. On the other: "France welcomes Quebec's will to take its destiny into its own hands." As if to brush away any ambiguities, he assured the Quebecers that control of their own destiny was what other peoples around the world also wanted, and that such control need not prevent "your cooperation with neighbors and different elements." However, while such cooperation with English speaking Canadians was desirable, the real danger lay to the south, and here de Gaulle had no hesitation in suggesting a foreign policy to his New France by which it could "safeguard their substance and their independence in contact with the colossal neighboring state."

De Gaulle did not exaggerate when he described his passage along the St. Lawrence as exuding an atmosphere similar to what he had encountered in the liberation of France in 1945. No wonder he felt justified in climaxing his journey with the slogan of the Separatists, "Vive le Quebec Libre."

At that point, the storm broke. Ottawa could no longer ignore his intervention. Still, Prime Minister Pearson played it cool, fearful of fueling the incident into a separatist conflagration. And Pearson understood, perhaps better than de Gaulle, the distinction between the dramatic excitement de Gaulle elicited and the true balance of political forces in Quebec and Canada.

There is no doubt that de Gaulle miscalculated. The Separatists are a tiny sect. By the time de Gaulle had reached Montreal, they flocked to his public appearances, carrying banners of endorsement. That they had nothing whatsoever to do with what de Gaulle was saying was evident. Poorly organized, they were caught flatfooted.

Pearson could also rely on the boomerang effect. After all, it's one thing for a minority that has long felt discriminated against to identify with de Gaulle and the cultural motherland; it is quite another for a foreign head of state to launch an independence movement in one's own front yard. Thus, Réal Caouette, head of the Social Credit party and *quondam enfant terrible* of Canadian politics, could say: "We are of French descent, but our country is Canada, not France."

Turning around de Gaulle's proposal of a two-way exchange of scientists and technologists, Caouette was able to state that the French-Canadian standard of living was now superior to that of France, and "that is without doubt why the General made his call for aid from French Canadians in favor of France."

Whether Caouette is literally correct in claiming higher economic levels for Quebecers is beside the point. The fact is that French Canadians never had it so good. I do not wish to underrate the problems of urban blight and other manifestations of modern society which infect all of Canada. Yet one cannot help marveling at the change upon crossing the border. Vermont

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and New Hampshire seem never to have recovered from the flight of the textile mills; their pleasant valleys are spotted with the ugly legacy of the industrial revolution. By contrast, the plain along the St. Lawrence unfolds a prospect of large, mechanized and prosperous farms. As near as I could see, the cities are doing equally well.

I must admit to being caught by surprise. The image I held of French Canada was one of backwardness. I realize now that this simply represented the dominant Anglo-Saxon view, sifted to me by like-minded American textbook writers and teachers. In any case, the image is obsolete.

Economics aside, I found that the French Canadians have created a virile French culture of their own, not an aping of metropolitan France. Until quite recently, there were no significant cultural ties between the two peoples, and even now, although one can get *Le Monde* and *Elle* on newsstands even in the smaller towns, indigenous experience and talent nurture Quebecers' attitudes.

French Canada managed to survive not only independently of France, but against it. It has suffered as a result. What it has become lacks the depth and richness of France, but there is no question that it is distinctly itself, an almost improbable example of stubborn national persistence within a hostile environment.

Historically, French Canada dates from the settlements of Quebec and Montreal by Champlain in the early seventeenth century, under royal grant. While France surrendered its Canadian colonies to Britain in 1763, this was not necessarily decisive as far as the colonists were concerned. Regarding the British as temporary victors, they looked to the day when fortune would return them to the motherland. Two other events that followed soon after were to determine the fate of the French Canadians.

First, the American revolution brought a flood of refugees seeking sanctuary under the British crown. These were the Loyalists, landed gentry, well connected in London who opted for remaining British subjects. Having turned their backs on separation from London, they hardly looked with favor on the French settlers—for France had been an ally of the rebels. Class differences also intruded. The Loyalists regarded themselves as aristocrats, adherents of the Church of England. The French colonials were chiefly fur traders, small farmers, Roman Catholics, who were inclined toward miscegnation with the Indians. These attitudes jelled quickly into a pattern of oppressive colonial rule which was to persist for the better part of a century and has not yet evaporated.

The second event that was to sever the French colonists from France was the French Revolution. Ironically, La Nouvelle France could not accept the revolution. Its loyalties were to the *ancien régime*. In particular, it could not accept the disestablishment of the Church, for the Church was the very bastion on which rested their communal survival. The Rule of Reason, the new laicism, the permeation of French life with secular values were repugnant. And for its part, Revolutionary France was not concerned with colonies.

What began as separation became mutation. While France proceeded to become a modern society, the French

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in Canada clung to the past as the only possession by which they could retain their identity. The French language, pre-1789 vintage, became the symbol of struggle against British assimilationism. In a situation which severely limited political activity and with power monopolized by the British, the Church assumed all leadership —not only political, but intellectual, educational, moral. Even today, Church adherence is not at all the formality largely limited to women that it has become in Italy, France, and elsewhere. Rather, the Church functioned for the French Canadians in a way similar to its role in Poland and Ireland, as a center of national and popular struggle. The price was backwardness. Quebec became a poor agrarian enclave, resistant to change, forever behind the times.

The Act of Confederation, whose centennial is the cause of this year's celebrations, began to break the stalemate by establishing an autonomous provincial government for Quebec, as for the other eight provinces, under the central regime at Ottawa. The French language would no longer be proscribed, the Church could function freely, the Quebecers could preserve their cultural separateness. It also assigned to Quebec permanent minority status as one among nine provinces, and this became the basis for French-Canadian grievances ever since.

For the last century the politics of French Canada has focused on easing the consequences of this minority position. Autonomist or separatist parties began to emerge in the twenties and by 1936 the Union Nationale victory over the Liberals finally gave Quebec a government it could call its own. Today even the Liberal party of Quebec, as much as any of the other major parties, is French-Canadian in outlook. Nonetheless, the sense of grievance runs deep. Quebecers feel that they get the short end of every stick, even if that end is a great deal longer than it used to be. The political parties of Quebec largely compete around the issue of greater autonomy vis à vis the central government, which in effect means also against British Canada.

In the light of this history, how can the head of the French state come to make claims of a special relationship and to chart a course of independence for French Canadians? As Caouette correctly reminded de Gaulle, Quebec owes nothing to France: "If we have had the heart and courage to save our language and our faith, it is not the fault of France."

And yet de Gaulle is a man of profound political instinct. Precisely because it is freer and more self-assured, Quebec is now able to turn again to France. The technological remolding of Quebec, the organization of the industrial base of its present prosperity, was the work of American and British capital, French and French-Canadian capital had little to do with it. Highly aware of its economic dependence on the American colossus, Canada attempts to define its nationhood in juxtaposition to the U.S., just as the long history of Quebec's struggle for survival was defined by resistance to economically and politically dominant British Canada. British Canada has only slight natural resistance to American cultural inundation, but Quebec has the advantage of a different language, a different tradi-

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tional outlook, and different institutions. As Quebec unmoors more and more from its tradition-bound culture and enters the modern world, the desire to refurbish its French heritage along modern lines has increasingly offset its historic distaste for post-revolutionary France.

For example, importation of French books and periodicals are not only welcomed in Quebec but fostered as a matter of provincial policy. To be sure, the kinds of French thought deemed acceptable conform to Quebec's tradition. Mauriac and Maritain are the philosophers of interest, not Sartre and Camus.

Quebec's Premier, Daniel Johnson, spent some weeks in Paris earlier this year preparing a new relationship between Quebec and France involving joint radio and TV projects, technical cooperation in developing nuclear and hydro power, exchanges of teachers, students, and engineers. The Pearson regime has encouraged this trend, partly to offset dependence on America and partly because it supports enlarging the areas of Quebec autonomy in order to maintain the Canadian Federation.

Johnson invited de Gaulle on behalf of the government of Quebec rather than the government of Canada. The arrangements were worked out with the Quebecers in such a way as to all but exclude Ottawa. This has given rise to speculation that Johnson oversold himself in Paris by tending to act in a sovereign capacity. Quite possibly, caught up in the aura of Gaullist mystique, Johnson allowed himself to blur over the differences between Quebec's autonomist desires and outright independence, thereby misleading de Gaulle in the process. That all this fit into de Gaulle's own thinking probably made the mutual deception easier. Yet, Johnson, who has to live in Canada and not in France, has since announced that Quebec will solve its problems within a Canadian framework.

Grievance, hurt pride, hunger for recognition that would erase the stigma of inferiority, sensitivity to every restriction, real or imagined, awareness that survival and unremitting struggle have been synonymous—these were the deep veins of feeling which de Gaulle mined. His error lay in confounding them with a movement for independence. Autonomy is the desire I encountered, but not a burning hunger to tear loose and form an independent Quebec. De Gaulle failed to distinguish between the two.

Ours is an age of nationalist passions and the breakup of historic associations of peoples. Even Belgium and Switzerland fear for their ancient unities. The Canadian experiment in binationalism offers a democratic alternative. De Gaulle's excursion into rhetorical political violence notwithstanding, the capacity of a progressing Quebec to shake free from its past and to redefine itself as a cultural entity will be strengthened by closer involvement with France. All Canada will thereby be better able to sustain its independence from the United States.

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COMMUNICATIONS

Alan Lelchuk

On Judging the Israelis

The author of the following communication is a young member of the Brandeis English Department. We invite further brief communications expressing other opinions.—ED.

Let me supplement the discussion begun in the July-August issue of DISSENT concerning the Arab-Israeli war. I shall deal with two topics: a certain style of criticism that has appeared against Israel, and the difficulties of rapprochement.

On the whole, I agree with Howe and Plastrik. And I share some of their worries, though I shall avoid repeating them here.

Jewish Saintliness

The New York Times has been flooded with letters from American liberals, requesting that the leaders of Israel display exemplary behavior toward the Arabs now that they have defeated them. The complicated refugee problem—which has existed for 19 years with little international help and considerable Arab encouragement—is to be resolved by Israel quickly, resolutely, and above all, *justly*. The Arab lands the Israelis have just occupied must be returned immediately to their rightful owners, and any other decision is unacceptable and immoral. Especially outrageous is the Jewish take-over of Jerusalem—it will fan the Arabs' eternal hatred; Jerusalem must be returned immediately. And so on. The logic of this position is that the Israelis have made their point; they have saved their lives, headed off their extinction—and any further action is excessive and immoral.

I submit that such demands are generally sanctimonious and ahistoric, and that Israel is being condemned while actually behaving, on the whole, better than most countries. Ironically, better-than-reasonable conduct seems to mean little to these "fair-minded" critics; instead, they demand actions of self-sacrifice and sainthood. As if history overflows with examples of countries that have measured up to the standards of abstract (suprapolitical) Justice!

At the outset of the conflict, the Arab forces pointed their guns at Israel, and the Israelis were advised and ordered to wait . . . to be patient. They were not supposed to behave like other nations; like the U.S. under Kennedy, for example, who, when alerted to Russian missiles in Cuba, acted immediately in terms of American self-interest—despite setting off thereby a far greater threat to world

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peace than did the recent Mideast conflict. I wonder how many of the now righteous liberals voiced protest against that much more dangerous act of their beloved President.

And now, after the war, these people invoke their universalist concepts of Justice and Morality—but refuse to compare the *present* situation with *historical* precedents. Thus, Israel is not a defendant in a court of history and fact, but in a court of fantasy and emotion. Why? But I shall not discuss the motives of the irrational critics who make these demands. The exhortations of some American Jews for Israeli saintliness should be seen as the not unexpected product of "the ghetto mentality," for which the image of the Jew as anything but the noble victim is *psychically unacceptable*. One sees the desire for an ascetic Jew, with *yarmolke* and *tallis,* herded to his death—an image which for some Jews completely dominates that of a virile Israeli standing atop a tank. It need not be amplified here how centuries of suffering and persecution serve to brainwash men. The ghetto man's greatest wish becomes to please his masters, to appease them at all costs. The ghetto victim is a slumped figure, a victim of a cruel history, but also the perpetrator of his own psychic agony. Yet, some Jews have waited a long time for an alternate, new imagery. But defiance and self-confidence are not easy to take after an eternity of acquiescence.

The question of Israeli seizure of Arab land should at least be considered from the Israeli point of view, before it can be dismissed with the cant label, "aggrandizement." It is obvious that the Israelis will not endear themselves to Arab hearts by holding on to the land. But it should be stressed that there is little evidence, given the present Arab leadership, that a return of the land will significantly change prevailing views on Israel's right to exist. The Arab people will continue to hate the state of Israel because of the propaganda spread by their authoritarian leaders who continually exploit the issue of Israel as a ready scapegoat for their own failure to develop their backward countries.

Furthermore, Israel's control of several key points strengthens its military position and leaves the country much less vulnerable to the kind of open aggression we have just witnessed. Control of these strategic points can serve to deter (to an extent yet difficult to measure) future Arab schemes for Israel's liquidation —terms acting as a stabilizing factor in keeping the peace, shaky as it may be.

There is also another very real and disconcerting fact to consider: the Arabs claim that a state of war in the Mideast still exists and will continue as long as there is a state of Israel. The persistence of such a claim makes imperative an openly militaristic foreign policy, which in turn has forced Israel into a schizophrenic public personality—civil and military. Certainly, it seems romantic at best to ask Israel to relinquish the lands of a people who for two decades now have openly proclaimed themselves an active enemy. Has anyone heard the like of such a proposal before? If these critics would rest their case for Israel's withdrawal upon the condition that the Arabs accept a non-belligerent state of affairs—that is, *accept the fact*

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of Israel—they would at least argue within the context of understandable international relations.

Some words here about Jerusalem. I would like to ask all those who are now stressing the need for Jews to understand Arab emotions and the city's religious significance for Arabs: Where were you during the 19 years when no Jewish shrine or holy place in the city of Jerusalem was allowed to be open for worship? Where were you when it came to asking the Arabs during all these years to understand *the emotional needs of the Jews,* and the significance of their religious heritage? It is a fact that now, with Israeli control of the city, all Moslem and Christian holy places are protected and that access to them is guaranteed.

APORTES

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Moreover, and this is the crucial point, if the take-over of Jerusalem is at all representative of Israel's occupation of Arab land in general, then it is clear that Israel is not behaving like a typical vanquishing country—but in fact consistently better. Here is the great irony of the situation! A French observer, in a recent account of political and administrative activities in Jerusalem (*The New York Times Magazine,* July 29), relates facts about Jewish fairness that can only be described as astonishing when one considers the short time that has elapsed since the war.

It is a fact, for example, that three weeks after the siege of Jerusalem, the Arabs were already in the process of receiving the same rights and privileges as are enjoyed by Israeli citizens. It is a fact that in the next Jerusalem election a larger measure of the population will know what democracy means than ever did under Jordanian rule. For the first time *all* citizens of voting age will have the right to vote —not only males with property rights, or 8 per cent of the total population, as was true under Jordanian jurisdiction. It is a fact, unpleasant as it may be to the ruling Arab elites, that the Israelis are going to build schools and improve educational standards (previously, for example, education was compulsory for males only). The Israelis plan to build more medical facilities, and they will try to wipe out diseases which are no longer rampant in the West, and in Israel (trachoma, tuberculosis, polio); they will create a modicum of standards in sanitation. And they will initiate and institutionalize welfare programs for a people sorely in need of them. Of course, there will be cries against all this

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Westernizing; most of them, you can bet, will come from people who have, for a long time, been forcing themselves to enjoy "pernicious" Western material comforts.

I do not maintain that such policies are a moral justification for Israeli political actions. I do not believe the Arabs in the occupied areas should necessarily "accept" Israeli domination even if its terms are more pleasant for them than was life under Nasser or Hussein; I can understand their wish to escape Israeli rule, no matter how mild it may be. Nor am I at all justifying an indefinite occupation or formal annexation in which Arabs would be forced to live under Israeli domination. I am simply saying that, given the inexorable fact or occupation, the Israeli government—a government, not a gathering of saints—has thus far acted rather well. Apparently, there have been incidents of bad Israeli conduct; if so, let them be condemned. But meanwhile, let us be somewhat restrained in the demands we make of a tiny nation which only yesterday was being threatened with extinction by neighbors far larger, and lavishly armed by the Soviet Union.

It seems unlikely that Israel is absolutely committed to keep all the presently occupied Arab land. I think it obvious that some of it is being held for the negotiating table. The land gives the Israelis elbowroom, maneuverability, positions for bargaining. To ask them to relinquish the land at this point, without the slightest concession from the Arabs, is not to argue politically. There will be plenty of time to accuse the Israelis when and if they fail to respond to a sign of Arab concession or initiative with indifference or disdain. What the Israelis now want from the Arabs is words and declarations; in return, they will give back land and people.

Rapprochement:

It is foolish to believe that Mideast peace will depend *primarily* on decisions made or not made by Israeli leaders. The basic problem lies in the nature of Arab leadership; upon that leadership depend the possibilities for real peace in the Mideast. It is possible but highly improbable, as long as Nasser reigns, that a secure and lasting peace can come about between the Arab countries and Israel. Only with real change in the political regimes of several Arab countries can intransigent attitudes be modified and foreign policies be constructed that will take into account the reality of Israel.

When speaking here of Arab leadership, I exclude the Jordanians. The greatest tragedy of the war fell upon Jordan, the Titoist stepchild; as far as Israel is concerned, amidst the dogmatic Arab family, Jordan has been the only country to achieve real communication with Israel. For Jordan represented the concrete example that peace and rapprochement among all the countries of the entire area could become a *real* possibility. For the time being at least, this hope was dealt a severe, if not irreparable, blow and both Israel and Hussein are only too painfully aware of it. I submit that it is a piece of arrogance for outsiders to think that Israel has to be reminded of the special need to renew communication with Hussein.

Serious rapprochement in the near future must also be viewed within the

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perspective of the international political scene (which has too often been ignored in viewing the crisis itself). It is apparent that Russia fanned the flame in the Mideast as a response to American intransigence in Vietnam, and that *all* the countries involved in the Mideast conflict were deployed as pawns in an international chess game. The plan collapsed, but it should be noticed that Russia once again showed its potential for stirring up dangerous crises.

Local rapprochement often depends on what happens outside the immediate area. If America is willing to halt the bombing of North Vietnam, Russia may very well change its directives and stop its flow of military supplies. In the short run it is not the rich countries of the world who suffer when trading markets are severed, but the poor. The rich know this; sometimes the poor pay a high price to learn the lesson. What happens in Vietnam in the coming months will probably have a significant effect on events in the Mideast.

Leonard Levin

Morality and War—A Reply

In his article "Moral Judgment in Time of War" (DISSENT, May-June 1967) Michael Walzer has stated the case well for the need of a moral judgment applicable within the context of war. I think, though, that his argument is incomplete inasmuch as it concentrates on the standpoint of rule-ethics and does not explore the possibility of an approach closer to situational ethics or what I would prefer to call moral atomism. The one approach judges acts categorically by their conformity to categories or rules; the other individually, by their likely concrete consequences, creative and destructive.

I do not suggest that the general in the field be called upon to use his "moral discretion" on the spur of the moment to decide whether the defense of freedom justifies decimating another village. The general is understandably preoccupied with "military necessity" to the exclusion of moral considerations. That is why we need generalized prohibitions to check certain kinds of action. Atomistic analysis of moral situations is generally much more difficult than applying rules to them. On the field of battle we need rules; that, however, should not preclude the other approach for the armchair strategist-judge.

For a start, one could easily list three major weaknesses of rule-ethics as applied to war:

(1) The same verbal rule can allow ever greater actual destruction as the

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technology of warfare progresses indefinitely with time. If any reasons are to be found for keeping the destruction at a constant level, the rules we now have can no longer provide such reasons. New rules are needed—that is clear. But both the moral inspiration of these rules, and the moral deterrence which would have to restrain us until such rules are agreed upon, would have to come from a more basic notion of morality than rule-ethics provides.

(2) Rules depend on consensus—a rule once discarded for convenience's sake (or "for necessity's sake") is dead, whereas "wanton destruction," for instance, is an objective term no matter who has practiced it or approved of it last year or before. It is likely that with the decline of religion the consensus on rule-ethics in general is weakening considerably, though it is highly unlikely that it will ever "die." A more serious threat to rule-ethics in war is that the consensus is shattered once a major power or two break a rule with impunity, and then some other basis for moral condemnation must be found to avert total chaos. I think we shall be facing that problem soon, at the rate we are going.

(3) "The tensions and ambiguities implicit in the very idea of *morality in the midst of war* are all too easy to ignore" (Walzer's last paragraph)—and perhaps the second most destructive fallacy in history (second only to the Crusader's rationale) is to suppose that because some act is permitted by the rules of war, it is therefore right. (*Honorable* is the shibboleth.) The moment one is fighting one forgets to ask whether the war is justified, and the "morality of war" is immediately declared in effect, permitting anti-combatant violence and restricted devastation. Did one ask *before* that moment whether it would be right to fight? No! It just happened, one got dragged in, or an "incident" exploded a tense situation into a major conflagration. And because it "happened" that way, it is now "right" or "honorable" to kill "only" young men in uniform and not middle-aged women, for instance. The absurdity of this is clear—I am sure Mr. Walzer will grant this, just as I will grant that there is no ready escape from the reality of it except by total political and moral abdication. I would insist, though, that only from a fundamental, atomistic moral position can we appreciate that absurdity and consider dealing with it positively.

From a certain standpoint, "morality in war" is a necessary check on man's destructive impulses; from another standpoint, it is an accommodation with immorality and a partial justification of it—psychologically, if not logically. What it amounts to is that someone can be obeying a set of rules while he acts immorally, and so can avoid even the slightest feeling of guilt. No doubt, we can "effect present change" in this instance only by appealing to currently accepted standards of licit and illicit conduct in war. But we must be on our guard against seeing in these rules more than there actually is. There is another standard—more truly moral, I would say—transcending these conventions. Or is there? And if there is, how would it apply to the problems we raise?

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BOOKS

Lewis Coser

Watts—A Portrait in Depth

RIVERS OF BLOOD, YEARS OF DARKNESS, by Robert Conot. New York: Bantam Books. 497 pp. $0.95.

During the recent Boston riots, a Negro teen-ager told a *New York Times* reporter, "We want our own place, that's what we want. Some place we can make the rules."

This pithy statement seems to sum up the deepest reason for the recent outbreaks of riots in a number of American cities. There are a variety of other causes: high unemployment; degrading housing; lack of recreational facilities—the whole dreary catalogue of indignities white America has imposed on those forced to live in our black ghettos. But over and beyond all these stark facts ghetto dwellers have a sense that they are living in occupied territory, that they have no control over their own turf, that they are being treated like natives on a reservation. The riots, though they may originate in a variety of specific situations and be triggered by fortuitous incidents, all seem fundamentally to be rooted in this desire of the ghetto dwellers to escape from the oppressive and degrading impact of "their" law and "their" order. They yearn for "some place we can make the rules."

Robert Conot's book, an exhaustive description of the origins and development of the Watts riots, helps a good deal in understanding the causes of the outbreak. The author is a young journalist and novelist from Los Angeles. He has used all the official reports and documents on the riots; he has examined the complete transcripts of the McCone Commission hearings, pertinent records of the Los Angeles Fire Department, the County District Attorney's office, the County Probation Department, and the Bureau of Public Assistance, and he has gone through the records of some 200 felony trials. He saw certain records of the Police Department and supplemented them by interviews with leading police officials. He had access to sworn statements by 150 area residents and, most important, has personally interviewed nearly 1,000 persons. This is no impressionistic quickie. Conot has written a serious historical account, even though he has couched it in a popularized and sometimes a bit dramatized style. My sociological brethren are likely to call this nonscientific journalism; but, since they have so far produced next to nothing on the riots, this is the best we have, by far the best.

Conot has followed the development of the riots, hour by hour, and he has been able to trace the life history of a number of key participants in con-

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siderable detail. It all started with a comparatively trivial incident, such riots always start in this way: an arrest of a somewhat drunken young Negro driver. The ineptness, fear, and diffuse racial prejudice of the police soon led to the spreading of rumors of police brutality, to the milling of indignant crowds, and to the emergence of Negro youngsters who released some of their pent-up frustrations. The author followed the ensuing developments from the initial, almost playful throwing of rocks at passing automobiles, to the frantic outbursts of hatred against policemen and firemen, to the burning of stores and looting. The disorganized police actions and the final intervention of the National Guard are likewise recorded in exhaustive detail.

The book is a careful chronicle, but more, it is also an effort at compassionate understanding. The author manages to convey a vivid sense of what it means to live in an urban ghetto, and especially what it means for people who, in their majority, grew up in a Southern rural environment and lack full comprehension of the ways of urban civilization.

Certain insensitive white observers have remarked that Watts is, after all, by no means as horrid a slum as one can find, say, on the outskirts of most Latin-American cities. To be sure. But such Latin-American slum dwellers—Oscar Lewis's recent work to the contrary notwithstanding—still maintain at least the rudiments of a community. Watts, however, is not a community but simply an agglomeration of isolated, terrified, and frustrated human beings living in an environment they never made and which they fail fully to understand. Whereas in a community, even in a slum community, one's sense of worth is affirmed by the regard of one's fellows, a disorganized slum, continuously policed by an alien "them," destroys a man's self-regard. How can self-esteem survive in a world where one is perpetually afraid of being stopped in the street, spread-eagled against a wall or a car and frisked, where armies of alien social workers and police officials pry into your private life and probe into your marital and sexual attachments? It is but natural that a "paranoid" view develops in a world in which truant officers and rent collectors, welfare bureaucrats and police officials continually harass the population and hover over them in what can only seem a perpetual conspiracy to oppress and degrade them. The true paranoid *thinks* that he is being persecuted, the Watts Negro *is*. The author provides literally hundreds of illustrative examples. Let me quote just two:

A Negro waitress getting off work and returning home at two o'clock in the morning is stopped by a white motorist who attempts to rape her. She runs to a nearby house and calls the police, who, refusing to believe her, arrest her instead. When she subsequently registers a complaint against the officers this is dismissed and she is arrested again, this time for registering a false complaint . . .

A man, attempting to act with foresight and responsibility, acquires a secondhand car in anticipation of having to drive his pregnant wife to the hospital for delivery—public transportation is practically unavailable. When

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the hour comes and he drives her to the hospital he is stopped for driving with a faulty muffler, and when arguing with the police officer he is arrested for resisting an officer of the law . . .

Conot has wisely resisted the temptation to lay the blame for the riots on particular individuals. To be sure, William Parker, who was police chief at the time, acted with incredible ineptness. Many individual policemen behaved brutally and harbored deep-seated racial prejudices. But policemen often acted out of sheer animal fear or because they finally broke under the strain of continual harassment and taunting by the crowd. It is but too easy to understand why an officer having been called a mother-fucker once too often finally reacts with a brutality fanned by uncontrolled hatred. No, Conot makes it abundantly clear that what is at issue is not the failing of individuals but the result of an inhuman system which degrades both oppressed and oppressor.

Particular individuals acted from a variety of motives; fear, hatred, resentment, frustration, as well as thrill-seeking and a sense of adventure. But it would be futile to attempt to explain the riot by adding up the diverse motives of the participants. It would, moreover, be erroneous to explain what happened by some Le Bonian theory of the irrationality of crowd behavior. The rioters, far from being random in their choice of targets, did not attack schools or public libraries, industrial or manufacturing property or public utilities, although there were hundreds of such targets in the area. They attacked the stores that had gouged them and the representatives of the official white world that had harassed and humiliated and belittled them all their lives.

Beyond all the finely documented minutiae of life histories and private tragedies, this book leaves the reader with one overwhelming impression: there will be riots on the American scene as long as an affluent society tolerates enclaves in its midst in which black men are robbed of their dignity, their sense of manhood, their feeling of autonomy and control.

Crisis in the Caste System Down South

CHILDREN OF CRISIS: A Study of Courage and Fear, by Robert Coles. Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press. 401 pp. $8.50.

"The teachers, they say it's inside us, that's where all the trouble is and the mean words, they come from people with bad hearts; but it's outside, too, because they're all the time around, the people shouting at us, and they fired my daddy from his job yesterday." This analysis of the origins of prejudice came from a six-year-old Negro girl who walked daily through mobs in 1960 to the first integrated school in New Orleans. She was talking with Robert Coles, the author of this book, and a child psychiatrist by profession.

Coles says the purpose of the book is to find out: "What was happening to that Negro child both in school

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and in her mind? What made her white assailants finally take their angry opposition to the streets? While they did that, why did other white people refuse to join them—or even to take the little girl's side?"

The author does a compassionate job of psychological journalism in answering questions of this sort about Southerners faced with desegreagtion in New Orleans and elsewhere. Obviously a sympathetic man, he is neither ready to condemn the people he interviews nor eager to fit their experiences into a preconceived theory. He insists on the "clumsy, undefined, paradoxical flow of life and its events which may, in fact, be the truth of it."

The book can be highly recommended to those who have not been exposed to the voluminous writings on the South; for those who have, the information is repetitious. As for the public and private etiology of race hatred—a matter of considerable importance—Coles's analysis is a bit more sophisticated, but not much more profound, than the view of the six-year-old Negro child I have quoted. Life is indeed perplexing, as Coles observes, but there's more to be done in classifying and explaining that confusion than he chooses to undertake.

The vignettes of the people who were forced to contend with the integration of the first elementary school in New Orleans comprise the best reporting in the book. There is the fat white woman, a member of the mob, "struggling to manage herself and her large family in the face of poverty, ignorance, social isolation, and virtual abandonment by her occasionally employed husband"; she describes herself, Coles says, when she complains of Negroes: "They eat pig food and they eat just like pigs, too." There's the white, Catholic mother—previously untroubled by segregation—who became, through an unforseeable sequence of events, "determined" enough to send her children to school during the lengthy boycott. There's the unemployed Negro father, who lost his job because his daughter was attending a white school; he sits "on the front steps of the house carving a piece of wood, throwing it away, hurling the knife at the house's wood, then fetching a new branch to peel, cut and again discard."

Then there are the few black and white children who set the crucial precedent for Southern education simply by going to school. Here, Coles's training as a child psychiatrist comes to the fore in his sensitive interpretations of the drawings he asked them to make. Fortunately, 13 of the pictures are reproduced. This enables the reader to appreciate the accuracy of Coles's analysis of the characteristic fashion in which racial prejudice shapes the content and composition of the art works.

The substance of Coles's interpretation is that, by the age of three, children of both races perceive and express—either verbally or visually—the way the caste system molds their lives. The Negro children believe themselves mutilated and suffer inhibited rage against the whites. The white youngsters ascribe to the blacks all sorts of forbidden pleasures, and therefore thoroughly disapprove of them. The price paid by both is that of losing much of their humanity in the process of growing up.

None of this is new to the literature of prejudice. However, because of the tangible witness of the drawings and

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the painful aptness of the children's comments, this report moves us in accordance with the actuality of the innocents' suffering.

Coles asks the children illuminating questions and makes good psychological sense out of their replies. In reading his reports of interviews with their elders, on the other hand, one occasionally feels that he failed to probe deeply enough. Oddly, this seems especially the case with matters that apparently belong in the province of a psychiatrist.

Coles relates an interview with a white teacher who describes a summer she has spent in New York City doing graduate work in education. Speaking *14 years after the event,* she says of an episode that happened in the women's dormitory where she stayed:

> I'll never quite forget the second it took place. It was an ordinary morning and I was coming out of the shower when suddenly I saw that nigra woman. There were several showers and she was standing there, drying herself. She had just come out herself (I thought about that later, you know) and we were probably taking showers at the same time. Anyway, she came out of hers just a few seconds before I came out of mine. When I saw her I didn't know what to do. It was if I'd seen the Devil himself, or I was about to face Judgment Day. I felt sick all over, and frightened. What I remember—I'll never forget it—is that horrible feeling of being caught in a terrible trap, and not knowing what to do about it. I thought of running out of the room and screaming at that woman to get out, or running back into the shower. My mind was in a terrible panic; I thought of everything I could do at once, but I felt paralyzed. I felt like fainting, and vomiting, too; it was shock, like seasickness; it took hold of me all over and I wondered whether I was about to die.

A caste system certainly can flourish on the ground of such passionate abhorrence! Unfortunately, Coles does not go on to ask why the mere sight of a naked Negro lady in a dormitory shower should so discomfit her white fellow student.

He does tell how she learned to eat, as well as shower, with Negroes that Northern summer and how, many years later, she volunteered to teach one of the first integrated classes in Alabama. The account of how she put aside her prejudices to teach—and to teach kindness more than subject matter—is a document of human decency. Coles quotes her as saying after two years with an integrated class:

> I've never felt so useful, so constantly useful, not just to the children but to our whole society, American as well as Southern. Those children, all of them, have given me more than I've given them. They've helped me realize that some unpleasant times in my own life were not spent in vain. That's a privilege, to be able to have your life tested and found somewhat consistent, at least over the long haul. I guess I grew up there in New York, and used the strength from it down here later on. I was just another teacher up North for the summer, but it made me a better Southerner, a better person, for a long time afterward.

That ordinary people can act morally in a social crisis forms an underlying theme of Coles's book. That he does not know enough yet about the human condition to predict who will come through, or why, or when, forms another strand. A third is that we have no right to call the ones who persist in evil action "crazy."

As Coles cries out, after relating the poverty-stricken life history of a lyncher and noting that his actions do not

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differ from those of many "respectable" citizens in his state:

> I wonder about the eager emphasis given private, aberrant motives by some in our society. Many ignore crying, horrible, concrete social and political realities whose effects—as a matter of fact—might lead us to understand how [the lyncher] and others like him continue to plague us. It is easier, I suppose, to look for the madman's impulse and make explaining the doctor's task.
>
> The bestiality I have seen in the South cannot be attributed only to its psychotic and ignorant people. Once and for all, in the face of what we have seen in this century, we must all know that the animal in us can be elaborately rationalized in a society until an act of murder is seen as self-defense and dynamited houses become evidence of moral courage. Nor is the confused, damaged South the only region of this country in need of that particular knowledge.

The virtue of Coles's book is that he tells us this. Its fault is that he does not tell us much more.

SUSAN GOODMAN

Bossism: Kwame Nkrumah's Style

THE RISE AND FALL OF KWAME NKRUMAH: A STUDY OF PERSONAL RULE IN AFRICA, by Henry L. Bretton. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 252 pp. $5.95.

The destiny of Ghana has been a paradoxical one. The country the British have praised for having produced capable, honest administrators and technicians was suffering from mismanagement, corruption, and plain and obvious administrative malfunctioning on the eve of the February *coup d'état*. The country that had the potential for an effectively functioning democracy—Western style—was, in Conor Cruise O'Brien's terminology, in the hands of "party demagogues" and "yes-men," "often with socialist slogans in their mouths and contractors' money in their pockets." The most capable and most honest civil servants and technicians fled the country to avoid succumbing to Nkrumahist policies and tactics. In the jargon of the *Osagyefo* (the Liberator, Redeemer), Ghana continued to experience "negative development," because of the prevalence and predominance of "negative action" over "positive action." What accounted for these developments in Ghana, a country possessing such resources on the eve of its independence?

Henry L. Bretton, professor of political science at the University of Michigan, attributes the Ghanaian fiasco to the political machine and political style of Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's deposed President. Bretton, who once was "admonished" by Kwame Nkrumah to be "intellectually honest" in his writing about Ghana, tells us that under the cover of a one-party state, a political machine dominated by Kwame Nkrumah ruled Ghana. Bretton reports that Nkrumah utilized

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the prerogatives of all bosses of political machines: economic blackmail, extortion, and bribery in order to sustain his personal political machine. The party's hand-picked leaders, according to Bretton, were watchdogs and messengers for the "Redeemer." Nkrumah, rather than the party or its representatives in Parliament, made those decisions that gravely affected the lives of Ghanaians. In fact, a number of decisions went unmade because the "Supreme One" never got around to making them.

Before Nkrumah, no national symbol had existed for Ghanaians; no ideology, code, or object, no personality had ever captured the national imagination. Nkrumah filled this vacuum as he emerged to national leadership. And thus he substituted his political machine for the "cultural wasteland" colonialism had created.

When Nkrumah took office as the leader of "Government Business" (and later as Prime Minister), he held "relatively little economic, hence political power." During pre-independence days and the first few years following independence, Nkrumah was most sensitive in his handling of the old overlords in London who still controlled the decision-making apparatus of the country. Nkrumah's strategy, if one can call it that, was not to "rock the boat" or to alienate these powerful economic groups as he cautiously moved to free Ghana from their influence. He was aware that he must not give them a hard time, or the end result would be his overthrow. To combat the constitutional restraint imposed on him from London, Nkrumah made a series of moves that contributed to his personal rule. Among these were his attempts to remove expatriates from key positions in the civil service and to replace them with loyal but, at times, incompetent Ghanaians under the guise of Africanization. With loyal individuals "least scrupulous about democratic principles," he proceeded to legislate the opposition out of existence. Deportation Acts enabled him to rid Ghana of foreign citizens who had links with the opposition party, and any party with a religious basis was banned. Under the guise of decentralization, he appointed his loyal followers to represent him in the various regions of the country. Nkrumah, according to Professor Bretton, converted regional assemblies into a personal following and, at his pleasure, then abolished them to enhance his power on the national level.

Under his instructions, his party faithfuls in Parliament legitimized certain repressive measures; among them were the Preventive Detention Acts which facilitated arbitrary detentions *en masse*. The 1959 Act, for instance, barred any member of the National Assembly against whom a preventive detention order was in force from taking his seat; the Act was retroactive and barred many members of the opposition party from their seats.

An amendment of the criminal code made it a criminal offense to do anything that "would make the President an object of national ridicule or contempt." Thus, Nkrumah and his political machine were above criticism—whatever the "boss" did was right for Ghana. Parliament also placed the courts, the police, the prisons, and virtually every other institution in Ghana under his control.

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Every Ghanaian was at the mercy of Nkrumah, according to Professor Bretton. If one was not dependent upon him economically, one was subjected to investigation by the secret police who were under Nkrumah's control; one was tried in courts Nkrumah controlled by judges he commanded, and incarcerated in jails he regulated. Nkrumah could command an investigation of any Ghanaian. And in Flagstaff House he created a separate branch of government to existing administrative institutions. From there his loyal tribesmen and foreign advisers ran the country, amidst designed confusion and the dependency syndrome. To legitimize any action, the phrases *"Osagyefo* says" this or *"Osagyefo* wants" that done were utilized to circumvent red tape in the civil service. Obscurity, unpredictability, inconsistency, and uncertainty were devices used in maintaining the political machine.

Nkrumah's foreign advisers, Bretton maintains, diverted and overextended Nkrumah's vision to pan-Africanism which estranged him from knowing of the poor living conditions in Ghana. Nkrumah feared foreigners, especially Westerners, but his fall was the result of his dependence on foreign advisers, Easterners, and self-imposed detainees from the West, mostly Communists.

According to Bretton, Ghana lacked an ideology under Nkrumah and Nkrumahism, lacked consistency and/or substance. Nkrumah suffered from Nkrumahmania—thinking that Nkrumah was Ghana and Ghana Nkrumah. Bretton has shown that in Ghana, under Nkrumah, government was conducted on a personal, *ad hoc* basis in a highly irregular and unpredictable fashion; Nkrumah applied socially and economically irrelevant ideological formulae, and he overextended Ghana's commitments beyond her borders. The end result was miscalculation and mismanagement of funds, having Ghana in ruins. Nkrumah sought the political kingdom—he gained it, but all other things did not follow for him nor for other Ghanaians.

One shortcoming in Bretton's analysis of Nkrumah's political machine is that he fails to discuss the component parts of the political machine. It was not as easy for Nkrumah to replace "obsolete" people in his political machine with new and submissive "clogs" as Bretton seems to assume. Ghanaians are not as submissive as Bretton would have us believe, and they are not as ignorant as he implies. There are people who went along with Nkrumah because they stood to benefit—the insincere ones who were the first to condemn Nkrumah after the *coup d'état.* These are the people who idolized Nkrumah and made him what Bretton (who is also the author of *Power and Stability in Nigeria*) says Nkrumah

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for change to become effective

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was. Any study of Nkrumah's political machine that excludes mention of these people must be considered incomplete. There are Ghanaians who resisted his control, not because they had their country at heart—they too, under the guise of democracy, may be acting like Nkrumah in the years ahead.

Bretton's analysis of Nkrumah's political machine grants Nkrumah more power than he held; Nkrumah was not always free to act at will. He, too, thought of the political consequences of his actions. Although he tried all three of the following methods, Nkrumah came to realize that he could not control the leaders of the opposition by buying them off, imprisoning them, or by causing them to flee the country. Nkrumah was not equipped to handle a revolt of the masses. His only recourse was to use the military; but, like most Ghanaians, he was repelled by massacres. And his decisions were calculated not to alienate or agitate the masses against him. Bretton's analysis reinforces Nkrumah's belief that he was Ghana and Ghana was Nkrumah. No Ghanaian, including Nkrumah and the rest of his political machine, is indispensable to Ghana.

Each appendage to Nkrumah's political machine was annexed by mutual agreement; Nkrumah did not possess the political acumen attributed to him by Professor Bretton; if he did, he would have saved himself. Ghana, as well as Nkrumah, must be tried; Ghanaians contributed to the fiasco and Professor Bretton must not absolve them of their guilt. Expression of opinions, as divergent as they may be, promotes a healthy society and is synonymous with democracy. Under one-party rule, ideas are imposed on the citizenry from the top by a clique, and this does not promote grass-roots participation in the decision-making apparatus.

Bretton's analysis does not question the legitimacy of one-party rule; instead, he shows that the party was not functional because of "His Highness."

The validity of Professor Bretton's findings can be questioned because he relies most heavily on interviews, commission reports, and newspaper articles, all promulgated after the *coup d'état* as his source of documentation. Ghanaians are engaged in a free-for-all accusation of Nkrumah, and neither he nor any counsel of his has been available to confirm or deny these accusations. The subtitle of the book, *A Study of Personal Rule in Africa*, is rather imposing but misleading. One can see no justification for it, as Kwame Nkrumah was never accepted as a ruler of Africa or a true leader of the Third World, and the facts presented in this book do not describe him in these terms.

Yet, the publication of this book constitutes an important event, not only in African studies but in comparative politics at large; not because of its original contributions, which are substantial, but because it may represent the emergence of a new attitude toward cross-national studies. This is the most substantial book yet to appear in comparative politics devoted to a study of a political machine anywhere in Africa.

POLYBIUS AFRICANUS

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The Arab Ba'th and the Middle East

THE ARAB BA'TH SOCIALIST PARTY, by Kamel S. Abu Jaber. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 218 pp. $6.50.

Quoting an interview with the veteran socialist, Akram Hourani, Kamel Abu Jaber reports that when asked to whom he felt closer—a British socialist or a Saudi Arabian Sheikh, Hourani replied, "the Saudi Arabian Sheikh without any question." Events of the past few months, culminating in the lightening war of June in the Middle East, strongly bear out the accuracy and the paradox of this position. In the midst of crisis, the socialists of the Arab Ba'th (Resurrection) Party did not hesitate to unite with some of their less progressive brothers; the link was Arabhood rather than socialism. But this choice cannot be attributed solely to the exigencies of war, it is part of the complex nature of Arab socialism and its most sophisticated variant, the Arab Ba'th Socialist party. Committed partisans of the Ba'th would claim that there was less evil in an alliance with a feudal Saudi Sheikh than in one with the heirs of the imperialist tradition in the Middle East. But Western socialists, even those fully capable of understanding such an evaluation, would be wise to question the history and theory that have been accumulated in its defense. The history of the Ba'th party is an excellent introduction to this subject.

The Ba'th party was founded in Damascus in 1943 by a small group of intellectuals; it held its first national convention in 1947. Despite its modest membership—ten members in the first three years—it adopted an ambitious program that distinguished it from its competitors in Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East. In 1949 the party won three seats in the Syrian Parliament, a number that climbed to 16 five years later and eventually brought the Ba'th into the Cabinet in the summer of 1956. The Ba'th, claiming to be an Arab and not exclusively a Syrian party, had already spread to neighboring Lebanon and Jordan before Syria entered into the brief and difficult union with Egypt in 1958. Two years after the breakup of the U.A.R., in 1963, the Ba'th succeeded in toppling the Qasim regime in Iraq and one month later, in March, it repeated this performance in Syria, thus regaining power in its home base. Yet the Ba'th has been neither as successful as its founders wish it to be, nor as much of a failure as its enemies like to assume.

The central experience of Syrian patriots of all political persuasions has been the struggle for independence, and consequently, their relationship with the West. Even after Syria and Lebanon had been granted their legal independence by France, the presence of foreigners was a reminder of how distant the goal of true independence remained. Moreover, the end of the mandate system did not mean the reintegration of the separate regions of the Middle East, which perpetuated what some considered a grave injustice.

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From these two conditions, the struggle for independence and the desire to reunify the Arab world, the Arab Ba'th Socialist party derived a number of its programs. By its name it declared its refusal to confirm the "artificial boundaries drawn by foreigners," and it objected to the Arab League on the ground that its existence confirmed that partition. The desire to achieve a lasting independence for the entire Middle East led it to oppose the creation of Israel, which it saw as a Western state forcibly imposed in its midst.

The defeat of the Arab states in the debacle of 1948 was a turning point in recent Middle Eastern history. From this undisguised failure came the desire to reform the corrupt regimes, the administrative mismanagement, and the military obsolescence that were considered the cause of the Arab disaster. In Syria alone, in the period between 1949 and 1953, there were three *coups d'état,* 21 cabinet changes, and two military dictatorships. In the new political groupings that emerged, two issues were fundamental: the extent to which collaboration with the West was possible, and the extent to which internal reform could be implemented. Among the progressive reformers promising large-scale change and a severe limitation of Western influence, two continue to be outstanding: the leaders of the Egyptian revolution and the members of the Arab Ba'th Socialist party.

Both the pragmatic policies of Nasser and the more doctrinaire leanings of the Syrian Ba'thists reflect the preference for "totalitarian democracy" that is common to left-wing reformers of the Middle East. In large measure it explains the eclectic doctrine evolved by the Ba'thists. For the first generation of Ba'thists, and especially for its two leaders Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, socialism was the only correct alternative to capitalism and Communism.

Arab socialism has been described as the social content of Arab nationalism and as the foundation for the creation of a popular democracy. In the writings of its theoretical leader, Aflaq, it remains a plan designed to transform the Arab world from its present situation to a condition in which social justice and economic and political equality will prevail. The idea of regeneration contained in the term Ba'th refers to the moral transformation of the Arab people which is to precede and accompany material changes. The vital moral connotations in Aflaq's writings may be of little importance to the current regime which is not noted for sentiment or mysticism.

In the course of their political education, Aflaq and Bitar learned much from both Marx and the French Communists. Indeed, the French Communist party, in collaboration with the Blum government in 1936 accounts for their disillusionment with Communism as an allegedly anti-imperialist force. This has not prevented the Ba'th from cooperating with the Communist party in Syria, nor has it blunted its sympathy for the Soviet bloc. The Ba'thists have not forgotten, however, that the Soviet government voted for the seating of the new State of Israel in 1948; nor that local Communists were not enthusiastic partisans of Arab nationalism, i.e., Arab unity, until after the 1956 transformation of the Soviet position. In its struggle

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against the remnants of Western imperialism, the old proverb, "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," is a practical guide.

Political considerations may explain the party's changing attitude toward the U.S.S.R., yet this is less true in its assessment of classic Marxist theory. Here the Ba'thists have withheld approval from Marxist conceptions of materialism, internationalism, class struggle, and the dictatorship of the proletariat. The absence of a large proletariat, the pressure of a land-hungry peasantry, the desire for Arab unity, and the continued public adherence to Islam are some of the reasons for this rejection. To these should be added the effect of the confusion between Marxism and Soviet policy, which persisted for so long. However, the attitude described above is not shared by a number of younger Ba'thists, who generally have greater interest in the applicability of Marxist and Leninist analyses to local conditions. In this respect, Abu Jaber's book has its limitations, since he fails to consider fully these generational and ideological differences.

Ba'thists are the first to point out that while conditions in the Middle East may bar easy acceptance of Communism or Marxism, they do not bar differing conceptions of socialism. The most obvious competitor in this area is Egypt, whose pragmatic trial-and-error policies have recently been restated in terms designed to make them more attractive to sophisticated reformers. In explaining the complicated events that led up to the creation of Syro-Egyptian union in 1958 and that subsequently brought about its demise in 1961, Abu Jaber does justice to the divisions that separate Nasser and the Syrian Ba'thists. And here again, it is useful to recognize the differences that exist among the Ba'thists themselves, the militant extremists on the one hand and the moderates on the other. These differences extend from the question of cooperation with Nasser to the matter of land redistribution. For the Ba'thists—until February 1966 at least—Nasserism has been unexpectedly useful in that it had forced the party to redefine its position on the questions of liberty, pluralism, the principles of collective leadership and democratic centralism. On the basis of the Sixth Party Convention held in 1963, it is clear that the majority adhered to these principles while reaffirming the desirability of working with Nasser for eventual Arab unity.

Published in 1966, therefore, before the onset of recent tension and war, Kamel Abu Jaber's book has lost none of its timelines. Regarding Israel as a Western state in their midst, suspicious of its socialist claims, the members of the Ba'th continue to reject the possibility of a dialogue with the Israeli Left. One may well hope that this seemingly eternal block will eventually be overcome; but in the interval it is useful to recall that the obstacles to such a rapprochement involve all of the grievances that have come to characterize the relations of the Arab world, and the Arab Left, with the West.

IRENE L. GENDZIER

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LETTERS

CIA—A Modest Proposal

EDITORS:

In his comment on the CIA, "A Modest Proposal: Abolish the Damn Thing," May–June 1967, Stanley Plastrik states that he wishes to discuss "the failure of most people to grasp what, precisely, the CIA is." He informs us that providing funds for various organizations accounts for only 10 per cent of the functions engaged in by the CIA. The remaining resources of the organization are divided between the "vanguard" operations which are devoted to assassination, bribery, sabotage, political intervention, etc., and the research and scientific personnel who feed the vanguard. Plastrik concludes that the CIA should be abolished and that the formation of both domestic and foreign policy be turned back to the proper institutions of government.

Two major points made by Plastrik are not clear to me. First, I have not been convinced that the formation of domestic and foreign policy have been taken out of the proper institutions of government, if this is meant to imply that the CIA has assumed these functions. I suggest that a misleading dichotomy has been set up when we talk of the CIA on the one hand and the proper institutions of government on the other hand. The dichotomy should rather be conceived of as one between the Congressional and Executive branches of government. Plastrik himself tells us that the CIA does not report to Congress and is responsible only to the President. The case of the CIA must be seen in the light of the progressive growth of the power of the Executive branch. In short, return the formation of both domestic and foreign policy back to Congress.

A second point of confusion is Plastrik's phrase, "Abolish the Damn Thing." That is, abolish the CIA. It is not clear to me whether Plastrik is outraged at the existence of an agency called the CIA or whether his outrage is directed at the activities, i.e. assassination, intervention, etc., engaged in by an arm of the U.S. government. It is the latter which concerns me and I fail to see how the abolition of the CIA will remedy this situation. It is very likely that these same activities would be carried out by another of the "proper institutions" of the government.

We should venture beyond the superficial discussions of the abolition of the CIA and employ the phrase, "Abolish the Damn Thing" to mean, abolish assassination, bribery, intervention, etc. As I have suggested, these activities are not a product of the CIA but rather, the CIA is a product of a society which engages in these activities.

MARK JAY OROMANER

STANLEY PLASTRIK *replies*:

The CIA is a creature of the government's executive branch, spawned by the cold-war phase of American foreign policy. But, as everyone knows, cancerous growths have a way of taking off on their own and of dragging the rest of the organism along. There are many illustrations of how the CIA has created situations and presented the authorities with *faits acocmplis*. Basically, of course, I recognize the omnipotent Presidency as the center for the formation of foreign policy.

Clearly, as to Mr. Oromaner's second point, I am opposed to both the CIA *and* its activities. I have no quarrel with him or his assertion that our world and society tend to produce this type of criminal activity. Still, today and in this society, it's the CIA that is guilty. Its dismantlement would not usher in a moral international order, but it would at least remove one of the worst odors from a poisonous atmosphere.

On Alinsky in Syracuse

Editors:

In his article "The Myth of Saul Alinsky" (July–August 1967), Frank Riessman wrote:

> Alinsky resigned from the Syracuse project not long after the going got rough, and the Office of Economic Opportunity (which had founded the

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organization) required that the project be placed under the umbrella of the city-wide antipoverty agency. Alinsky seemed completely unable to develop tactics to respond to this condition.

As the [former] director of the Syracuse project, I want to point out that this statement has little basis in fact.

Saul Alinsky did not resign from the Syracuse project: he was fired by the university administration. He had been employed to come to Syracuse for four days a month to teach a seminar which primarily concerned the formation of the Back of the Yards Council in Chicago. We had an agreement that he would not discuss Syracuse, with which he was unacquainted, especially in view of the fact that the organizational model used in Syracuse was not that developed by Alinsky. He was never involved in the formulation of tactics in Syracuse. The Syracuse project was not an Alinsky project, nor was Alinsky's salary in Syracuse paid for by funds secured through the Office of Economic Opportunity.

In his reference to me, Dr. Riessman was similarly inventive. I have never suggested that poor people do not need money, nor has it been my view that militant social action unrelated to environmental change is therapeutic, nor does my organizational orientation derive from the Alinsky model.

It would be useful to subject organizational efforts, including those of Saul Alinsky, to a critical examination. But the fancy of Frank Riessman obviously does not have patience for such a pedestrian enterprise.

WARREN C. HAGGSTROM
Associate Professor
UCLA School of Social Welfare

FRANK RIESSMAN *replies:*

If one were to take seriously Dr. Haggstrom's comment, one would have to believe that Mr. Alinsky came to the Syracuse Project *coincidentally* at the time it was funded by the OEO and departed *coincidentally* at the time the Project came under criticism from the OEO. Moreover, the idea that Alinsky "did not discuss Syracuse with which he was unacquainted" seems highly questionable because Mr. Alinsky has publicly discussed projects in a variety of cities (e.g., Rochester, Buffalo, etc.) with which he was equally unacquainted. In fact, the basic liaison between Alinsky's Industrial Areas Foundation and the Syracuse Project was executed through Mr. Fred Ross, a major organizer for the IAF who functioned also as the field director of the Syracuse Project! It would seem that Dr. Haggstrom is asking us to take the Syracuse charade at face value rather than the way it was understood by everyone connected with it: the OEO, the Syracuse staff, social scientist observers in Syracuse, and the press.

I did not suggest that Alinsky organized the Syracuse Project but included it among a group of projects *stimulated* by Alinsky. In long personal conversations with Dr. Haggstrom prior to the development of the Syracuse Project I had the overwhelming impression that he was a powerful Alinsky advocate and that he intended to develop a variant of the Alinsky model in Syracuse. Incidentally, since 1963 I have been hearing from him that he intends to provide a critical empirical examination of the Alinsky model; as yet, no such data is available from him.

Dr. Haggstrom in a further paragraph writes that I misinterpret his views in summarizing them under a sociotherapeutic rubric; the reader can only judge this for himself by reading Haggstrom's article entitled "The Power of the Poor," an article published in a book I coauthored entitled *Mental Health of the Poor* (Free Press, 1964).

Finally, I should note that in the time Alinsky was in Syracuse there were frequent newspaper and magazine articles describing the Project as an Alinsky-type project; I do not recall Dr. Haggstrom publishing any strong disclaimers at that time. This is particularly surprising because he was typically interviewed by the newspaper and magazine writers in question.

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A SPECIAL FEATURE

Michael Harrington

AMERICAN POWER IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The democratic Left must help finish the creation of the world. The world—and I borrow here from Peter Worsley's imaginative way of speaking—is scarcely begun. The globe has, of course, existed for eons, and humans project their various histories more than 4000 years into the past. But those interrelationships that transcend tribe, nation, and empire, uniting the people of the earth in a common destiny —whether they like it or not—are only a century or so old. The first day of this creation took place when economics, science, and warfare put the planet together. The second day is now, and there might not be a third.

Applying such high-flown biblical imagery to politics strikes most Americans as grandiose; they leave the world-to-come to the preachers while they pragmatically reconstruct the reality that is. Until World War II the Pacific and Atlantic oceans allowed Americans to disdain foreign entanglements on principle. And being of an anti-imperialist imperialism, a power which usually dominated other lands through the subtlety of money rather than the brutality of force, America burdened its people with an excessively good conscience. For all of these reasons, it is particularly important to insist within the United States that the day-to-day decisions of foreign policy involve the choice of a new order of things for the twenty-first century. So far, America is creating the world very badly—though this need not be.

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America is imperialist. To the average citizen, this statement is a patent slander. If the nation has erred, he would say, it has been generous to a fault, and only a Communist could deny the charity and anti-colonialism of its historic record. But the United States has been profoundly imperialist in the decades after World War II (and before, but that is another story). Yet, the United States need not be imperialist. This notion strikes most revolutionists, and not just the Communists, as unpardonably tender-minded. To them, fat, prosperous, capitalist America cannot possibly ally itself with the downtrodden and against the international *status quo*; it is fated to be reactionary, the very headquarters of the world's counterrevolution. This trust in the country's inherent evil is, however, almost as naive as the patriotic faith in its goodness. For given a turn to the democratic Left, this nation could play a crucial and positive role in finishing the creation of the world.

Anti-utopia seems more possible than a better world. And yet, there is hope. Although there are tremendous social, political, and economic forces urging the U.S. (and the West, and the rich Communist East) to do wrong, this country could take the lead in making a democratic revolution—in finishing the creation of the world in humane fashion. This fragile hope is my point of departure.

The Progress of the Third World

It has been said so often that the rich nations are getting richer and the poor nations poorer that the very enormity of the fact is lost in cliché.

In the middle of the "Development Decade," proclaimed by the U.N., the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) announced that the developing lands were more ill-nourished in 1965 than they had been before World War II, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimated in 1966 that the nourishment needs in these countries will grow twice as fast as the supply during the remaining years of the century. Also in 1966, the U.N. journal *World Economic Survey* reported that the purchasing power of the Third World had declined while its net outflow of interest and profit to the wealthy powers—the tribute the poor pay to the rich—had increased by 10 per cent. This outrage has been repeatedly denounced by the Secretaries General of the U.N., various Popes, the World Council of Churches, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

As Mr. McNamara summarized this anguished prospect in a Montreal speech in 1966, in the year 2000 half of the developing nations

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will have achieved a per capita income of $170 a year, assuming a continuation of present trends; the American figure would be $4,500. This tragedy is utterly rational according to the economic "laws" of the world the West has carefully created in the last century.

When capitalism conquered the planet, it destroyed or corrupted the indigenous achievements it encountered. Native industry was broken up either by force or because it could not compete with cheap, manufactured goods; direct tribute, and sometimes slave labor, were required; and the "mother" country entered into an alliance with the most reactionary of the local leaders. These cruelties were much more sophisticated and effective than those of the pirates and freebooters; the triumphant entrepreneurs not only stole from their subjects but also integrated them into their economic system.

"You cannot continue to inundate a country with your manufactures," Karl Marx shrewdly observed at the time, "unless you enable it to give some produce in return." Thus, a new economy was created. The colony exported primary products from its fields and mines according to the needs of the metropolitan economy (the profits were shipped out, too). Then, with whatever pittance was left to them, the natives were allowed to buy manufactured goods from their exploiters and so provided them with still another profit. There was, to be sure, some economic progress and modernization in the colony; the French proclaimed it in most noble terms: they were engaged in "*la mission civilatrice.*"

According to the rationalizations of the time, the various countries were simply doing what they could do "best," submitting to the impersonal laws of economics. People somehow failed to realize that these "laws" were artificial constructions of Western power. Asia, Africa, and Latin America were carefully and systematically denied the benefits of the new industrialism; they were designated the hewers of wood and the drawers of water.

After World War II a new indignity was in store for the Third World. Paradoxically, the new nations suffered because the advanced lands were now less interested in exploiting them. The new mid-century technology no longer required great quantities of traditional raw materials; synthetics now substituted for old imports, and subsidized, protected agricultural sectors took care of about 80 per cent of the need for primary products. Ironically, the very success of the Western welfare state, and particularly of government policies to promote full employment, made profiteering in the backward areas less attractive. For now the wealthy powers had created such stable and enormous markets that

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they could make more money producing for one another's affluence than by investing in underdeveloped countries.

On the world market, the demand for manufactured goods zoomed while that for primary products declined. The First Committee of the U.N. Trade and Development Conference in 1964 reported the result: between 1950 and 1962 prices paid for the exports of the underdeveloped countries went down by 7 per cent and prices paid for their imports from the industrialized countries went up by 27 per cent. And whenever the Third World managed to attract some public or private capital from the great powers, they paid cash on the barrelhead. The result of these trends has been, in the words of Raul Prebisch, "a regressive redistribution of income . . . between the developed and developing countries."

Profit, Priorities & Economic "Laws"

As Gunnar Myrdal has pointed out, everyone knows that it is more profitable to invest in safe projects than in risky ones—in European and American affluence rather than in Third World poverty. Given the political and social outlook of private business, available funds will go to private rather than to public enterprises, and to undertakings in the ex-colonies only when they promote a quick profit rather than balanced growth of the whole society. The priorities so skillfully built into the very structure of the international economy are often a more efficient, and subtle, way of keeping the world's poor in their unhappy place than were the gunboats and troops of the earlier imperialism. To do incalculable harm to the masses of the Third World, the Western politician or businessman need not be evil, but only reasonable and realistic.

The man-made logic of the international division of labor is so compelling that it directs the developing country to embrace the misfortune which has been visited upon it. And this is precisely what the Committee for Economic Development (CED), one of the most sophisticated and liberal business organizations in the U.S., advocated in a 1966 policy statement. The new nations, the CED said, must invest "where the increment in value of product promises to be greatest." This sounds quite sensible, and it leads to the conclusion that priority should be given to those export industries "that can earn substantial foreign exchange if they can compete with effective industries in other countries. . . ." Obviously, fledgling societies cannot compete with the advanced giant industries of Europe and America; it would be a waste to allocate resources to a modern technological sector which would,

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after all, only duplicate Western factories and at a much higher and noncompetitive cost.

In obedience to the "laws" of the world market, the developing country must find some export specialty that suits the needs of the big powers, for that is the only rational thing to do in a system created by, and for, these big powers. And this logic can easily override consideration of the needs of the people or the requirements for building a balanced, modern economy. But even a country that manages to escape from these inexorabilities of the international economy and invests in an advanced enterprise is victimized by the way the world is organized. Celso Furtado, a brilliant Latin-American economist, has vividly analyzed what this means:

Technology developed "organically" in the West. When the first factories needed semiskilled and unskilled operatives, peasants were expropriated and a working class was created. As mechanical ingenuity advanced, the workers were progressively withdrawn from primary and secondary occupations (agriculture, mining, and mass production) and channeled into the service and white-collar sector. At times, these transitions were accomplished by brute force; at times, mass action won concessions and ameliorations. In either case, economy and society grew up side by side with the machines and the new organization of work.

Thus, Furtado points out, the corporation is designed to fit the needs of profit-making in an advanced economy, and when one tries to transplant its technology to impoverished, developing lands, furious contradictions result. The newest machines save manpower—a blessing in the U.S. and a curse in a country with rampant underemployment. Mass production requires a huge market nonexistent in an archaic agricultural society. So, Furtado concludes, the very structure of economic life in the new nations—forced upon them in the last century—makes it difficult for them to absorb the benefits of scientific and technical progress on those rare occasions when they might have the opportunity to do so.

Thus, the rich nations specialize in activities which make work easier, goods more abundant, leisure more widespread, and living standards higher. The poor nations are left with the grubby tasks of primary production and with a stagnant or declining market; they must sell cheap and buy dear from the booming factories. In such a world, the gap separating the impoverished from the affluent will grow no matter what the U.N. General Assembly decides.

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Americans Abroad: Benefactors and Entrepreneurs

The foreign policies of the big powers operate to reinforce the logic of injustice which is part of the world created by the nineteenth-century West. Thus, statesmanship has served to increase the distance between the world's haves and have-nots. And yet, the average American would argue that the U.S. possesses no colonies; that it has spent tremendous sums in the military defense of freedom around the earth and given away billions of dollars to impoverished nations. In return for all this idealism and largesse, he would conclude, the country has received little but ingratitude; how can the recipients of all this charity call the United States imperialist?

This perplexed and angry view is not described here for purposes of ridicule. No doubt, generosity is a peculiarity of the American national character, and this excellent emotion has provided the political basis for foreign aid from the Marshall Plan to the present. Yet, the results of these efforts have often been at variance with the spirit that motivated them. And this is precisely why it is so important to understand how the U.S., even when it acts out of its best instincts (and is *not* motivated by hysterical anti-Communism, oil diplomacy, and the like), has intensified the very social and economic miseries it deplores.

There is a deep American political tradition which holds that a man who gives away something for nothing is probably effeminate and certainly not fit for public office. Therefore, it is often necessary for the politician to disguise noble impulses in the rhetoric of the counting house. Harry Truman's Leninism in the following statement on Point Four was probably such verbiage, designed to win support from a dubious business community for the do-gooding concepts of Point Four:

> It seemed to me that if we could encourage stabilized governments in underdeveloped countries in Africa, South America, and Asia, we could encourage the use for the development of these areas of some of the capital which had accumulated in the United States. If the investment of capital from the United States could be protected and not confiscated, and if we could persuade the capitalists that they were not working in foreign countries to exploit them, it would be to the mutual benefit of everybody concerned.

From Truman's Presidency to the present, it has been U.S. policy to proceed according to this scenario: to discover some reasonable ex-colonials committed to capitalist development of their lands; to instill some social purpose in American businessmen; then, to have the American government provide the financial framework within which these

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two groups can make a free-enterprise idyll of peaceful progress. But the contradictory elements in this vision guaranteed its self-defeat. The U.S. indeed honestly felt committed to a democratic alternative to Communist industrialization, to abolition of the world's inequities by means of freedom rather than dictatorship. But this fine aspiration was to be pursued according to the traditional rules of world capitalism—rules which were a major source of the misery that supposedly was to be abolished.

Concretely, American foreign aid and military programs, private investment, and tariff policy were permeated and guided by the principles of the old order they were intended to challenge. While trying to be noble, the U.S. thus, unwittingly but inevitably, made money and, more often than not, worsened the plight of those it had set out to aid and whose support it sought in the Cold War. Dean Acheson, in an important speech in Cleveland, Mississippi, on the direct orders of President Truman, noted that American exports were twice as great as the imports, and that the balance of trade was *too* favorable. Therefore, Acheson concluded, American funds must go to Europe. Now it is clear that the Marshall Plan was not simply designed in order to give businessmen a stable market in the Old World. Political, military, and even cultural considerations led to the decision to defend the continent against what was seen as the imminent threat of Communist insurrection and/or invasion. But American generosity and anti-Communism also had the effect of priming the European pump; it was a type of international Keynesianism creating an effective demand for U.S. products overseas and consequently leading to higher profits.

This self-interest rationale for foreign aid persists to this day. In lobbying for the Administration's 1967 program, the Agency for International Development (AID) told Congress, "In the less developed world today, the AID program is introducing American products and performance standards to some of the great potential markets of the future. . . . The goods and services go overseas, the dollar stays here to pay for them."

In part, this is the same shamming cynicism as Harry Truman's Leninist tough talk, used to conceal decent motives; but it also has another dead serious aspect. For when there is conflict between the needs of the American corporation and those of the impoverished whom we supposedly are helping, the domestic dollar comes first. In March 1966 a Buenos Aires meeting was convened to consider what gains had been made by the Alliance for Progress. There was an immediate uproar when the Latin Americans attacked the policy of "tied" aid—which

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requires the beneficiary to spend his gift or loan in the United States ("The goods and services go overseas, the dollar stays here to pay for them"). The delegates pointed out that they could often get cheaper goods in Europe or Japan. Lincoln Gordon of the State Department replied for the U.S. His nation, he said, was interested in world-wide trade liberalization but "considerations of national security and structural problems within our own economy have led to the imposition of import restrictions." Plainly, the Latin-American developers were to subordinate their needs to those of the American commitment in Vietnam, the balance of payment problem, and the alleged threat of domestic inflation.

The Varying Uses of Aid

India provides an even better example for the profitable uses of American generosity. This particular case grows out of the fact that there is money to be made in the starvation market. As *Forbes Magazine* (which advertises itself as a "capitalist tool") headlined the cover story in the March 1, 1966 issue: "Feeding the World's Hungry Millions: How It Will Mean Billions for U.S. Business." The American oil companies, *Forbes* said in this article, had got the message and were embarking on fertilizer production. Then followed this frank and revealing anecdote:

> For a long time, India insisted that it handle all the distribution of fertilizer produced in that country by U.S. companies and that it also set the price. Standard of Indiana understandably refused to accept these conditions. AID put food shipments to India on a month-to-month basis until the Indian government let Standard of Indiana market its fertilizer at its own price.

And so, in the 1967 AID proposals, the request for $50 million for fertilizer to India was a "tied" grant and its stated goal was to encourage private enterprise—which is to say American oil corporations—in this area. Oil is, after all, more sovereign than India.

Thus, foreign aid has been an immensely profitable undertaking for the American economy and whenever it shows any sign of becoming a real gift, of requiring more giving than getting, it has been cut back. Here, too, the "rational" approach is to give the largest amount of help to the richest rather than the poorest nations, and this is logical in terms of the world market and the international division of labor. Europe can, after all, absorb more capital than Asia, Africa, or Latin America.

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So of the $40 billion spent by AID and its predecessors between 1946 and 1965, $18.5 billion went to restore capitalism in Europe ($13 billion during the brief Marshall Plan period, an extra $2.7 billion to Greece and Turkey, $2.8 billion to Europe after the Marshall Plan). Chiang's "China," Vietnam, and South Korea received another $6 billion. India received more money in the years after the Communist attack in 1962 than in the 15 previous (and largely neutralist) years ($1.4 billion as against $1.022 billion). The funds for Europe were mainly grants, for the poor countries mainly loans. The priorities involved in these allocations, with one major exception, were those that usually motivate investments of a private corporation; aid was directed to the areas of the greatest pay-off. Thus, even benevolence has increased the gap between the rich and the poor.

There was and is, however, a major exception to this rule. In certain cases, the nonprofit logic of military need prevailed over the calculus of the market in the American aid effort. Then a very poor nation could obtain huge sums of money for nothing—although there was usually an unspoken interest rate computed in the numbers of the dead and maimed. This grim exception proved that it was possible, where there was a real political will, to defy the rationality of an artificial world and to favor principles over balance sheets. It is, of course, only one more irony imposed upon the world's impoverished that this burst of idealism took place for purposes of destruction rather than construction.

As a result, the military defiance of economic law accentuated rather than reversed the reactionary priorities at work in the rest of the American aid program. To qualify for this exceptional support, a regime had to be fanatically anti-Communist—and it almost always was opposed to any real democratic social progress as well. Inefficiency, corruption, and instability were tolerated, as in the various governments in Vietnam in the sixties. But, to the military a genuine program for social justice smacked too much of Communism. Indeed, in the postwar period, American military funds for the avowed and practicing opponents of decent change in Asia and Latin America were much more generous than those given to the modernizers.

The U.N. journal *World Economic Survey* in 1965 put the matter succintly. During that year, it reported, the self-help efforts of the Third World resulted in an increase in savings of 6 per cent (of the surplus deducted from a meager, sometimes starvation-level, consumption). But the outflow to the advanced countries in interest and profit went up by 10 per cent. As a result, the U.N. concluded, the developing countries were sending back to the donors more than half of the funds

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they had received! The external debt of these nations in 1964 was "on the order of" $40 billion, or roughly equal to the entire postwar American aid program up to 1965.

These figures cover a wide range of societies at different levels of development. The London *Economist* reported in October 1966: "The poorest among them, a former World Bank official has estimated, are now paying more interest and principle on World Bank loans than they are receiving from the World Bank in new loans." Some random cases will demonstrate this fantastic situation: *The New York Times* reported in 1965 that Latin-American "debt payments were as high as the total of all public development loans and grants during the year"; the interest due on past loans to India in 1966, to quote the *Times* again, was equal to 35 per cent of the foreign exchange required for the next five-year plan. And perhaps the most summary and cruel statement of this phenomenon was made by Jacques Ferrandi, Director of the *Fond Européen du Développement*: "We can say without exaggeration that certain recently contracted loans [for "development"] are being used to pay old debts."

So the world's poorest countries have done more to raise the living standards of the affluent than to help their own people. But this monstrous subsidy from the miserable to the fat is, after all, quite logical. With the enormous amounts of money being invested in Europe and America, it is only reasonable that risky, emerging societies should pay dear for whatever they receive. In October 1966 a neutralist "summit" was held at New Delhi and there were reports that Tito, Nasser, and Madame Gandhi were going to protest this tragedy and call for a "freezing" of the debt of all the developing countries. However, the London *Economist* reported, both India and Yugoslavia were fearful that the advocacy of such a radical step would bring the wrath of the U.S. down upon their heads. To protect what financial support they did receive, they refrained from complaining.

But the backward economies export more than money to the industrialized countries; they send their most precious national resource, trained human beings. An Iranian sociologist has reported that Togo sent more physicians and professors to France than vice versa and that, between mid-1950 and mid-1964, Argentina sent 13,800 engineers to the U.S. The president of Cornell University has estimated that in a 12-year postwar period some 43,000 scientists and engineers, "many" of them from developing countries, have migrated to the U.S. As a result, in 1964–65 28 per cent of the internships and 26 per cent of the residen-

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cies in U.S. hospitals were filled by foreigners—and 90 per cent of the students from Asia who came to study in America didn't go home.

But perhaps the most single revealing example of how American policy reinforces the systematic injustices of our artificial economic world is found in the area of tarriffs. I am not referring to the straightforward evils of protectionism which were designed to do harm to the poor and benefit the rich. Thus, for example, the "differential" tarriff raises the duty on an import according to the degree to which it has been industrially processed. If the backward economy contents itself with the simple—and impoverishing—extraction of raw materials, it is rewarded; but if it develops itself and sends out more sophisticated products, it is penalized. Similarly, the United States admonishes other nations on the importance of free trade and the test of international competition (in the 1960's, India was particularly favored with such lectures). Yet, America scrupulously ignores these pieties where its own corporate interests are involved. Domestic agriculture is subsidized, world oil prices are rigged to suit the needs of Texas millionaires, and so on. In fairness, it must be added that the Common Market agriculturists are adept at the same games.

But more interesting than these routine and self-interested betrayals of our cherished principles are cases when the U.S. does wrong in the name of virtue. Such cases are based on the denial of the very existence of an international order of economic inequity—but they prove the contrary.

Fair Rules for World Trade

To most Americans, the principles behind the rules and regulations for world trade drawn up at a meeting in Havana shortly after World War II and partially embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), are the essence of fairness itself: the nations would exchange with one another according to a principle of reciprocity; the advanced country would lower its duties on raw materials in response to a reduction of charges on industrial imports in the underdeveloped lands; in this way, all nations would obtain a larger market for whatever they happened to sell and each would be encouraged to specialize in the areas of its particular genius. This was a practical expression of the classic economic faith in free trade and in the benevolent workings of the world market.

This marvelous symmetrical theory assumed that there was free

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economic exchange among equals; only there were no equals. On the one hand, the advanced countries were making brilliant use of the advantages they had secured by force over the previous two centuries. They were moving into the spheres of super-industrialization, automation, and affluence—making so much money off each other that they were now less interested in exploiting their ex-colonies. They were, to borrow an irony from George Orwell, becoming "more equal" than ever before. The impoverished lands of the Third World, however, were suffering more and more from their inherited disadvantages. The demand for their raw materials was stagnant, or shrinking, despite their growing need for increased imports in order to feed their expanding population and/or to industrialize. Thus, they were becoming constantly "less equal."

In this setting, the principles of "fairness" laid down at Havana allowed Western capital to increase the world's economic unfairness. As the Secretary General of the U.N. Trade and Development Conference reported in 1964, reciprocity had actually widened the gap between the rich and the poor. In a pure world of mathematical logic all nations would indeed gain by making equivalent concessions to one another. But in the impure world fashioned in the nineteenth century the impoverished lands were required to give up the possibility of protecting new industries during the first, hesitant phase of development. Meanwhile, the advanced economies were required to make a reduction in duty which was, at most, a minor annoyance.

Under such circumstances, justice would paradoxically require, as Gunnar Myrdal has phrased it, a double standard of international economic morality. In order to compensate for the tremendous disadvantages which have been imposed upon the poor lands for well over 100 years, they must, in strictest equity, be given special advantages. But this notion was decisively rejected by the Kennedy Round.

The disastrous results of America's seemingly fair policy of tariff reciprocity can stand as a sort of summary symbol of how this nation has made money and harmed the poor of the Third World, even when sincerely trying to do good. For foreign aid, military aid, grants and loans and tariffs were all organized according to the irrational rationality of the world market. And by far and large, postwar American policy reinforced the vicious economic "laws" from which the country benefits so profoundly. Thus, St. Matthew's parable of the rich getting richer and the poor poorer is coming true now on a global scale.

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East-West Entente—Rich North Against Poor South?

We have one foot in genesis and the other in apocalypse, and annihilation is always an option. The future could even conform to a half-truth found in the fantasies of Mao Tse-tung: the advanced Communist societies can benefit from international injustice every bit as much as the corporations. This might lead to a deal between well-heeled commissars and executives to end the old-fashioned conflict between East and West, so that the industrialized North could get on with the serious work of exploiting the backward South without regard to race, class, or political creed. An extraordinary potential exists in the world of the late 1960's. The struggle between East and West, Communism and capitalism, which has dominated international politics since the end of World War II, could now come to an end—and be replaced by this conflict between the North, both Communist and capitalist, and the South, which is poor.

The following turgid piece of prose is from an article entitled "Cost Accounting In Economic Relations Between Socialist Countries"; it appeared in the October 1966 issue of the international organ of the pro-Moscow Communists, the *World Marxist Review*:

> The prices for which the socialist countries sell their goods are influenced mostly by the conditions of production in the capitalist lands, and for this reason the exchange proportions are not always commensurate with the proportion of the expenditure of socially necessary labor within the framework of the socialist world economy.

Che Guevara made the same point more bluntly. In a 1965 speech, Guevara said,

> We should not speak any more about developing mutually beneficial trade based on prices which are really disadvantageous to the underdeveloped countries because of the law of value and the unequal relations of international trade caused by that law. How can "mutual benefit" mean the selling at world market prices of raw materials that cost the underdeveloped countries unlimited sweat and suffering and the buying at world market prices of machines produced in large, modern, mechanized factories?

There is no way of evading this point. For world prices reflect, precisely, the cheapness of primary products and the great expense of industrial goods. And if the fat Communists use these prices in their relations with the impoverished Communists, then they are getting the same kind of unjust advantage as the fat capitalists.

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Guevara followed his logic to its conclusion: "If we establish that type of relationship between two groups of nations, we must argue that the socialist countries are to a certain extent accomplices of imperialist exploitation." And this exactly is admitted in the convoluted phrases of the Russian *World Marxist Review*.

The strange notion of a non- and even anti-capitalist imperialism was first put forward in the 1920's by one of the most brilliant of the Bolshevik economists, E. Preobrazhensky.* His analysis still casts a very real light upon the present relations between the Communists and the Third World. The essence of trade between a capitalist power and a colony, Preobrazhensky said, was that "the figures will always show an inequality in the expenditure of labor on the two masses of goods exchanged as equivalents." In Guevara's terms, sweat is cheap and machines are costly. But, Preobrazhensky continued, this "non-equivalence of exchange" would go on even *after* the victory of socialism in the capitalist countries for it was, in part at least, a function of the backwardness of peasant economies as compared to *any* industrialized economy, capitalist or socialist. Preobrazhensky advocated the abolition of this inequity as fast as possible through the modernization of the retrograde societies.

But the victorious socialist revolution in the "capitalist countries"—that socialism based upon the European working class and technology which all the original Bolsheviks anticipated—never came to pass, and Preobrazhensky's hypothesis was never tested. Yet, it follows from the record of Communist totalitarianism (a system which is neither capitalist nor Communist) that the Bolshevik theorist had divined one of the most important truths of the second half of the twentieth century: that the division between rich and poor, industrialized and backward, North and South can transcend social systems. As the *World Marxist Review* shamefacedly admitted and Guevara boldly asserted, both the fat Communist and the fat capitalist can benefit from the "non-equivalence of exchange" on the world market.

This fact has not escaped the notice of the Third World. Here is Julius Nyerere's observation:

> Socialist countries, no less than capitalist countries, are prepared to behave like the millionaire—to use millions to destroy the other "millionaire," and it need not be a capitalist millionaire—it is just as likely to be a socialist "millionaire." In other words, socialist wealth now tolerates poverty, which is an even more unforgiveable crime . . . don't forget

* *The New Economics*, by E. Preobrazhensky, translated by Brian Pearce. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1965.

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> that rich countries . . . may be found on either side of the division between the capitalist and socialist countries.

But this imperialist process on the Communist side was not restricted to profiteering from world market prices; it was political as well. Thus, the pro-Castro editors of the *Monthly Review* in the U.S. rightly noted that Cuba, by specializing in sugar production for the "socialist" market, had become politically dependent on the Russians. There can be little doubt that this client relationship helped cause Fidel to opt for Moscow against Peking in the ideological Sino-Soviet dispute. On the other hand, the East European Communist countries have been openly fighting since 1956 to reject the "socialist" division of labor proposed by the Russians; for under Moscow's system of fraternal exploitation it was suggested that some of the East European states play the classic role of raw-materials and agricultural supplier to the industrialized Big Brother in the Soviet Union.

Acting again in classic capitalist fashion, the Russians have been quite willing to subordinate their ideology in order to make a killing on the international market. In the summer of 1966, for instance, Fidel Castro expressed outrage at the "criminal" idea that Moscow was going to sign a commercial pact with Brazil. Nikolai Patolichev replied for the Soviet Union in the pragmatic phrases of a good businessman who will let nothing interfere with a good deal:

> We believe that foreign trade cannot, and should not, acknowledge frontiers or ideology. My government attributes the utmost importance to commercial relations with countries in the course of economic development, like Brazil. . . . The continuous increase of production in the Soviet economy permits us to accelerate the rhythm and volume of our exports. . . .

In this last sentence, the Russian spokesman sounded very much like Harry Truman imitating Lenin. And he clearly implied that his country, as it becomes more industrialized, will take advantage of the exploitative relationships which have been so conveniently designed by world capitalism.

At this point one encounters an element of truth in the Maoist fantasy of international politics and Communist betrayal. Practical reasons have already impelled the U.S. and Russia to a measure of détente—the armament race and the threat of nuclear holocaust. As Russia becomes more modernized, the two social systems seem to some of their proponents less at odds. If these trends continue, the old antagonists of the Cold War might make a *de facto*, worldwide gentleman's

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agreement in which each tacitly respects the right of the other to exploitation in its own economic and political sphere.

There is a concrete possibility of the development described by the Algerian delegate to the U.N. Economic and Social Council Meeting in Geneva, in July 1966: "Even as the détente in the Cold War has permitted an attenuation of the conflict between blocs with different social systems, one must fear that the East-West opposition will revolve on its axis and become an antagonism of North against South."

Hopeful Omens of Change

There are a few hesitant signs of hopeful change. There is a system to ameliorate the great fluctuations in coffee prices; some of the theoretical justifications of the "Kennedy Round" recognized that tariff reciprocity was profoundly unreciprocal in practice; and the Third World emerged as a cohesive bloc at the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development. But, as the grim figures of failure and retrogression during the first half of the Development Decade show, the basic anti-human trends which distribute more wealth to the rich and more poverty to the poor remain in force. The problem is not to change this or that aspect of American, and Western, policy: a fundamental reorientation is required. Cherished "laws" of the world market must be repealed. The international division of labor must be restructured, and this will go against the old, irrational rationality. To follow the principle of efficiency in world affairs—to insist that resources be allocated and production organized "economically," in the cheapest way—is to condemn the backward to be even more backward. To defy the artificial yet tenacious principles of the present international economy will require that money flow from the rich to the poor until a new and sensible rationality is forged.

If the underdeveloped countries cannot expect any effective aid from the affluent economies, if they can only modernize on the basis of their own impoverished resources, they will be forced to exploit the one thing they have in abundance: human beings. This can hardly be done with the freely given consent of the people, and democracy will therefore be viewed as hostile to economic development and political independence. Many theorists, both in and outside the Third World, describe such terrible necessities as if they were the finest flowering of civilization. Their word for such brutal and forced accumulation of capital is "socialism."

If the West proves incapable of this dramatic about-face (and nothing that has happened in the postwar period gives any basis for optimism),

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if changes of this character do not take place peaceably, things will continue to get worse—and the earth of the year 2000 will be even more outrageously unjust than it is today and certainly more unstable. Our improbable and only hope is to create a new world to replace the inadequate one in which we now live. That is the task of the democratic Left.

Theories on the Fate of Old and New Nations

The theory that the advanced powers are inevitably committed to reaction implies that there is no hope of democracy in the new nations.

The various formulations of America's (or, more precisely, capitalism's) role and fate, from Lenin to Mao, have obvious deficiencies. Yet, it is true that America has displayed a vested interest in at least some of the misery and poverty of the globe, and the defense of such ill-gotten gains could be (and in the past has been) the basis of a world view and foreign policy. There is the tragic possibility that this view might lead America to continue to promote the gap between rich and poor nations. The exploitation of impoverished people, however, is not a necessity for the American economy but only a cruel convenience. The nation could make new international departures without undergoing a sweeping domestic transformation. There would be many motives for such a change, among them enlightened self-interest (the present trends hurry toward more instability and violence which could be disastrous for the wealthy as well as for the hungry)—and that current of democratic idealism which still flows within American society.

So the U.S. embraces an *almost* imperialism. America has the potential of positive change, of helping to create a new world; yet that course would require considerable radicalization of its political life. If, as Aldous Huxley once said pessimistically, a 99 per cent pacifist is a 100 per cent militarist, then one can optimistically hope that an *almost*-imperialist will become anti-imperialist.

Lenin's belief that capitalism's inability to resolve its internal contradiction drove it to seek imperium over the entire world has become one of the most influential ideas of the twentieth century. And not only those who submit to Communist orthodoxy give lip service to this analysis. (As for the Chinese Communists, it is only lip service; for they have made the most sweeping revisions of doctrine, albeit in a spirit of fanatic fundamentalism.) Beyond that, almost all the nationalist, non-Communist revolutionists and reformers of the ex-colonial world have affirmed one or another version of the Leninist thesis. And even in the

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advanced countries Lenin's idea has had a profound effect upon intellectual life.

On the whole, the postwar experience violates the letter of the Leninist argument at almost every point—yet leaves much of its spirit intact. Following Marx, Lenin held that capitalism was not simply interested in plunder and booty abroad. The struggle between the various Western powers "for the sources of raw materials . . . and for 'spheres of influence' " was also a fight to avoid crisis at home. Since 1945 and with the single but glaring exception of oil, this assertion has become less true with every passing day. Advances in technology, synthetics, the organization of the market, and a whole host of factors have reduced the importance of the ex-colonies for the big powers; paradoxically, in the short run, the Third World would perhaps be better off if the capitalists were more interested in exploiting it.*

But the heart of Lenin's argument was not the simple assertion that there was a greedy scramble for resources and markets. Lenin believed that capitalism was forced to export its capital because it could not invest it profitably within the limits of the advanced economy. As the system became mature and over-organized, the rate of profit fell, and business was thus driven overseas in search for capital outlets. Thus, imperialism was the distinctive and last historical stage of capitalism itself—a final, desperate attempt to postpone the crisis of the system. However, the same maturity that forced the capitalists to war among themselves over the division of global spoils also heightened the revolutionary consciousness of the working class. So, World War I signalled the beginning of the epoch of "imperialist war and proletarian revolution."

There is no need here to discuss the complex question of how much this analysis applied to events before 1945. Relevant here is that throughout the postwar period, the trend in the export of capital has been to accentuate investment by the affluent powers *in* the affluent powers, rather than competition among them for opportunities in the ex-colonial world. During this time, American "direct investment" abroad (where business sets up a plant in a foreign country rather than exporting American goods to it) more than doubled—and England and Canada absorbed more than 60 per cent of the increase. These movements of capital, leaving the oil industry aside for a moment, accounted for a

* For relevant figures on the trends in international trade, see *Modern Capitalism*, by Andrew Schonfeld, Appendix I, pp. 428–29. For the most recent government figures, see the September 1966 issue of *Survey of Current Business*.

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smaller proportion of the national income than similar exports had for Britain in the nineteenth century.*

In France, by the mid-sixties, this situation had become a key element in Gaullist economic thinking. The failure of the French computer industry had made that country dependent on American corporations—and allowed the U.S. State Department to veto the sale of machines which might have facilitated the development of the *force de frappe*. As a result, the French government launched a state-subsidized merger movement to create a corporate base large enough to sustain a modern computer technology. There were those on the Left who criticized de Gaulle for not having acted earlier and more decisively in this area. The socialist Gaston Deferre, for instance, said that "Europe will be colonized by the United States unless we decide to pool our resources in order to create industrial concerns comparable in size to the American ones and able to compete with them on an equal footing." The British Labor government took much the same line when it reopened its bid for entry into the Common Market in 1966.

Now all of this has a familiar, Leninist ring to it and hardly shows that the world market has been turned into a charitable trust. Gigantic corporations, with the conscious political support of their governments, are engaged in a fierce competition for markets. But the setting is not at all Leninist, for the fight is not conducted so much in Asia, Africa, or Latin America as in Europe and America. Thus, Western business has preserved much of its old-fashioned Leninist spirit, though it has profoundly revised the letter of Lenin's law.

But there is a recalcitrant exception to these trends: oil. For the economy as a whole, the raw materials and capital export markets of the Third World have become less and less important. In economic terms, it is not *necessary* for the U.S. to promote international injustice in order to maintain domestic prosperity. But the huge and politically powerful oil industry thrives on these inequities.

In 1964, there were $44.3 billion of direct U.S. investment overseas, in 1965, $49.2 billion. In both years, net foreign investment was only about 5 per cent of gross private domestic investment (the percentage actually declined a bit from 1964 to 1965). In both years, the distribution of this capital was about the same. In 1964, for instance, 31.2 per cent of the American money had gone to Canada, 27.2 per cent to Europe, 20.1 per cent to Latin America, 6.9 per cent to Asia, and 3.5

* See *After Imperialism*, by Michael Barret Brown, p. 206. This is a fascinating book written from a democratic socialist point of view. It makes more contemporary sense out of Lenin than anything I have read.

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per cent to Africa. All these figures support the thesis that exploiting the Third World is a diminishing and non-crucial part of the American economy.

At the same time, however, the petroleum and mining industries accounted for around 40 per cent of this total, about the same portion as that of manufacturing. More to the point, the income in 1964 on $14.3 billion of petroleum investment was more than *twice* as great as that realized on the $16.8 billion of investment in manufacturing ($1.9 billion as against $.876 billion). This obviously is a super-profit and it depends on arrangements with countries that are either poor or rich in a distorted way (Kuwait, which has the second highest per capita income in the world, is a balkanized fief for oil and not, as it should be, a source of wealth for Mideast development generally).

In the process of accumulating this enormous wealth, the oil industry works hand in glove with the U.S. government, and vice versa. The companies benefit, of course, from direct production controls within America—the money made in this rigidly *dirigiste* sector of the economy paradoxically seems to create *laisser-faire* millionaires—and the princely benefits from the 27½ per cent depletion allowance. Import controls are also designed to support the (costly, noncompetitive) American wells in the manner to which they are accustomed. Indeed, world oil prices are an ingenious and artificial creation; John Strachey once calculated that, were the Arabs to nationalize the petroleum operations in their countries and permit a "market" price to emerge, oil consumers in the West would be able to buy at a much cheaper price than now prevails. However, since a single decision of Royal Dutch Shell was reported by Elizabeth Jager to have effected the balance of payments position of both Britain and Italy, it is unlikely that any such experimentation will be allowed.

But oil politics have also effected American foreign policy. The basic premise was stated in Harry Truman's reminiscences of the 1945 Mideast crisis: "If the Russians were to control Iran's oil, either directly or indirectly, the raw material balance of the world would undergo a serious change and it would be a serious loss for the economy of the Western world."

The oil industry's argument is, of course, that as the producer of a strategic fuel its interests must be protected precisely in the interest of America's common good. Recently, in a Senate speech in May 1966, Senator Robert F. Kennedy gave an example of the kind of private self-interest dominating the policy of the nation. In Peru, Kennedy said, President Belaunde had asked for $16 million for a domestic Peace-Corps

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type project. The State Department held up these funds in order to "make the Peruvians more reasonable" in the negotiations which they were then carrying on with American oil companies. Kennedy added. "the same was true in Argentina." And, it should also be noted, when AID threatened to turn off food shipments unless India accepted American price-fixing for fertilizer, it acted as the agent of oil companies.

The oil industry, then, acts according to the classic Leninist scenario. It profiteers in the Third World, supports local reaction, opposes democratic and modernizing movements, and sometimes treats the U.S. government like a hired plant security guard. At almost every point, the result has been to make American foreign policy more reactionary. If the country's international actions were dedicated to reduce the gap between rich and poor nations, the oil industry would suffer. The resultant misery of various millionaires would hardly overturn the American economy; but the catch is, of course, political. Oil is powerful in Washington, and therefore any hope of a truly democratic foreign policy would require the defeat of its domestic influence.

With this very important caveat about oil a general and un-Leninist proposition can be restated: the prosperity of the American economy need not depend on the exploitation of the Third World and, to a considerable measure, does not at this moment. The reactionary policies the country has followed in widening the international gap between the rich and the poor are thus not the inexorable expressions of economic and social structure. They are reasonable, businesslike evils perpetrated according to the rules of this world which was so carefully made for us; but these rules could be changed. And that is something which is not to be found in the philosophy of Lenin or his followers.

The Fallacies of Good Intentions

The late Paul Baran, a Marxist sympathetic to the more orthodox brand of Communism, saw how the postwar economic trends turned the Cold War into a worldwide paradox. America, he argued, was devoting enormous military and political means to the service of relatively modest material ends. A similar conclusion developed out of quite another point of view. In the mid-sixties Walter Lippmann, and other moderate critics of the war in Vietnam, held that there simply was not a discernable American self-interest to justify the commitment of hundreds of thousands of troops to Southeast Asia. More generally, the flag of American *almost*-imperialism usually did not, during the postwar period, follow the dollar, except in the case of oil. Not only is it

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statistically possible for U.S. policy to escape from economic determinism; it is already a curious fact.

The Cold War began with a series of crises in Eastern Europe and the Middle East (Poland, Greece, Iran, Turkey). But the real struggle was over the future of Europe. The American commitments were, of course, made in the revered name of centuries of historical, political, and religious ties; but they rested upon a crass substratum of self-interest. I am not suggesting anything subtle or Machiavellian; quite simply, Communist domination of Western Europe or capitalist domination of Eastern Europe would have decisively tipped the international balance of power. Such disequilibrium would have been intolerable enough according to the old-fashioned rules designed for nations within a single social system—but it became utterly impossible when the contending powers represented alternate ways of organizing the globe.

In *Power and Impotence, the Failure of America's Foreign Policy*, Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff wrote, "In effect, the early Cold War was a contest for the control of a prostrate, but fundamentally very rich, continent that had functioned as the center of world politics for three hundred years." There is close correspondence between material self-interest and the political and military commitment on both sides. But once one leaves the initial, European period of the Cold War and turns to the Third World, the disparity between economics and foreign policy becomes manifest.

The historians of the twenty-first century might well conclude that the Korean War was the most curious "accident" of our postwar period. That country had been partitioned in desultory fashion on the basis of proposals made by General MacArthur and sanctioned by Stalin. The Russo-Korean treaty of 1949 did not even contain a mutual assistance provision, and in January 1950 Dean Acheson suggested that both Korea and Formosa were outside of the American defense perimeter. The Chinese Communists did not maintain an ambassador in North Korea and, Robert Guillian speculated in *Le Monde* in 1966, may well have regarded the invasion of the South as a Stalinist adventure. There were even public opinion polls in the United States which showed, in the late forties, that there was no strong popular support for action against Mao. And in August 1946, five months after Winston Churchill's famous "Iron Curtain" speech, President Truman was telling Chiang that, unless he liberalized a bit, "it must be expected that American opinion will not continue its generous attitude toward your nation."

But with the Korean War the ideological hostility which was rooted in the serious conflict of interests in Europe began to take on a life of

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its own in Asia. The French were then able to involve the U.S. in their Indochina debacle and thus laid the basis for the tragic Vietnamese conflict of the sixties. The issue of who "lost" China began to play a role in American politics, and Chiang's pseudo-China on Taiwan became a centerpiece of the nation's Asian policy. Thus, in the 1950's Chiang, Syngman Rhee, Bao Dai and Diem received a vast outpouring of American aid—and Nehru relatively little. The former group had enlisted in the cause of the "Free World"; the latter was, of course, a neutralist.

John Foster Dulles officially gave the Cold War its ideological cast: the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union was turned into a titanic conflict between good and evil in which any challenge, no matter how remote, had to be met. A far-flung network of alliances and treaty organizations was established; it was based on conservative and reactionary powers and excluded the modernizers, non-Communist revolutionaries, and neutralists. This approach accentuated the gap between the rich and the poor, for it meant that American donations were effectively militarized and usually assigned to the indigenous friends, rather than the foes, of backwardness.

In the period of the post-European Cold War the U.S. was ruled by domestic conservatism. A Republican, business-oriented Administration held office for two terms, the Dixiecrat-Republican coalition prevailed in Congress, and McCarthyism made it difficult to even have a debate. These were the internal reasons for the nation's reactionary foreign policy. American leadership, unable to see the need for reform at home, was of course bewildered by a world in revolutionary transition. Since the Administration—and the people—genuinely believed in their own benevolence, the only possible explanation for nationalist and anti-American movements abroad seemed to them subversion, spying, infiltration. And these demons are fought with guns and counterespionage, not with social programs. If democratic reformers came to power, the argument went, they would only create instability, a breakdown of order, and conditions which would lead to a Communist take-over. Therefore, the only true friends of the "Free World" were on the Right. In the fifties, this logic brought American support to Batista, Jiminez, Trujillo, and their like.

But this emphasis on the ideological aspect of the Dulles policy should not lead to the conclusion that justice would have been served if the nation simply had stuck to its material self-interest. In 1945, as de Gaulle bitterly recounts the fantastic incident in his memoirs, Roosevelt was in favor of independence for Indochina on the basis of the "ideology" of democracy. If the United States had persisted

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in its policy of cooperating with the nationalist revolutionary movement in that country, there would have been a chance of avoiding the more than two decades of bloodletting which followed the return of French colonialism.

The main point remains: the history of the Cold War shows that American foreign policy need not be the result of economic interest, and much of it has not been. Yet, it is sad to remember that most of our disinterested idealists have been reactionary, as in the case of Dulles. But even this unfortunate example proves that our role in the world does not have to be determined by cost accountants.

Arms Economy vs. Social Spending

Another important theory seeks to demonstrate that America's reactionary stance in foreign affairs, particularly in the Third World, is an inevitable consequence of the very structure of the society. In this view, the society does not need the Cold War in order to protect its overseas profits, but rather to justify a domestic war economy which is the main bulwark against depression. Thus, the late Paul Baran resolved his paradox about the disparity of the enormous military means which America deployed to protect its relatively modest international economic ends. (At times, Baran veered back to the classic Leninist thesis, as in *Monopoly Capital* which he wrote in collaboration with Paul Sweezy.) But it was hardly necessary to be a Marxist to understand the tremendous significance of the tens of billions of dollars of annual armament spending. In his farewell message as President, Dwight D. Eisenhower said of the "immense military establishment" which was "new in the American experience," that its "total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every state house, every office of the federal government."

If America were to embark upon a genuinely democratic foreign policy, and sought to abolish the gap between rich and poor nations, this vested interest in death would be threatened. For an emphasis on international construction, massive investments of men and money in the Third World, and disarmament would reverse the priorities which have prevailed in the postwar period. Could the American economy tolerate such steps toward peace?

In theory, the answer is yes. In practice, everything depends on politics. Building an arsenal of annihilation is a congenial activity for American society. The mass unemployment of the Depression, it must be remembered, was not ended by the social and economic policies of

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the New Deal. Indeed, by the end of the thirties, Keynes himself wondered if any peacetime (and capitalist) government would ever intervene on the scale required by his computations. The abolition of joblessness took place during the reign of Dr. Win-the-War, not during that of Dr. New Deal.

There are solid, conservative reasons for the high esteem conferred upon spending for destruction. Government investment in socially useful projects tends to raise disturbing, ideological questions. There is always the danger that some reformer will suggest that monies be appropriated for an undertaking like TVA, and that actually redefines the lines between the public and private sectors.

A vast increase in war spending is usually accompanied by an end to social innovation. The emotion of patriotism unites the entire nation, and class differences are submerged in the common effort. In the case of a shooting conflict, the military obligingly dispenses with competitive principles and adopts uneconomic methods like cost-plus contracts (When it is necessary in a conservative cause, or in fighting a war. America is always ready to turn its back on the myths of the market economy, but such idealism is almost never applied to truly idealistic projects.) In a cold war, particularly one run by a top executive from the Ford Motor Company, the old rules of efficiency are in force; but then military hardware has the marvelous quality of becoming obsolete almost on the day it becomes operational. The production possibilities are therefore almost infinite.

For these and many other reasons Congress will enthusiastically vote $70 billion for Defense while it haggles over a less than $2 billion appropriation for fighting poverty. It is most dangerous to think that, as peace begins to break out, it would be simple enough to transfer funds from the work of destruction to that of construction. The socialization of death is, thus far, much more generally popular than the socialization of life. And a shift of money from Defense to, say, Health, Education, and Welfare would require a basic turn toward the democratic Left within the society.

The crucial question is whether or not it is possible, without a revolution of the system itself, to substitute social for armaments spending. In their work *Monopoly Capital* Baran and Sweezy curiously treat this most fundamental issue only in a footnote. Writing of the liberals who "postulate . . . a substitution of welfare spending for military spending," they comment: "We must say of such liberals what Marx said of the bourgeois reformers of his day: 'They all want the impossible, namely the conditions of bourgeois existence without the necessary consequences

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of those conditions.' " This argument, based on a Marxian generality (which arose out of a contraversy with Proudhon), is hardly convincing proof of the state and tendency of the American economy in the late sixties and seventies. It is necessary to consult reality as well as authority.

Lenin and Keynes: Past Projections vs. the Present

This can best be done by examining the actual, living fate of a projection very similar to the one urged by Baran and Sweezy. The author was V. I. Lenin, the date, 1916, the text, *Imperialism.*

> It goes without saying [Lenin wrote] that if capitalism could develop agriculture, which today lags far behind industry everywhere, it could raise the standard of living of the masses, who are everywhere still poverty-stricken and underfed; in spite of the amazing advance in technical knowledge, there could be no talk of a superabundance of capital. . . . But if capitalism did these things it would not be capitalism; for uneven development and wretched conditions of the masses are fundamental and inevitable conditions and premises of this mode of production.

Lenin's prediction certainly held up from 1916 to 1945. In the twenties, the purchasing power of the masses of Americans was held down while the productive capacity of the society was vastly increased and there was an eventual collapse. In the thirties, Roosevelt's attempts to follow Keynes and to inject effective demand into the economy were half-hearted and ultimately ineffective. But from 1945 on, every one of the advanced capitalist powers pursued some variant of a full-employment policy. These efforts hardly created utopia; they were consonant with the persistence of great poverty, increasing injustice in the distribution of wealth and, particularly in the U.S., a chronic and scandalous level of unemployment (but not general joblessness of the thirties type). Capitalism had remained capitalism, yet it had learned that improving the lot of the masses could be good business.

There is no point in picturing this development in idyllic terms. The version of Keynesianism embraced by the American businessman of the sixties did not involve the notion that a reduction in Defense spending would be compensated by a corresponding, multi-billion-dollar rise in social investments. The "reactionary Keynesians" favored tax cuts which would disproportiontately benefit the rich, maximize private consumption, and keep the public sector on starvation rations. If American society has come to a certain consensus that the government must intervene to stave off depression and that intervention would certainly

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be needed in the case of peace, there is still a fierce debate as to how this shall be done. The conservatives propose to prime the pump by raising the living standard of the wealthy, the liberals and radicals by improving the lot of the poor and of society as a whole.

But the American economy does not correspond to the rigid simplicity of the Baran-Sweezy model. In 1916, Lenin had the excuse that he could not look 30 years ahead into the future; but we have now lived that future and cannot afford to ignore its reality.

Moreover, one cannot speak of a simple substitution of social spending for defense outlays. As John Kenneth Galbraith pointed out in *The New Industrial State,* the billions for armament go to a very specific sector of the economy, one that requires extensive research and development for the creation of a sophisticated and advanced technology. Some of these machine and human skills could be put to benevolent use—but some could not. There must therefore be, Galbraith argues, a public investment in a peacetime production which is technologically similar to the annihilation industry. Space exploration, he concludes, would meet this requirement.

There is a certain puritanism on the Left whenever the question of space comes up. It is the fashion to denigrate spending money on heaven when earth is still so shoddy. But this view ignores two important points. First, if peace were to break out, a massive cutback in the billions for defense plus the normal growth of a full-employment economy would provide sufficient funds for rebuilding America *and* going to the stars. Second, space is not empty of social, scientific, and even aesthetic significance. It could conceivably provide room for human beings, vast new resources for the development of the world, and it will certainly incite a deeper knowledge of both man and the universe. Beyond these pragmatic considerations, there is a moral imperative which requires that humanity live up to the fullness of its powers, and men can rightly boast that they have always experimented and innovated.

There is a general American commitment to government intervention against depressions, and there is the possibility that, with a turn toward the democratic Left, this commitment could take the form of a vast social investment which would substitute for the armament sector. Here too, as in the case of overseas exploitation, there are powerful vested interests in the prevailing order of injustice. These will not be easily defeated—but they can be. Cold war, imperialism, the accentuation of the chasm between rich and poor nations, all these are deep trends in both the national and international economy of the U.S.; but they are not inexorable fates.

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Mao's Thought and Global Good & Evil

No consideration of America's predisposition toward global good and evil would be complete without reference to the Thought of Mao Tse-tung. It would be hard to imagine a more audacious revision of Lenin than Mao's version of Leninist orthodoxy. Mao no longer defines imperialism as the last stage of capitalism but sees it as the united front of the rich, whatever their social system. In his famous essay on "People's War," Lin Piao called North America and Western Europe "the cities of the world"—and Asia, Africa, and Latin America "the rural areas of the world." He delicately refrained from noting that Russia and Eastern Europe were really also part of the "cities of the world"; but the Maoists of the mid-sixties were obviously working on the basis of that deduction. Where Marx and Lenin had seen the working class as the historic agency of social change, the Chinese Communist leader looked to the peasantry—the class Marx had regarded as lumpish, like so many potatoes in a sack.

It is easy to ridicule the fantasy elements in Mao's vision; but it is more important to understand their profound relationship to reality. There is, after all, a basis for a conspiracy of the industrial North, corporations and commissars alike, against the backward South. There even are American liberals who advocate such an arrangement as a way of ending the Cold War. Although the peasants of this world are hardly going to usher in a reign of peace and justice, they could well become the agents of their own enslavement. For the anti-democratic and totalitarian program of modernization which Mao represents is one of the most important trends in the developing lands.

There is a definite reactionary potential in a Soviet-American alliance. Toward the end of World War II, a Republican member of Franklin Roosevelt's cabinet had an intriguing idea of a postwar settlement. Gar Alperovitz has summarized it in this way:

> The essence of Stimson's view was a conservative belief that the postwar power structure in Europe had to be acknowledged so that a *modus vivendi* could be established with Russia. Although he wished to preserve American economic interests in Eastern Europe, he took for granted Soviet special interests in the border countries just as he accepted American special interests in Latin America—the two areas were "our respective orbits."

Secretary of War Stimson's perspective was not adopted; there was a cold war instead. Yet it is important to remember that the Stimson

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approach was explored by another leading figure in those days: Joseph Stalin. The Russian dictator wrote to Harry Truman:

> The question of Poland has the same meaning for the Soviet Union as the question of Belgium and Greece for the security of Great Britain. . . . I do not know whether there has been established in Greece a truly representative government and whether the government in Belgium is truly democratic. The Soviet Union was not consulted when these governments were established. The Soviet Union did not lay claim to interference in these affairs as it understands the whole importance of Belgium and Greece for the security of Great Britain.

There was some ghoulish humor in this document. When Stalin acknowledged the legitimacy of the British—and imperialist—claim to a sphere of interest in Greece, he was making a not so sly reference to an agreement he had made with Winston Churchill. The Briton and the Russian had coldly divided up Eastern Europe (the details are to be found in Churchill's memoirs of the war), and Greece was given to England. When there was a Communist-led insurrection in Greece, Stalin was as good as his word. He stood by while his comrades were put down in blood. He "knew" very well the character of the Greek government, and he had indeed been "consulted." He was simply advising Truman that he could be counted on to keep a bargain.

But Truman did not take up Stalin's proposal that the Communists and capitalists should recognize each others' spheres of exploitation. The idea, however, did not die out. It was, for example, the program of Presidential candidate Henry A. Wallace in 1948. "The real peace treaty we need now," the former Vice President told a rally in 1946, "is between the United States and Russia. On our part, we should recognize that we have no more business in the political affairs of Eastern Europe than Russia has in the political affairs of Latin America, Western Europe, or the United States."

In the 1950's and 1960's, the atomic balance of terror imposed a *de facto* recognition of power realities somewhat along the lines Stimson, Stalin, and Wallace had proposed. In 1956, the American inability to intervene in Hungary constituted an admission that Communist power in Eastern Europe could not be rolled back. And during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, Khrushchev was forced to bow to the United States in the Caribbean. No one in Europe any longer believed that they lived under the threat of Soviet invasion, and this was the basis of de Gaulle's attack on NATO.

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Mao's Vision: Peasants vs. "Cities of the World"

In terms of world peace, this détente between the nuclear giants was most welcome. But it also gave potential substance to the Maoist vision of the imperialist "cities of the world." An America not inexorably fated to exploit the globe on its own is hardly driven to do so in concert with the Russians; Mao is on to a possibility, not a necessity. Yet, it is particularly important that the democratic Left be aware of the element of reality at the center of Mao's often fanciful thought. For the democratic Left has understood that peace, in this nuclear age, is the precondition for all progress—but it would be a serious mistake to think that peace is a sufficient condition for that progress. A *pax Sovietica-Americana* is preferable to a holocaust initiated by the two powers, of course; but it is not a genuine vision of justice. It is therefore crucial to be concerned with the far side of disarmament and the kind of a world that must be created.

It is not enough to take Mao's truths seriously. His illusions must also be treated with the utmost respect, for there is a very objective basis for their appeal to despairing masses and aspiring elites. I refer, above all, to the preposterous and powerful notion that the peasants of the Third World are going to build the socialism which the European workers failed to make. For Mao, the contradiction between the rural areas of the world and its cities is the dynamic force in this epoch. The Southern and poor powers are therefore seen as developing a common consciousness of their plight. At first, there will be wars of national liberation and defensive alliances (this is the "democratic" stage of the process). But eventually, the proletarian nations (which are really peasant) will realize that nothing less than socialism can suffice. And, for the indefinite future at least, this drama is to be played out without the intervention of the Western working class, that old Marxian hero, said to be integrated now in imperialist society.

For many reasons this profoundly influential perspective is false. It is racist to assume that the Third World represents a unity, that all the non-whites, all the Southerners and all the poor are like one another. "An African is no Tamil," write Stillman and Pfaff, "a Malay is not a Pathan." More broadly, "Asia is the domain of sophisticated and accomplished civilizations," Africa has "no culture comparable to Asia," and Latin America is an "archaic Western society." There are deep differences within the ex-colonies; sometimes they are even murderous, as the Chinese of Indonesia and the Indians of Africa have learned. Peasants may well be capable of greater political struggle than

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Marx imagined, but in the ultimate analysis they can only deliver power to the city dwellers who will rule over them. For modern technology is urban and one could almost define a modern nation by saying that it has succeeded in shifting masses from the fields to the factories (and, eventually, to the computers).

But, most important of all, the collectivization of poverty can only produce poverty, not a society of justice and abundance. All the righteousness of the anger of the world's poor cannot will factories and a high level of mass education into existence. Thus, Marx insisted that the socialist future could be more liberating than the capitalist present only because it was to be built upon the material accomplishments of that present.

Therefore, for all of its talk of "freedom," as soon as the Maoist ideology posits a revolution of impoverished peasants going it alone, it must also opt for totalitarianism. If the new countries are to accumulate capital, or even keep pace with their expanding populations, and if there is absolutely no hope of genuine aid from the advanced lands—a huge surplus must be extracted from the labor of the people. Yet, neither Western workers nor Third World peasants enjoy sacrificing present consumption to future investment while working harder than ever before. The real meaning of the word "socialism" in the Maoist vocabulary is a forced accumulation of capital more pitiless and systematic than that of Western capitalism.

But the Maoist illusion has great appeal. It can inspire peasants who see no hope in a world order which condemns them to hunger and misery. It reaches out to African nationalists who come to power on the basis of classless, populist movements, and who are therefore suspicious of party democracy which they associate with the ways of imperialism. It speaks to some Western intellectuals who discover in the ex-colonial peasant the miraculous resurrection of The God That Failed.

Maoism also has a message for aspiring elites. For the totalitarian industrialization is not carried out by an impersonal History but by men and women. In theory, the period of monolithic "democracy" which accompanies this accumulation of capital is to be followed by an age of greater political freedom. As the history of Russia demonstrates, the elite which acts in the name of the nation develops common economic privileges and interests, and these eventually come into conflict with the needs of the great mass of the people. After the first stage of totalitarianism there comes, with adjustments and thaws, the second stage of totalitarianism.

There is a strange dialectic of anti-democracy, based on *de facto*

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cooperation of Western capitalists and Chinese Communists. By maintaining the international order of economic injustice, the West makes it materially impossible for the Third World to advance toward both modernity and freedom. And Maoism (and all the Maoist variants, for the theories of the Chinese Communist are symbolic of a political and intellectual trend found throughout the Third World) makes a choice for totalitarian progress. The democratic Left in its commitment to help in the creation of a new world aims at nothing less than at utterly transcending the options which are now available—or at providing a new choice.

Up and On from Almost-Imperialism

America, the *almost*-imperialist, could act to change the imperialist order of things. American (and Western) prosperity does not depend on the evil which is done in the international economy; this country—and the rest of the West—could actually benefit by acting humanely in the world. If the imperialist heritage of economic interest, ideology, and feeling of superiority were rooted in economic necessity, there would be no hope of overcoming it. Since it is not, there is hope—but so far, in the postwar period, this is a most modest and theoretical consolation. The statistical possibilities for doing global good require radicalized politics if they are ever to be realized. An America that cannot even provide decent housing for its own "well-off" poor is hardly going to lead in the bold measures needed to end the threat of starvation forever.

Indeed, non-economic factors might keep America from doing anything decent for the world's poor. In his provocative, thoughtful article on "Counterrevolutionary America" in the April 1967 issue of *Commentary* Robert Heilbroner argued that this was necessarily so. In Heilbroner's view, the "social psychology" of the less developed countries is an even greater barrier to modernization than their low levels of production. The ancient ways have to be rooted out, the social structure has to be overturned, and this requires

> some shock treatment like that of Communism. . . . Only a campaign of an intensity and singlemindedness that must approach the ludicrous and the unbearable offers the chance to ride roughshod over the resistance of the rich and the poor alike and to open the way for the forcible implantation of those modern attitudes and techniques without which there will be no escape from the misery of underdevelopment.

Heilbroner concedes that an American economy with $1.3 trillion in corporate assets could afford the loss of $16 billion of capital in Asia,

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Africa, and Latin America without facing an internal crisis. But he doubts that the U.S. is politically able to tolerate the upheavals, the smashing of the old oligarchies, the violence inherent in the development process. Therefore, he concludes, ". . . Communism, which may indeed represent a retrogressive movement in the West where it should continue to be resisted with full energies, may nonetheless represent a progressive movement in the backward areas where its advent may be the only chance these areas have of escaping misery."

There are two distinct parts of this thesis, one a description, the other a value judgment. The latter asserts that if a coercive and even totalitarian accumulation of capital is the only practical way out of the impoverished past into a more just future, then one reluctantly endorses the "progressiveness" of this tragic, but unavoidable, transition. There is a perpetual danger that this attitude will lead to a surrender of morality in the name of the "wave of the future." Mussolini made the trains run on time, Hitler "solved" the problem of unemployment, South Africa has the highest per capita income for black men on that continent, and Franco has recently presided over growth rates to be envied by Communist planners. Yet, no one of the democratic Left would propose political support for a fascist government, however economically successful.

But even supposing Heilbroner's descriptive analysis is correct and there is no way for developing nations to avoid the agony of totalitarian modernization, democratic Leftists still cannot give their support to those who carry out this transformation. Even when a tiny minority whose hour has not yet come—it is those who are struggling for justice rather than growth rates who are the political determinant of what is truly progressive. Sometimes they will even be found within the Communist movement—or in the one, official and single party; wherever they are, these people represent their nation's most precious resource.

But Heilbroner's description is overly pessimistic. The gloomy pattern he outlines is a possibility, perhaps even a probability. But it is not absolutely fated to come true, and by thinking that it is, there is a danger of helping to fulfill a deplorable prophecy.

It is not clear to me that America must react with such hostility to the violence and turmoil of the developmental process. Senator J. W. Fulbright is a conservative in the old, humane and humanist sense of the term; he believes that human nature will eventually assert itself in the Communist world and produce a "Thermidor" which will make the revolution practical and realistic. He therefore favors a policy of watchful waiting and he is, of course, opposed to American intervention into

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every upheaval. I disagree with Fulbright's analysis—particularly in discussions of human nature and Thermidor—yet tend to share many of his conclusions. Relevant is the fact that the Senator from Arkansas has long recognized the reality described by Heilbroner and that he has not recoiled from it in horror.

In *Old Myths and New Realities*, Fulbright wrote, ". . . we must be under no illusions as to the extreme difficulty of uprooting long-established ruling oligarchies without disruptions involving lesser or greater degrees of violence. The historic odds are probably against the prospects of peaceful social revolution . . . ." The democratic Left could be at least as candid as the conservative Senator; it is not at all precluded that the American people could come to accept these disturbing complexities of international politics.

But it is possible to tamper with the "historic odds" cited by Fulbright (and Heilbroner); for they are, to a degree, man-made. The American policy I have described sets in motion a vicious circle: the market transfers wealth from the poor to the rich—and foreign aid, far from off-setting this tendency, exacerbates it. Thus, the developing countries discover that they must accumulate capital from their own internal resources. They must create a coercive state, whether Communist or not; thus, they suppress the opposition, not simply of the wealthy but of the mass of the people who now must work harder, eat less, and give up the consolation of their ancient superstitions. In the U.S. the attendant violence and impieties are viewed with alarm and their existence becomes one more reactionary argument for pursuing international policies that breed still more violence.

Toward a New World Economy

If, however, the direction of this spiral were reversed, hopeful factors would reinforce one another. If some wealth were actually transferred from the rich nations to the poor, at least some economic compulsion toward coercion and violence would be removed. Consumption could, for instance, be gradually increased without endangering the whole modernization program. And the marvelous fact of ex-colonial people rising out of their poverty should make it politically easier in the U.S. to argue for redoubled efforts. And so, the crucial issue is political, not economic, for trends do not create new societies; they only make them possible.

In undertaking to help complete the creation of a more humane world, one must not expect too much. It will take radical new beginnings

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to justify modest hopes. This cruel paradox, like everything else about the contemporary international disorder, is a creation of man in history. The developing nations were deprived of capital and skills, and both of these deficiencies can be made up in part by capital and technical assistance from the advanced economies. But a heritage of backwardness is not easily overcome. Native oligarchies, tribalism, antimodern cultures, and other reactionary trends were vigorously encouraged by the West during its imperial rule. (Africa's Balkanization to suit European needs is an obvious case in point.)

To paraphrase Keynes, the pursuit of a just world economy will guarantee not civilization itself but its possibility. And to follow this unprecedented course of action is our only chance to close the gap between the world's rich and poor.

First, there must be international economic planning which will allocate massive resources to the new nations on the basis of their needs and capacities. To accomplish this, economic aid must be freed from the priorities of generals, diplomats, corporation executives—and commissars. But this cannot be done while appropriations are subject to the vagaries of annual political review in donor countries. The advanced powers will have to agree to some long-term mechanism of international taxation which will automatically provide the required sums —to create a *contrat social* for the planet.

Senator Fulbright put it this way in his *Arrogance of Power*:

> I suggest that we begin to replace bilateral foreign aid, which is analogous to private philanthropy, with an internationalized program based on the same principle of public responsibility which underlies progressive taxation and the social services we provide for our own people. I suggest that we extend the frontiers of our loyalty and compassion in order to transform our aid to the world's poorer nations from something resembling a private gratuity to a community responsibility.

Second, the present "laws" of the international economy must be repealed and turned upside down. Where the world market of the past century was designed to transfer wealth from poor to rich, we must now devote our ingenuity to the building of mechanisms with the exact opposite effect. This means understanding and applying Gunnar Myrdal's paradox: only a double standard can ensure fairness; for now it is obvious that free and equal trade between unequal nations leads to sys-

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tematic injustice. In the name of equity and not of charity, trade policies must discriminate in favor of the developing countries.

These new trade and aid programs might come to serve as a substitute for the Cold War. Once again, we must speak of possibilities rather than of utopias. The Cold War has many causes, and the fate of the Third World is not pre-eminent among them. Even if America and Russia have now discovered a common interest in not annihilating one another, they still represent different social systems with conflicting ideas about how to organize the globe. Moreover, the two countries may end their conflict by a gentleman's agreement between rich Northerners to keep the Southerners of the planet poor. Yet, there is hope of combining peace with a modicum of justice which is the aim of these proposals.

For some time, the best Americans have called for a democratic revolution in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, both on grounds of justice and as an alternative to Communism. And yet, this familiar, excellent idea is more radical than its proponents realize. It requires, to use John Kenneth Galbraith's symbolic language, a revolution that would be less than a "Russian" and yet more profound than a "French" revolution. In analyzing why this is so, I hope to develop a long-range perspective on the practical problems of creating a new world.

My point is not to argue for a "Russian" revolution, an imitation of Lenin in 1917, and much less of Stalin in the thirties or of Mao in the fifties and sixties. It is precisely the material and spiritual agony of the totalitarian accumulation of capital initiated by the latter two leaders that must be avoided.

Experiments in Third-World Aid: The Alliance for Progress

To make a democratic revolution here and now, it is necessary to go beyond the French model—to institute extensive economic planning, and to ignore the allocation of resources made by the market. This clearly has anti-capitalist and socialist implications, but not in the ideologically neat way Lenin and Trotsky once imagined; for our time demands a new type of revolution. This means discarding a central assumption of U.S. policy from Harry Truman to the present—that a sophisticated and liberalized free enterprise could provide the economic basis for political democracy in the Third World.

In 1966, Senator Robert Kennedy, in a long, probing speech on "The Alliance for Progress: Symbol and Substance," attempted to draw

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up a balance sheet on this experiment which had been initiated by his brother. The Senator acknowledged that basic issues are at stake for

> a revolution is coming—which will be peaceful if we are wise enough; successful if we are fortunate enough—but a revolution which is coming whether we will it or not . . . large-scale land redistribution necessarily implies major changes in the internal political balance of many Latin-American countries—away from oligarchy and privilege, toward more popular government.

Thus, if literacy is broadened, so are the eligible electors in Brazil; if agricultural credit is made available to the masses, the moneylenders are threatened; if higher education is democratized, the upper-class monopoly of the universities will be broken. And there must be more equitable sharing of wealth to create a large domestic market, and massive investments in education and new industrial and economic infrastructures.

Now this is a call for wide-ranging change (though it falls short of what is needed). Senator Kennedy recognizes that neither this dream nor the original ideals of the Alliance are anywhere near accomplishment. He notes that in the first period of the Alliance there was no real increase in per capita agricultural production; North American private capital has not participated in Latin-American development as it was supposed to; and the actual public U.S. aid was much too small and should be immediately doubled. Kennedy also scores the reactionary effect of the oversubsidization of the Latin military, and of the State Department's practice of placing the interest of American oil profits on a higher plane than those of a Peruvian domestic Peace Corps.

Robert Kennedy's criticisms are sound and so are his proposals to double economic aid and cut military subsidies. But on the conceptual level he retains Harry Truman's classic assumptions about Point Four: the government is to create a context in which American businessmen and ex-colonial entrepreneurs can cooperate, to the profit of all, in the work of modernization. As Kennedy states the premise, "private industry is the primary source of capital in all the underdeveloped regions; it is potentially the major source of development capital . . . private enterprise is also the principal repository of the technical and technological skills which Latin America needs."

This is not true, and a failure to recognize the counter-productivity of private American (or other advanced) capital in Latin America is the basic flaw in Robert Kennedy's candid, genuinely motivated critique of the Alliance. For the market mechanism cannot be the mainspring

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of Latin-American development in terms either of attracting foreign or allocating domestic capital. There must be, in contradiction to "French" revolutionary principles, conscious economic and social planning, not private enterprise. For the rationality of the profit motive directs the foreign giant corporation to distort the economic structure of the developing nation at best, and to keep it backward at worst. The basic infrastructural needs of the poor nations—roads, education, cheap mass housing, etc.—are simply not profitable investments. No one is really interested in building decent homes for the poverty-stricken *within* the United States, and smart money would shun even more such an undertaking overseas.

In Venezuela, the urban population increased from 35 per cent of the total in 1936 to 63 per cent in 1965, and the 1,632,000 citizens of present-day Caracas total more than all city dwellers in 1941. This situation was precipitated by a foreign-sponsored boom in the oil industry which, with the third largest output in the world, employs only 33,472 workers. Foreign capital, of course, utilized the most modern techniques in order to maximize profit. This helped uproot the old traditions but did not provide new employment, and mass unemployment has been a chronic problem for the post-Jiminez and pro-Alliance governments.

But not only the foreign investor distorts the backward economy; the local oligarch follows the same rationale of profitability. To this day Latin-American profits are high in trade, and there is no real incentive to industrialize; the export sector distorts the entire economy. If private industry, as Senator Kennedy suggests, is seen as the primary source of capital in the underedeveloped regions, both foreigners and moneyed natives will have a systematic tendency to invest in the wrong —the highly profitable, distorting, and not socially useful—enterprises. As Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., described the conduct of American businessmen in Latin America in the early sixties, they pressured the Alliance "to talk less about social reforms and more about private investment." And these men were quite right to regard social reform and private investment as often antithetical.

One cannot ignore the uncomfortable fact that the West is dominated by business or even argue that there is no role for private corporations in the work of development. But free enterprise can participate in such a process only in a subordinate, never in a primary, role. If, for instance, Eduardo Frei of Chile had followed the advice of the sophisticated executives of the Committee for Economic Development, he would never have "Chileanized" part of the copper industry (a program de-

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signed to double output *and* assure partial state ownership). In that case, one of the most hopeful governments on the continent would have lost much of its dynamic and popular support.

The United States must abandon its ideological hostility to the public sector in the developing nations. In saying this, I do not intend to turn the free-enterprise myth topsy-turvy or argue that nationalization is some magic, painless way to modernization. For after recent events in countries like China and Cuba, this view can no longer be seriously maintained. There is no easy road out of underdevelopment, and one must talk pragmatically about some sort of international mixed economy. The Third World cannot simply put its faith in Adam Smith or any of his heirs; for the market mechanism is a cause of, rather than a solution to, its poverty.

Thus, the democratic revolution must build on economic and social foundations unknown, and even antithetical, to those of the great European capitalist transformations of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. And the generous vision of Robert Kennedy—and of American liberalism generally—must be amended so as not to depend on private enterprise, either in the U.S. or in the emerging nations, as the prime mover in the modernization process. Yet, even while insisting upon these far-reaching changes in American policy, the political limits of our intervention must be kept carefully in mind.

As John F. Kennedy realized when he initiated the Alliance, there is structural resistance to positive change in the developing lands; the Latin-American oligarchs are the classic case in point. In its original, reformist version, the Alliance sought to meet this problem by making grants contingent on policy changes in the recipient nations, such as the creation of an equitable tax system. Thus, there was hope that a revolution would proceed from the top down. "The leaders of Latin America," President Kennedy said at Bogota, "the industrialists and the landowners are, I am sure, also ready to admit past mistakes and accept new responsibilities." In retrospect, the President's confidence was either naive or ceremonial. The Latin-American *status quo* is not even prepared to take a position of enlightened self-interest.

Although America must provide massive assistance precisely in order to minimize the potential for bloody conflict within the Third World, there must be an expectation of turmoil and even violence—and the U.S. must find itself sympathetic to armed revolutionists of the Left rather than, as so often in the past, to the military dictators of the Right. But this most emphatically does not mean that this country

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should adopt some democratic variant of the Maoist strategy and seek to foment wars of "national liberation" all over the globe. The pretension to omnipotence which led to the tragic commitment in Vietnam is as dangerous in the service of a good policy as of a bad one. And that is why it is so important to specify exactly what is proposed in this activist notion of creating a new world—and what is not proposed.

Paradoxically, one of the most vigorous actions the U.S. could take in support of the democratic revolution simply involves ceasing to do the wrong thing. For during the postwar period, America usually gave political, economic, and military support to the confirmed opponents of social change. The list of recipients is dreary and familiar: Chiang, Rhee, Bao Dai, Diem, Ky, Franco, Batista, Jiminez, Trujillo, and so on. The tragic conflicts of the sixties, as Theodore Draper has pointed out, pitted the United States against popular upheavals—in Vietnam, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic—and were a consequence of previous American policy, such as the support of French imperialism and of Cuban and Dominican dictatorship.

But it is not enough to refrain from doing evil; it is possible to establish political sympathy for revolutionary movements without sending agents to direct them. For all of the failings of the Alliance for Progress, for instance, there is no question that in the period of its inception John F. Kennedy managed to identify his Administration's policy with the aspiration for change in Latin America. And the President's speech in support of Algeria's right to independence was one of the few events of the fifties that demonstrated not all Americans were bent on subordinating democratic and anti-colonial principles to the political needs of the NATO alliance.

Indeed, the U.S. should follow the advice of the Latin Americans who met in Bogota in August 1966 (Frei of Chile, Lleras Restrepo of Columbia, Leoni of Venezuela) and restore the "Betancourt doctrine" under which this nation refuses to recognize Rightist *coups d'état*. In this way, and by refusing to create and finance the armies of Latin America, the U.S. could make an enormous contribution to the cause of democratic revolution without pretending to be omnipotent. Beyond these crucial political and military acts, a public commitment by the United States to make a democratic revolution economically possible will be in itself an incitement to change. Over a century ago, Marx realized that one of the factors which made the bourgeois revolution more dynamic than any previous upheaval was the development of the means of communication; now, of course, this point is a thousand times more relevant. The American word, if it is backed up with the right

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deeds, could thus become a mighty force. There is the danger that America might adopt a policy of "sentimental imperialism" (the phrase is that of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.). Instead of assuming that our military technology allows us to intervene everywhere in the world, we would then act as if our social ingenuity and political institutions were universal models. There was more than a hint of this attitude when Lyndon Johnson proposed in 1966 to build a Great Society in Asia (since he had not yet built one in the U.S., the announcement was, at a minimum, premature). Yet, by ceasing to support the rightist opponents of change, by open political sympathy extended to revolutionists (and sometimes even violent ones), and, above all, by making political democracy in the Third World an economic possibility, the United States could take a step toward the creation of a new world.

Planning Toward Internationalized Economic Aid

Perhaps the most positive and dramatic action this nation could undertake would be to internationalize its economic aid. This would lay the basis for the global economic planning which alone can make the notion of "democracy between nations" a meaningful reality. For it is now necessary, as Senator Fulbright has said, to "extend the frontiers of our loyalty and compassion."

As the foregoing has shown, postwar aid, whether capitalist or Communist, has been inspired by almost every motive except one of orderly economic development for the earth's poor. In 1963, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reported, 84 per cent of aid funds were bilateral—subject to military and political priorities. Thus, France used its disbursements to create a special, and advantageous, relationship with its ex-colonies, and President Kennedy could say, "Our assistance makes possible the stationing of 3.5 million Allied troops along the Communist frontier at one-tenth the cost of maintaining a comparable number of American soldiers." And even when the money was not so blatantly an instrument of the donor's foreign policy, it was regularly tied to the needs of the advanced economy rather than to those of the impoverished economy. And, more recently, the trend has been to loans rather than grants.

For historical reasons normally not of their own making, underdeveloped countries are desperately short on human resources. The tricky political and military vagaries accompanying postwar aid taxed the capacity of a modern country's computerized planning process—and overwhelmed the shaky planning institutions in the new countries. Ob-

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viously, funds must now be allocated on some more rational, predictable basis of need and capacity to use them. The U.N. has already begun the ground work of developing econometric models of the world economy.* If the goal of closing the gap between the rich and the poor is taken seriously, this tentative undertaking must receive massive support and become the focus of a system of planned, internationalized aid.

Estimates differ as to how much it would cost were the advanced countries to foot the developing nations' deficiency in capital. In 1966, the Council of Economic Advisers optimistically figured that the new nations could only use $3 to $4 billion more than is now available. But there are much higher projections: Jan Tinbergen has set the needed funds at $7 billion, Michael Brower at $12 billion, and the First Committee of the U.N. Trade and Development Conference predicted that the "savings gap" would reach $20 billion in 1970.†

However much these computations differ (because of different definitions *and* the fact that so little effort has been devoted to the task), economists consider that there is an objective basis for determining how much capital the developing world needs and how much it can absorb. If massive intellectual and financial resources were invested in the task of such an analysis, rational planning and resources could be allocated on a global scale.

Even if the highest estimate is valid—the U.N.'s prediction of a $20 billion savings gap by 1970—the sum at issue is well within the means of the advanced nations. By 1970, Europe, North America, and Australia will have a total GNP of over $1.5 trillion. A deficit of $20 billion would, in that year, be less than the 3 per cent of American GNP Harry Truman proposed to spend on the Marshall Plan and would approximately equal the extra appropriation Lyndon B. Johnson asked for the Vietnam War in 1967. Such international economic planning could make long-range policies possible. Capital in the developing lands would no longer be at the mercy of the wild fluctuations of the world market in primary commodities or the vicissitudes of a cold war. Funds would be guaranteed over a considerable period of years, and this would allow local planners to make more efficient use of their resources. But this massive, steady flow of funds could only be assured if foreign aid by the advanced nations were put on a permanent basis.

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* *Studies in Long-Term Economic Projections for the World Economy*, United Nations, 1964. This is an example of the kind of work now being done in this area.

† Goran Ohlin's study, *Foreign Aid Policies Reconsidered*, Chapter IV (OECD, Paris, 1966), summarizes much of the work already done in computing the capital shortage of the poor nations.

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There have been proposals to commit all wealthy countries to automatically give 1 per cent of their GNP for international economic development. This would be an enormous improvement over the trends of recent years when the ratio has been regularly declining in the U.S. (which possesses more than half of the total GNP of the rich, non-Communist part of the world). This system would yield almost three-fourths of the $20 billion gap the U.N. Conference predicted for 1970.

Yet, there is a much better way of appropriating these funds: a progressive income tax:

(1) This notion has an obvious grounding in equity, since the richer a nation (or an individual) the smaller the percentage of income devoted to necessities and the greater the ability to meet social obligations.

(2) Such an approach meets the problem of the gap between rich and poor head-on by proposing (if quite modestly) some redistribution of income shares.

(3) As Senator Fulbright has emphasized, this would take foreign aid out of the realm of charity and philanthropy and make it a matter of right, like U.S. income tax and Social Security.

Experts, like P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, have already demonstrated that the details of such an international income-tax system can be worked out if there is the political will.*

Aid for Totalitarians?

However, another question in international economic planning is anything but a technicality; this is essentially the same difficulty faced by the Alliance for Progress: what attitude would an international aid agency take toward reactionary governments, toward rightist or Communist dictatorships? Unless this question is answered, the whole enterprise could have the most paradoxical results, and some of these reforms could subsidize local oligarchies, rotten power structures, and economic backwardness. Therefore, some minimal criteria have to be established for these grants.

The U.N., obviously, cannot intervene in the political life of every developing country. Yet, it can insist on regional planning in return

* In Rosenstein-Rodan's computation, if all the non-Communist advanced nations with per capita GNP of $600 or more were involved, the United States' share of the burden, on the basis of 1961 figures, would be 65 per cent of the total. P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "International Aid for Underdeveloped Countries," in *The Strategy of World Order,* Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz, ed., Vol. IV, p. 517.

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for its aid; it can disallow dictatorial pyramid building and old-fashioned thievery; it can insist that nations, and regional groupings, show that there is a "popular consumption criterion" (the phrase is Galbraith's) in their equations—that projects benefit the present, as well as the future, generation.

It is much simpler, of course, to solve these thorny issues on paper than in practice. Even under the best system of international economic planning there will be waste, funds will be appropriated by the corrupt and the dictatorial, etc. It is not that such an approach will work perfectly; but, if one is serious about closing the gap between rich and poor nations, only something like this approach might work at all. Certainly, the defenders of conventional wisdom and the actual aid-and-trade policies of the postwar period have utterly failed in their professed goal of narrowing the chasm which divides the fat North from the hungry South.

Some American right-wing critics are hostile to the present process of foreign aid for the worst of reasons: they want to turn their backs on the people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America—and they are sympathetic to the world's status quo and to military rule. But there are others, and they are much more numerous, who are simply bewildered by the seemingly endless and futile appropriations in Washington. There is no use pretending that these people can be easily convinced to support the regular allocation of even larger amounts of money. But this effort in political persuasion must be made. In the doing it is necessary to explain that past programs failed, not because they were so exceedingly generous, but because they were inadequate and manipulative. And international economic planning should not be proposed as a utopia but as the only *practical* way to reach ends Americans have thought they were supporting for over two decades.

International economic planning and a world system of taxation is the simplest and most direct way of achieving redistribution of wealth, and it has the virtue of creating pressure for structural reform in the recipient countries. A change in trade policies would not require sweeping innovations. It would mean a conscious decision to reverse the present reactionary priorities of the world market, to create a mechanism which would automatically transfer some of the profits of the international economy from the rich to the poor. To accomplish this, the tariff policies of the advanced nations would have to be radically changed. Yet, there would be no need for new institutions—only the old arrangement has to be turned upside down.

Basically, what the developing nations need—and want, for they

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made these demands on GATT in the summer of 1966—is a transition from tariffs which discriminate *against* them to those which discriminate *for* them. They asked the Kennedy Round negotiators to remove their products from the list of items excluded from tariff reduction; to reduce the rate on goods from developing lands more than rates on goods from advanced countries; to make a maximum reduction of tariffs on tropical foods, and to compensate the developing countries for their loss of tariff preferences when this takes place. These demands were basically turned down.

The U.N. economists have come up with an even broader conception. They have suggested a development insurance fund based on the "willingness of advanced countries to contribute, on the understanding that their direct benefits will not equal their contributions." Under this plan, all nations would pay in to a central fund and each would be compensated if there were a drop in export proceeds. In a series of complicated calculations, the U.N. Committee of Experts which outlined this system concluded that, had it been working between 1953 and 1959, the developing countries' claims would have ranged between $246 and $466 million a year (and the advanced countries would have received between $12 and $142 million a year). Such a program is easily within the bounds of the possible for the rich powers.

It might, however, be difficult to persuade the well-fed to stop making a profit from the hungry. As noted earlier, Nasser wanted the 1966 New Delhi summit meeting to advocate a freezing of the entire debt of the developing countries but, for political reasons, neither Tito nor Mrs. Gandhi could be persuaded to go along with this idea. Yet, there is no possibility of justice so long as India must return about one-quarter of the monies it receives in foreign aid just to service past debts. New Delhi is afraid to protest this outrage because it might then lose the three-quarters of assistance which does come through. The advanced economies hardly require this tribute from the impoverished; the developing countries' debts to the Western powers should be forgiven or else rescheduled and made interest free. Indeed, it is high time that the Western powers reverse the scandalous trend toward loans instead of aid which has been picking up strength throughout the sixties.

This does not mean that the wealthy nations are to opt for poverty in order to fulfill a moral obligation to the world's less fortunate. But affluent countries might enrich themselves at a somewhat slower rate and without pushing the majority of the world's population more deeply into misery. This can be done. Sober, intelligent proposals have demonstrated the possibility of creating a new world by simply changing the

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present injustices of aid and trade. The crucial question is not technical, but political.

The Politics of Hope

There is a sort of international Keynesian argument for the self-interest in America's doing justice in the world. For just as the vast increase in buying power, which developed in the U.S. through the welfare state and the labor movement, has laid the basis for an advance in the prosperity of the entire nation, so a decent life for the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America would be to the economic advantage of the entire world.

There is another paradoxical political case for global decency. For now that the Cold War is, thank God, coming to an end in Europe, it is possible for the first time to realize the decent values which most Americans thought they had been fighting for all along. To clarify this point requires an analysis of the two anti-Communisms.

At the height of the struggle between the Nato West and the Warsaw-Pact East there existed a straightforward version of anti-Communism. It was based on reactionary politics, and it viewed the Soviets as only one manifestation of the godlessness and disorder of a world which had taken leave of its fundamental values. From this point of view, anti-Communism was one, and only one, way of defending a *status quo*. The alliances with rightist dictators were, in this perspective, acts of virtue, not of necessity. And lacking any sense of the economic, political, and social roots of both nationalism and Communism, these rightist anti-Communists saw the enemy as a conspirator, a subversive, an agent who drove otherwise contented workers and peasants to revolt.

The American symbol of this one-dimensional and paranoid anti-Communism was, of course, Senator Joseph McCarthy. And it was no accident that McCarthy's heyday coincided with Stalin's last, demented years, and with the Korean War. The American people were bewildered and fearful in the presence of a megalomaniacal dictator, and involved in a frustrating shooting war only five years after World War II had ended in Tokyo Bay. In this political atmosphere McCarthy rocketed to prominence.

But there was, and is, another anti-Communism. It sought some alternative both to Communism and to the *status quo*, for it recognized the right and necessity of revolution but thought it should be democratic, not totalitarian. The views of Galbraith and Robert Kennedy are obviously in this tradition. Indeed, this attitude regularly sup-

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plied the official rhetoric for American development in the Cold War itself. "The seeds of totalitarian regimes," Harry Truman said in March 1947, "are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life ahead has died."

The words were fine enough—but the President uttered them in defense of the Truman Doctrine in Greece, where the United States placed its enormous power at the disposal of conservative forces fighting a popular movement whose leadership had been won over by the Communists. This was typical of the Cold War. Many Americans were committed to the fight against Communism for excellent reasons of democratic principle and hatred of injustice. Yet, by far and large, the U.S. could not possibly fulfill the hopes of these decent people; for the essential conservatism of the American economy in this artificially unjust world subverted most of the nation's progressive political aspirations.

In practical terms, as long as America's economic and social policies frustrated its political visions, the country regularly turned to the authoritarian Right even as it talked in the words of the democratic Left. Thus, the militarization of American foreign policy and its association with so many dictators and anti-democrats is not the result of a particular malevolence of this or that politician, but it is related to massive structural trends both within the U.S. and in its dealings with the world.

In this setting, to put an end to the Cold War allows America to recover its vision, to demilitarize its outlook. A massive commitment to international development does not provide simply an economic substitute for the arms economy. It might serve as an emotional and political substitute for the reactionary passions of rightist anti-Communism; it is the one way to implement peacefully the decent values which motivated the anti-Communism of the democratic Left. However, and most emphatically, this proposal is not primarily "anti." It cannot be, for a new world cannot be constructed out of hostility. One wants to save the workers and peasants of the Third World from the horrors of totalitarian capital accumulation, to be sure, and, in a social and economic sense, that is an anti-Communist program. But in an enterprise which requires such far ranging construction, the stress must be positive and the challenge is, in Fulbright's moving phrase, "to extend the frontiers of our loyalty and compassion."

The United States and the Soviet Union, having brought mankind to the brink of nuclear holocaust, could simply walk away from the

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Cold War, retreat into their separate self-interests, and respect each other's injustices. Or, America could take the lead in a gigantic international effort to finish the creation of the world. There are economic arguments for such a course, and they must be stated. But ultimately, if this is to be done it will happen because the buried, deep-running force of American idealism bursts out of the channels in which the generals and the executives have confined it, to take its own direction. That will be the politics of hope.

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

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